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PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CARD
CONTEXT: STRUCTURE, REPUTATION,
AND INCENTIVES
Andrew P. Morriss, Ph.D.* & Jason Korosec, J.D.*
ABSTRACT
Explosive growth in credit, debit, and other card payment systems in
recent years has produced a parallel growth in private dispute resolution
systems based on the web of contracts entered into by merchants, merchant
acquirers, consumers, card issuers, card associations, and transaction proc-
essors. These contracts have produced legal systems based on contract and
the enforcement of which rests primarily on reputational constraints. To
cost-effectively resolve disputes, these private legal systems have evolved
innovative procedures using resources at the lowest-possible level, includ-
ing incentive-payments for producing information and rigid deadlines for
parties' actions. This paper describes and analyzes these legal systems and
their procedures as a potential model for resolving other categories of dis-
putes.
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Credit and other payment cards are revolutionizing many aspects of
our economy, a revolution that "is arguably more profound than the intro-
duction of paper money."' Use of payment cards of various types (charge,
credit, and debit) has exploded, with the share of purchases using payment
cards growing from 6 percent in 1984 to 32 percent in 2002.2 In the year
2000, VISA3 alone handled more than $1.7 trillion in global transactions
1 David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Paying With Plastic: The Digital Revolution in Buying
and Borrowing 25 (1999).
2 Paying with Plastic.org, Stats and Facts, Payment Instruments, http://www
.payingwithplastic.org/index.cfmgesture=statsDetailPrinter&aid=1312 (last visited February 7, 2005).
3 Note that "VISA" is a used as a short-hand reference to the entire VISA network of organiza-
tions (e.g. VISA, USA, VISA Europe, etc.) Where our points depend on reference to a specific VISA
entity, we give the precise name.
4 PAUL CHUTKOW, VISA: THE POWER OF AN IDEA 81 (2001).
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In this paper we explore how card-based payment systems5 (e.g. VISA,
MasterCard, Discover, American Express) have evolved in response to
market and regulatory pressures to include dispute resolution systems,
which have largely automated resolution of disputes. These card-based
payment systems' dispute resolution procedures use reputational and finan-
cial incentives to induce the parties to reveal the information necessary to
resolve the disputes. They systematically push dispute resolution proce-
dures to the lowest possible level, and to use procedures that do not require
significant investments of time or human capital to resolve the most fre-
quent types of disputes. They also make use of the information generated
by disputes to impose constraints which alter behavior to prevent similar
disputes in the future involving different parties. These dispute resolution
systems solve many of the problems of the public legal system (e.g. high
costs, lack of speed). We believe that the card-based payment systems'
dispute resolution procedures accomplish these ends without sacrificing
many of the important values protected by the public legal system, includ-
ing due process and fairness, and therefore, can serve as a model for re-
thinking dispute resolution more generally.
In Part I we sketch the structure of disputes and briefly compare public
legal systems to card-based payment systems' dispute resolution processes.
In Part II, we describe card-based payment systems' technology in more
detail as part of an examination of their use of reputation and incentives. In
Part I, we discuss the dispute resolution procedures in detail. In Part IV
we examine the role of the state in shaping those systems. Part V concludes
with our assessment of the viability of modeling public legal system re-
forms on card-based payment systems.
I. RESOLVING DIsPuTES
By proposing card-based systems' dispute resolution systems as mod-
els for reforming the courts, we are suggesting a radical rethinking of dis-
pute resolution.' To evaluate this alternative, we examine several core rea-
5 We use the somewhat awkward term "card-based payment system" because there are many
types of such systems, including "general purpose and limited-purpose credit cards, automated teller
machine (ATM) cards, debit cards, smart cards, and check guarantee cards." MICHAEL AURIEMMA ET
AL., THE BANK CREDIT CARD BUSINESS 1, 2 (2d ed. 1996). All of these types of cards offer at least the
potential for the dispute resolution systems described here.
6 The limited legal literature that discusses card based payment systems' dispute resolution proc-
esses has, thus far, largely rejected them as a model. At times the reasons for this rejection are not clear.
See, e.g., William Krause, Do You Want to Step Outside? An Overview of Online Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 19 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 457, 472 (2001) (contending that card based
systems' dispute resolution systems have "limited applicability" to dispute resolution generally because
a "few disgruntled, vocal consumers can convince many others that there is an unacceptable risk. Even
small anecdotal evidence of online misfortune is potential poison in the water."). Prof. Krause does not
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sons that disputes require resolution by outsiders, which we describe to
allow us to benchmark the alternative against the features of the public legal
system.7
When parties have a dispute, they have a choice between "litigating"
the dispute (i.e. using a dispute resolution mechanism that does not require
agreement on the ultimate resolution, although it may require agreement on
the process) and "settling" the dispute (i.e. agreeing on the ultimate resolu-
tion without an outside decision-maker reaching the final decision).8 In this
section we briefly sketch the structure of disputes and compare the ap-
proaches of the public legal system to the card-based payment system dis-
pute resolution processes.9
A. Approaches to Disputes
We assume that the decision to litigate disputes between two parties
occurs because one (or more) of the following conditions exists: (1) dis-
agreement between the parties as to the facts; (2) disagreement between the
parties as to the appropriate rule governing the dispute; (3) tactical advan-
tages that reward a party for delaying resolution of the dispute; (4) the
transactions costs of settlement exceed those of litigation; (5) one or more
of the parties may be using the dispute to send a signal about its future be-
havior (or for other strategic reasons) 0 and the signal's value may exceed
the savings from resolving the dispute without litigation; and (6) attempts to
"roll the dice" and win because of the presence of random elements" in the
elaborate but this argument strikes us as implausible, particularly since the online services he suggests
will succeed have not displaced the card-based systems' procedures. Id.
7 We use the term "public" to refer to government courts, law, and so forth.
8 Thus our definition includes mediation within settlement and arbitration within litigation. We
recognize that this definition imposes a binary settlellitigate framework on a process that is a continuum
between pre-filing settlement through settlement before the final decision is rendered on appeal to a
final judgment upheld on appeal, but the key distinction appears to us to be whether an outsider renders
the final decision or whether a resolution is voluntarily agreed upon by the parties.
9 We provide a more detailed description of the card-based systems' process in Section II below.
10 In IP cases, for example, the owner of an IP right may have strategic reasons for litigating
unrelated to the costs and benefits from the particular suit. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo Arewa, Blocking,
Tackling and Holding: Boundaries, Marking and Strategic Business Uses of Intangibles 3 (Case W.
Reserve Sch. of L., Working Paper, Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-13, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=586483 (last visited May 31, 2005) (arguing that "broad grants of intellectual
property rights combined with intangibles paradigm business practices permit and even encourage the
holders of such rights to use them as strategic weapons in a manner that may actually be a disincentive
to future innovation.").
11 See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970-71 (2000) (noting existence of "Professional platitudes such as,
'litigation is always a crap shoot' or 'give a problem to 10 different lawyers and you'll get 11 different
answers."').
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dispute resolution process. 2 If none of these are present, no dispute or rea-
son to litigate exists. We will briefly consider each of these possible causes
of a decision to litigate.'3
Where the parties disagree as to the facts, the primary function of the
dispute resolution process is to prompt the exchange of information which
brings the parties' divergent view of the facts closer together, making reso-
lution possible. 4 Thus, for example, where the parties disagree about
whether a debt is owed, the creditor's provision of documentation showing
that the debtor incurred the debt would resolve the disputed factual issue
and could cause the debtor to reevaluate the facts and recognize the debt.
Resolving factual disputes is a "socially useful" function 5 of a dispute reso-
lution system.
In the public legal system, such disputes are handled by a demand by
the creditor for payment. If the debtor does not pay in response to the de-
mand, a formal legal complaint must be filed. 6 The parties exchange legal
12 We thus expand the traditional categories of differences in information and differences in
optimism. See, e.g., Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in
Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 79 (1993) ("There are numerous possible explana-
tions for why inefficient litigation may occur despite the cost savings from settlement. Most can be
classified as either differences of opinion between litigants or differences of information between liti-
gants.").
13 Of course, more than one reason may be present in any particular instance.
14 "Information is the lifeblood of [litigation]. Litigants battle to learn information, to conceal
information, and to spin information so that it might better persuade judges, juries, and opponents to
accept their view of the facts and law ... it is probably no exaggeration to claim that litigation is all
about the process of learning information, the cost of learning information, and the optimal response to
information." Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation I (Stanford
L. Sch., John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 292, 2004) available at http:l
ssrn.com/abstract=585803.
15 We define "socially useful" to mean instances in which an institution increases the participants'
total utility, not simply allocating a share of wealth to any particular party ("zero sum game"). Volun-
tary trades are thus the paradigmatic case, since they must increase the joint value in order to occur.
This differs from the neoclassical definition of efficiency, since a Kaldor-Hicks efficient transaction
would not meet our definition and yet would meet the neoclassical definition of efficiency. In the case
of a dispute, of course, the loser's utility is reduced by the loss of the dispute if the parties' utilities are
measured ex post. If they are measured ex ante, however, we contend that the expected utility of a
dispute resolution institution is greatest for those institutions which provide the greatest possibility of
factually-correct outcomes. This limitation is more rigorous than the test of neoclassical efficiency and
is, we think, more consistent with a Hayekian approach to law. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, RULES AND
ORDER 96-97 (1973) (question to be decided by judge "will not be whether the parties have obeyed
anybody's will, but whether their actions have conformed to expectations which the other parties had
reasonably formed because they corresponded to the practices on which the everyday conduct of the
members of the group was based."); See also Andrew P. Morriss, Hayek and Cowboys: Customary Law
in the American West, I N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 35, 41-42 (2005) (describing Hayekian dispute resolu-
tion).
16 Of course, summary collection procedures exist in the courts to reduce the transactions costs of
handling more routine debt collections. Even these, however, involve more elaborate procedures than
card-based dispute resolutions systems routinely use.
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papers, conduct discovery by serving each other with written requests for
production, requests for admission, and interrogatories, conducting formal
depositions, and so forth. Disputes during this process may result in the
need for intermediate decisions by a court. If the parties cannot agree to
settle the dispute, a trial is conducted and a decision reached by either a
judge or jury (depending on the circumstances). Appeals to higher courts
may follow. At all stages, both parties are likely to be represented by attor-
neys; the court will employ expensive decision makers (legally trained
judges, staff, and multiple lay decision makers on juries); the process takes
months and, often, years. As an example, consider that under a fixed rate
plan designed to reduce legal costs, the evaluation of a case and an initial
complaint costs $6,000 if the amount in dispute is under $150,000."
Within the payment systems context, this fact pattern arises when a
cardholder disputes a charge and alleges that he did not use the card to incur
the charge. In this situation, the cardholder complains first to the financial
institution that issued the card. In the process that we outline in more detail
below, the merchant attempts to retrieve a copy of the receipt and, if it is
found, a copy is provided to the consumer. In many cases, this process
ends the dispute, as the merchant either can or cannot prove the receipt ex-
ists. When it does not, the dispute is resolved after the financial institutions
involved (on both the merchant's and the cardholder's side) have ex-
changed information through a highly structured process that specifies what
information is to be exchanged and when the exchange is to occur. This
process provides both positive financial incentives and negative substantive
incentives for prompt compliance with the information exchange rules, and
leads to a decision without the involvement of legally-trained personnel.
Such disputes are required by the card system's rules (which are described
in detail below) to be resolved within a relatively short, fixed period of time
(typically within weeks rather than months).
When the parties disagree about the law, but not necessarily the facts,
the primary function of the dispute resolution process is to clarify the legal
rules which are applicable to the dispute. For example, where one party
believes the case will turn on legal rules concerning how to interpret an
employment agreement while the other believes it turns on the rules gov-
erning the fiduciary obligations to minority shareholders in a close corpora-
tion, 8 the dispute resolution process classifies the legal character of the
dispute and resolves the uncertainty. As with resolving factual disputes,
resolving uncertainty about the applicable law is a socially useful function
of the dispute resolution system.
17 Hadfield, supra note 11, at 958.
18 See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) (dispute between major-
ity opinion by Judge Easterbrook, holding case was a question of rights of a shareholder of close corpo-
ration, and dissent by Judge Posner, arguing case was a question of the rights of an at-will employee).
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In the public legal system, formal legal proceedings must be initiated
to resolve such disputes, as described above. The proceedings are compara-
tively unstructured, parties generally have legal counsel at all stages, and
decision makers are expensive. In the payment system context, an example
of a dispute over which rules govern is a consumer's warranty-related
claims to the financial institution that issued the card used to purchase the
underlying good or service. The consumer contends that the product is
defective in a quality dimension that is covered by the warranty; the mer-
chant denies that the relevant dimension is covered. As we describe below,
both the consumer and merchant must follow predefined rules in resolving
the dispute. Briefly, the consumer must first make a good faith attempt to
resolve the dispute with the merchant before raising the issue with the con-
sumer's financial institution. If the merchant and consumer fail to resolve
the dispute, the consumer raises the disputed item with the issuer. That
dispute will be resolved using the structured, technology-based dispute
resolution process described below. The process is administered by non-
lawyers, usually by telephone. The decision is reached through either the
procedure or the substance of the applicable rule, typically within about a
month or less. Or, if the dispute continues to through the maximum number
of phases including a formal arbitration procedure (with a non-lawyer arbi-
trator), the maximum elapsed time from dispute to decision is about five
months.
Where there is no fundamental disagreement over either the facts or
the law, one party may still prefer to submit a dispute to resolution through
a dispute resolution process to contracting for a settlement because the
party believes it will benefit from the process itself. Thus, for example,
where a party recognizes that it is liable but nonetheless believes it can earn
a return on the amount it must ultimately pay in excess of any prejudgment
interest obligations or that the opposing party may settle for a lower amount
because of a pressing need for cash, there is an incentive to litigate to delay
the inevitable payment.19 Where one party is gaming the system there is no
socially beneficial function of the litigation since the gain of one party is at
19 For example, Prof. Elihu Inselbuch argues that
[t]he real source of delay in the tort system... arise[s] from the economics of the tort system
and the insurance industry, which combine to create an impetus for defendants to withhold
realistic settlement offers. Insurance companies earn their profits from the investment of
premiums that they collect from their insured. The longer the insurers can delay payments to
plaintiffs, the greater the return they will realize on the funds withheld. The insurers' incen-
tive to exploit the time value of money is compounded by a tort system that imposes no costs
on them or their insured clients for delay in the payment of claims. If an insurer can settle a
case on the eve of trial for the same amount it would have cost to settle the claim years ear-
lier when the plaintiff first sued, then no incentive exists to move the insurer to settle and pay
the claim earlier. Indeed, given that the insurer is given a free float of the amounts owed the
tort victim, the system gives insurers and self-insured defendants a huge incentive not to set-
tle early because an early settlement would forfeit the time value of the money.
Elihu Inselbuch, Contingent Fees and Tort Reform: A Reassessment and Reality Check, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, at 183 (2001).
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the expense of the other party rather than as a result of increasing the size of
the joint surplus.
In the public legal system, gaming the system is difficult to police, as
parties have a great deal of freedom to structure their legal pleadings and
actions. Even after repeated, clear cases of abuse, for example, the public
legal system is rarely able to restrict future abuses by plaintiffs. 2' The prob-
lem for the public legal system is two-fold. First, there are no mechanisms
that identify gaming behavior because there is no institutional remedy
which can identify such behavior based on a comparison of particular par-
ties' behavior to other transactions. Second, even where such information
is found on an ad hoc basis, the public legal system is often reluctant to
sanction parties who game the system because doing so forecloses access to
the courts.
In the payment system context, there are also opportunities for gaming
behavior. For example, if a consumer complains about a charge, during the
dispute period the amount in dispute is temporarily debited from the mer-
chant's account and credited back to the consumer. This provides the con-
sumer with additional credit, since charges are not applied to the account
during the dispute. (Once the dispute is resolved, the temporary debits and
credits are either reversed or made permanent.) Consumers who repeatedly
game the system, however, self-identify themselves to their card-issuer.
Since the issuer bears some of the costs from consumer complaints, these
consumers' poor reputation for honesty can be a basis for the issuer to can-
cel the consumers' cards. The distinctive feature of card-based payment
systems is their ability to make use of the parties' reputations in controlling
attempts to game the system.2 1
In some situations, the parties may simply be unable to resolve their
dispute because of particularly high transactions costs involved in settle-
ment compared to the transactions costs of the dispute resolution system
20 Prisoners who abuse in forma pauperis filings are the only area where the courts regularly
impose such sanctions. See, e.g., Slicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777, 780-782 (10th Cir. 1997) (sanction-
ing a pro se prisoner litigant who had filed 33 matters with the 10th Circuit from 1989 to 1997, most of
which were summarily dismissed, and concluding that court had "determined to call a halt to Mr.
Schlicher's wasteful abuse of judicial resources" by barring him from future filings in forma pauperis
except in cases alleging an imminent danger of personal injury, forbidding him to file pro se pleadings,
and requiring production of specific information on his litigation to accompany any filings). Even in
these cases, however, the sanctions are imposed only after repeated abuses, and are limited in their
ability to forestall future abuses. Further, no systemic learning about how to deter others from similar
abuses occurs.
21 Reputation can serve two important functions. First, reputation may be a means of dealing with
non-verifiable information about a customer. Second, reputations aggregate information about discrete
events, with the aggregation providing more information than the sum of the information of the individ-
ual events. For example, knowledge is gained about a customer with multiple disputes with merchants
in which the facts are unclear by virtue of there being multiple disputes beyond the ambiguous informa-
tion contained in each dispute.
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itself. For example, it may be too costly to educate a corporate defendant's
decision making authority about the facts and law concerning a small dis-
pute once the opportunity costs of the decision makers' time is considered,
and so litigating may be less expensive than settlement. Here the invoca-
tion of the dispute resolution process is socially useful only because of the
relative transactions costs of litigation and settlement. In the public legal
system, there are high transactions costs of understanding the legal system's
substantive and procedural rules, as is demonstrated by, and perhaps caused
by, the extensive involvement of lawyers in all stages and types of public
legal system disputes. In the payment system context, however, these
transactions costs are reduced significantly by the use of a comprehensive
set of rules categorizing disputes and standardizing procedures, allowing an
almost lawyer-free dispute resolution process. Moreover, standardization
itself reduces the cost of participation by expensive participants. Many
financial institutions, for example, regularly have summary reports re-
viewed by high level employees. These reports identify outliers and
anomalous transactions, which can thus attract high level input, while rou-
tine cases do not waste resources. Further, the shifting of costs to losing
parties provides an additional motivation for participants to prefer settle-
ment to litigation.22
Finally, to the extent a random element exists in a dispute resolution
process, parties who know that an accurate process would find them liable
may be willing to "roll the dice" through litigation, in effect seeing the ad-
ditional costs of litigation over settlement as the price of a lottery ticket
whose prize is elimination of the obligation. Thus, for example, where both
parties to an oral contract know that the contract was properly made, one
party may be unwilling to perform because of the positive probability that a
jury will not believe the plaintiff's truthful testimony about the contract's
formation, believing instead the defendant's false testimony. In this case
the dispute resolution process does not serve a socially useful function and
the decision to litigate is motivated solely by the existence of a substantial
enough random element.
The public legal system's reliance (in the United States) on lay juries
includes a relatively large random element, since it reduces the predictabil-
ity of trial outcomes, perhaps best captured by the oft-repeated comment
22 In the payment systems context, certain merchants and consumers may be less organized and
responsive than others. Since one aspect of the payment system's dispute resolution process, as de-
scribed below, is grounded on responsiveness, a non-responsive party is likely to lose the dispute per-
manently. Since neither party knows how responsive the other party will be in a dispute, there is always
a chance that the other party will be a slouch and the likelihood of winning increases substantially. This
possibility is not a problem to the dispute resolution system within the payment system because all
disputes are tracked. Cardholders who appear to be gaming the system may have their accounts can-
celed or not renewed.
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that "you never know what a jury will do."23 Card-based payment systems'
dispute resolution systems, by contrast, rely more heavily on structured
analyses, which provide predictability. Moreover, since the financial insti-
tutions and networks involved in card-based payment systems are repeat
players, they profit from reducing randomness and invest in data analysis to
do so.
Dispute resolution processes thus serve socially useful functions when
they resolve factual and legal disputes and privately useful, but socially
costly functions when dispute resolution processes have characteristics that
motivate parties to litigate when no factual or legal dispute exists. In evalu-
ating alternatives to the public legal system, the relative performance of
alternatives in addressing each of these scenarios is one means of evaluat-
ing their value. In particular, the ability of a legal system to focus its re-
sources on socially useful categories of dispute resolution is important indi-
cia of success.
Our preliminary account of card-based payment systems points toward
several important differences between card-based payment systems' dispute
resolution processes and those of the public legal system. First, card-based
payment systems are able to make use of lower cost inputs because of the
more structured nature of their processes. Second, card-based payment
systems make extensive use of positive and negative incentives and reputa-
tion in securing compliance with procedures, reducing enforcement costs.
Third, card-based payment systems collect information that allows them to
eliminate future socially costly disputes by imposing constraints on partici-
pants.
B. Dispute Resolution as a Technology
Let us consider a somewhat stylized version of dispute resolution, to
identify the civil justice system's features that can serve as a benchmark for
the card-based systems' dispute resolution processes by examining the
technology the public courts use to resolve disputes with respect to three
key attributes: (1) the provision of factual information to the decision
maker; (2) the means of deciding questions of both fact and law when the
information provided is insufficient to compel a particular resolution clearly
23 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 127
(2001) (listing unpredictable "lawyer-driven, jury-centered methods of adjudication" as a distinguishing
feature of U.S. legal system); Gary T. Sachs & Neal W. Settergren, Juries Should Not Be Trusted to
Decide Maritime Cases, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 163, 170 (2003) ("A better instrument could scarcely be
imagined for achieving uncertainty, capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of former decisions-
utter unpredictability.").
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and conclusively; 24 and (3) the methods of correcting decisions or ensuring
correct, unbiased initial outcomes.
The rules of civil procedure and evidence used in civil trials in the
various common law jurisdictions provide one approach to accomplishing
this objective. The quite different rules used in civil law jurisdictions pro-
vide another.25 How a legal system (public or private) handles each of these
functions depends on the incentives and constraints created by the system's
rules and its technology. For example, Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure encourages participation in the dispute resolution procedure
of the federal courts by allowing parties whose opponents do not respond in
a timely way to obtain default judgments, and Rule 11 creates disincentives
for parties to make misrepresentations by penalizing the lawyers who sign
pleadings containing the misrepresentations.
In general, the public legal systems rely primarily on notice pleading, a
system of rules in which "the factual allegations contained in the pleadings
are judged by lax standards, because it is understood that more detailed
knowledge of the facts must await further development through the elabo-
rate discovery process provided for in the rules. 26 These rules place few
limits on the participants' ability to conduct expensive and time consuming
searches for evidence that may fit the broad set of claims of which the
pleadings give "notice."
The rules governing disputes in the public courts are largely built
around encouraging voluntary compliance with the rules through a combi-
nation of appeals to professional norms and sanctions for violations. The
rules rarely include positive incentives, such as cash payments, to encour-
age compliance. The problem with this approach is that professional obli-
gations require attorneys to put compliance with rules ahead of their clients'
and, sometimes, their own personal financial interests.2 ' Furthermore,
24 [I]f a controversy should arise between two men concerning the ownership of property, and
there be no statute upon the subject, the unwritten law must, nevertheless, decide it. No
matter how novel the question, it must be determined. It would not be endurable that one
man should hold unchallenged possession of property to which another honestly laid claim,
for the reason that the case was so novel as to render it difficult to determine to whom it
justly belonged. Society may leave a criminal unpunished; private citizens do not feel an
additional burden on this ground; but it cannot leave private controversies undecided, or to
be decided by force.
JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 34-35 (1884).
25 The universe of possible approaches is considerably broader than the set of approaches used by
various official legal systems.
26 Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DuKE L. J. 561, 606
(2001).
27 See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 11, at 955 ("the very concept of professionalism requires that a
disregard of economic incentives be a moral duty for the professional."); see also Philip J. Havers, Take
the Money and Run: Inherent Ethical Problems of the Contingency Fee and Loser Pays Systems, 14
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 621, 625 (2000) ("Because of this large personal financial
stake [due to contingent fees], the attorney can no longer look upon his practice of law as one devoted
primarily to justice. Besides calling into question this basis of our professional rules that he is now
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negative sanctions are discounted for the probability that one will not be
caught." The public courts thus are handicapped by their inability to make
systematic use of the reputations of either the lawyers or the parties and the
lack of certainty that those violating the rules will be identified and pun-
ished.
With respect to the technology of dispute resolution, the public courts
depend primarily on live testimony before the decision maker, with cross-
examination by the opposing counsel and observation by the decision
maker to test the veracity and accuracy of the testimony. The rules' ap-
proach may vary with the nature of the dispute or information. For exam-
ple, in fraud cases, where the nature of the claim raises concerns about the
factual basis of the claim, Federal Rule 9(b) requires more specific pleading
than in a negligence case." Similarly, the federal rules of evidence exclude
much hearsay evidence on the grounds that it is inherently unreliable."
While an improvement over many earlier technologies (e.g. trial by or-
deal),3' this technology remains largely unchanged since the early twentieth
century introduction of modem civil procedure,32 and has significant imper-
fections.
more likely to ignore or, at the least, will play with at the margins, the negative aspects of the contin-
gency system work their way into the sacred relationship between the attorney and client.").
28 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 220 (6th ed. 2003) (noting "growing
empirical literature on crime" that shows people respond to changes in "opportunity costs, in the prob-
ability of apprehension, in the severity of punishment, and in other relevant variables .... ).
29 F.R.CIV. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be averred generally."). Rule 9(b) has been criticized heavily. See, e.g., Christopher M.
Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers-Strike Rule 9(b), 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 282 (2004)
("At best, Rule 9(b) is an anachronism-harkening back to the abandoned pleading practices of the past
that spawned the modern Federal Rules.")
30 See Paul F. Kirgis, Meaning, Intention, and the Hearsay Rule, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 275,
301-06 (2001) for a discussion of the justifications for hearsay exclusions.
31 See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 5 (3rd ed. 1990):
The procedure [in early English law] in contentious matters was calculated to avoid reasoned
decision-making [which some times included] the physical test of an ordeal.... Ordeals in-
volved an appeal to God to reveal the truth in human disputes, and they required priestly par-
ticipation to achieve this rapport with the Deity.... [fIn England, they usually took the form
of fire or water. In the former, a piece of iron was put into a fire and then in the party's hand;
the hand was bound, and inspected a few days later: if the burn had festered, God was taken
to have decided against the party. The ordeal of cold water required the party to be trussed
and lowered into a pond; if he sank, the water was deemed to have 'received him' with God's
blessing, and so he was quickly fished out.
The parody of such procedures in the film Monty Python and the Holy Grail, in which Sir Bedevere
examines a purported witch and concludes that if she weighs the same as a duck then she is a witch, is
humorous precisely because of the seeming ridiculousness of early English trial methods. See
http://www.rit.edul-smo4215/monty.htm#Scene%205 (for a link to the script segment on the trial listed
under Scene 5) (Last visited February 7, 2005).
32 See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 1001-1002 (1987) (describing evolu-
tion of modern civil procedure and tracing contemporary problems to structural design of rules).
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To correct errors and biases, courts rely on appeals, which focus pri-
marily on legal questions rather than factual issues.33 To prevent errors and
biases, the structure of compensation and working conditions for judges
aim at eliminating conflicts of interest.34
In cases where the outcome depends upon resolution of factual uncer-
tainty, the lack of technological progress is unsurprising since many such
cases ultimately depend on choosing between two competing versions of
the truth as set out by witnesses, physical evidence, and documents. Par-
ticularly in the case of single episode interactions between strangers (e.g. a
transaction by a traveler away from home or an automobile accident), the
involvement of the public legal system's dispute resolution process only
after the dispute exists prevents any other approach, since the events lead-
ing to the dispute are over before the legal system is involved. Therefore,
only a retrospective accounting of the facts is possible.
The lack of technological progress is also not surprising given the sub-
stantial monopoly power of the legal profession in disputes in the public
legal system.35 Monopolies generally tend to under-produce innovations.36
Lawyers' role as one of the major costs of the public legal system suggests
that cost-reducing innovations would likely reduce their profits. Even the
few cost-reducing innovations which have been introduced, such as the use
of paralegals to do work previously done by lawyers, are limited by the
legal profession's control over the practice of law.37
The formal legal system's methods of resolving disputes thus include
(at least) four problematic features. First, there are a substantial number of
single event litigations, where one or more parties is not a repeat player.
The lack of repeat interactions reduces the usefulness of parties' reputations
in creating incentives for honesty and rule compliance. Of course, lawyers
33 POSNER, supra note 27, at 601.
34 See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitation of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827 (1990); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize (The
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S. CT. ECON. REv. 1 (1993).
35 See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 11, at 999:
The market for lawyers is fundamentally noncompetitive. As a consequence of the complex-
ity of legal reasoning and procedure, the profession's derived monopoly on the legitimate use
of coercion, and the unification of the profession to serve the diverse needs for access to law,
the price of law that emerges from the free market for lawyers is too high.
36 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 631 (1996) ("[We worry about monopoly because
of its generally evil result or potentialities: reduced output and higher prices, diminished incentives for
innovation, and fewer alternatives for suppliers and customers.").
37 See Carl M. Selinger, The Retention of Limitations on the Out-of-Court Practice of Law by
Independent Paralegals, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 879 (1996) (discussing means of limiting the impact
of independent paralegal practice on lawyers through ethical rules); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institu-
tional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures or
the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1189 (2003) ("Raising entry barriers has been the sine qua non of the
formation of modern bar associations and lawyer lobbying.").
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are by definition repeat players,38 but the size of the legal profession in
many larger communities and the limited control measures available to
courts means that reputation effects are often diluted even for attorneys.
Moreover, the public legal system usually makes only limited use of
information about parties' prior conduct.39 Legal rules limit the circum-
stances in which even previous formal disputes can be considered.' Al-
though the card-based payment systems do not use prior complaints to de-
termine the outcome of a particular dispute, the financial institution may
cancel or not renew the account of a consumer who frequently initiates
formal disputes because the costs of servicing that consumer are larger.
Similarly, merchants that receive a significant number of formal disputes
will be required by the financial institutions handling their accounts to pay a
higher discount rate41 to gain the ability to accept card based payment sys-
tems, or in egregious cases, abusive merchants may be expelled from the
system altogether.42
Second, there is a significant random, or at least, a non-merits related
element to dispute resolution, largely due to the role of juries43 , but also
38 See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Informal Methods of Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers,
54 S.C. L. REV. 967, 970 (2003) ("A repeat-player lawyer with a contrary reputation faces numerous
costly obstacles, such as the refusal by other lawyers to agree to reasonable schedule changes, the need
to memorialize every agreement in writing, and difficulty making credible commitments."). Wendel
uses accounts of lawyers in Charleston, S.C. and the Chicago municipal courts to argue that reputational
constraints are powerful constraints on the practice of law. He notes, however, problems with the form
of these constraints, including the possibility that the relevant reputational constraint is the lawyer's
allegiance to his legal community rather than to the client, encouraging a tradeoff of the client's interest
for the lawyer's, and the possibility that the relevant legal community norms themselves may be prob-
lematic (e.g. to exclude minorities from lucrative areas of law practice).
39 We recognize that we are speaking at a high level of generality-there are a variety of public
legal systems (federal, state, small claims, bankruptcy, etc.) and each has its own rules.
40 Collateral estoppel and res judicata principles, of course, allow some use.
41 The discount rate is the fee that the merchant pays to the financial institution processing these
transactions on their behalf. The fee is typically a percentage of the transaction. See MASTERCARD
DICTIONARY (December 2003), at 34.
42 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR,
15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 675, 691-92 (2000). Higher fees and expulsion serve as important
limits on fraudulent uses of the card systems. See, e.g., Barry Cutler, Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission before the Select Committee on Aging, Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care,
Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy, U.S.
House of Representatives (June 21, 1991), in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, RECENT TRENDS IN
TELEMARKETING FRAUD, Nov. 1991, (759 PLl/Corp 479) at 505 (describing how use of 900 numbers
substituted for credit card billing in fraud schemes, and how "this option solves several problems for the
fraudulent telemarketer. First, the company need not meet the criteria that major credit card companies
impose for obtaining a merchant account with a bank. Second, the company is able to use a payment
system that lacks the dispute resolution procedures and other safeguards for credit card transactions
found in the Fair Credit Billing Act.").
43 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail to Promote Efficiency, 39
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 139 (2002) (describing experiments demonstrating jurors' failure to follow instruc-
[VOL. 1:2
PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CARD CONTEXT
attributable to quality issues in the judiciary." Because we rarely observe
parties outside the formal legal system investing in either randomly chosen
lay panels or individuals chosen through the political process to decide dis-
putes, we can also infer that such panels' and judges' primary advantages
do not lie in accuracy or reduced transactions costs. This random element,
of course, increases the number of times the process is invoked in a socially
costly way.
Third, litigation in public legal systems is costly. 5 The costs are due
to both the length of proceedings and the involvement of large numbers of
highly trained and highly compensated individuals, including both judges
and lawyers. The success of privately provided alternative dispute resolu-
tion systems which offer reduced costs' suggests that the public legal sys-
tem's costs are higher than necessary to resolve at least some disputes.
Fourth, the public legal system is involved in many disputes only ex
post (although parties may change their behavior ex ante in anticipation of
litigation). The public legal system cannot, therefore, dictate parties' be-
havior in advance of disputes. Thus, for example, the negligence rule in
tort law may produce efficient levels of care by potential tortfeasors in
some situations,47 but it does not influence decisions on activity levels lead-
ing to inefficiently high activity levels.48 Intervention in transactions or
other interactions before a dispute arises may be a less costly means of han-
dling a matter than ex post dispute resolution.49
tions in assessing punitive damages and resulting penalties for firms that engage in risk analysis). On
juries more generally, see generally Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 550-58 (2004) (discussing cognitive biases introduced
into jury decision making by the structure of trials).
44 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEx. L. REV. 431, 431 (2004), who notes that "In
jurisdictions across the country, complaints are heard about judges and magistrates who are incompe-
tent, self-indulgent, abusive, or corrupt. These bad judges terrorize courtrooms, impair the functioning
of the legal system, and undermine public confidence in the law. They should not be allowed in office,
yet many retain prestigious positions even after their shortcomings are brought to light. The situation,
moreover, does not appear to be under control."
45 See Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 57-58 (2001)
(describing costs of trials).
46 See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2341-42 (2004) (describing categories of effi-
ciencies available in private dispute resolution).
47 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 16 (1987) (describing
circumstances under which model predicts negligence rule will produce optimal outcome).
48 Id. at 23-24 (noting that injurers do not "have a reason to consider the effect that engaging in
their activity has on accident losses. Consequently, injurers will be led to choose excessive activity
levels.").
49 See, e.g., Michigan Manufacturers Association, Insurance & Benefits, http://www.mma-net.org/
insurance/workers comp.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2005) ("Amerisure combines the expertise of experi-
enced professionals and sophisticated programs to find solutions to plant safety issues, prevent losses
and, ultimately, reduce insurance costs.").
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Card-based payment systems' dispute resolution systems offer a dif-
ferent approach to solving each of these problems. Card-based payment
systems convert all interactions between participants into repeat player
transactions." Rather than a single episode merchant-customer interaction,
the use of a card-based payment system to make a purchase creates a series
of related, repeat player transactions: merchant-bank, bank-payment
mechanism provider," payment mechanism provider-bank, and bank-
customer. Card-based payment systems harness reputations to prevent and
resolve disputes because these related repeat transactions are counted and
analyzed. The value of the relationship itself is defined by the analysis of
the transaction counts, and conclusions drawn about the revenue, cost, and
profit of the overall relationship. These systems also structure the underly-
ing transactions, dictating features of the cards, recordkeeping, and transac-
tion processing which decrease the frequency of disputes and the non-
objectively verifiable aspects of those disputes which do occur, reducing
the scope for randomness in decisions. Card-based payment systems' dis-
pute resolution procedures also drive the processing of claims down to rela-
tively low level employees and contain incentives for constant cost reduc-
tions, thereby lowering transaction costs. In the following section we ex-
amine how card-based payment systems accomplish these results.
II. PAYMENT SYSTEMS AS A TECHNOLOGY
In order to understand how incentives and features in the card-based
payment dispute resolution systems lower costs, we must first understand
how the payment system itself works. Some features will be difficult to
translate to other dispute resolution systems; other aspects are more readily
applicable to dispute resolution in general. Distinguishing among these
features and incentives requires an examination of the technology itself.
50 This point is sometimes missed in the literature on e-commerce, which overlaps to some extent
with the card-based payment systems literature. For example, Prof. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons calls for
government intervention into e-commerce consumer contracts to "encourage the development of con-
sumer institutions to counter the market advantages enjoyed by repeat players (such as merchants) .... "
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solution to Regulating the
Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online Consumer
Arbitration, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 1, 6-7 (2002).
51 We use the term "payment mechanism provider" to cover associations, such as VISA and
MasterCard; historically closed networks, such as American Express and Diners' Club; and the new,
third party networks, such as FirstData, which link the participants in card-based transactions.
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A. Payment Systems
We define a payment system as the combination of law, contracts, and
physical technology that enables the movement of value from one party to
another to meet the objectives of the parties involved.52 Money is itself a
payment system. So are a VISA credit card, a MasterCard debit card, a
traveler's check, a bank check, a money order, a stored value card, and a
certified check, to name but a few. Different payment systems have varied
features and attributes, enabling the users of that payment system to accom-
plish particular objectives in different ways. Where different payment sys-
tems are available, users select among them based on the combination of
costs and benefits each payment system offers.
Consider one of the simplest payment systems available: U.S. dol-
lars.53 In a typical cash transaction conducted in dollars, a consumer offers
a merchant dollars for goods or services. If acceptable,54 a merchant trans-
fers the goods or services to the consumer in exchange for physical Federal
Reserve notes." The notes the merchant receives are fungible; that is, they
are functionally identical to other, similarly valued notes in circulation.
The merchant can then exchange these notes for goods and services from
others.
To allow a comparison between dollars and other payment systems,
consider the features the dollar offers. There are technical features of Fed-
eral Reserve notes which facilitate transactions. The notes include anti-
fraud technology, such as complex printing techniques, watermarks and
serial numbers. 6 Inexpensive technology is available to the note-receiver
52 For an overview of some of the characteristics of payment systems, see generally Jane Kaufman
Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition Between Established and Emerging Electronic
Payment Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 675 (1999).
53 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and Technological Infrastructures for Electronic Payment
Systems, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (1996) ("The definitive payment system is
money.").
54 In the United States, prior to 1862, a merchant could decide which currency to accept, and
whether to accept currency at all. See generally Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and
Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1996). Once the Civil War era currency laws were
adopted, merchants no longer had a choice. Outside of the United States, merchants make this determi-
nation every day. Will they accept their own local currency, or some other global currency (i.e., dollars,
Euros, Yen, etc.)? Two parties freely elect to accept that currency-with all of the risks inherent in
accepting that currency and cash in general.
55 For a summary of legal issues surrounding the merchant acceptance of paper and electronic
currency, see James S. Rogers, The New Old Law of Electronic Money, 12-15, 35-52 (Boston College
Law School Research Paper No. 62, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=680803.
56 See Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Anticounterfeiting: Security Features,
http://www.moneyfactory.com/section.cfm7/35 (last visited February 7, 2005); Homer Brickey, Credit
Card Firms Battle Crooks with Technology, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, June 24, 1995, at 27, available at
1995 WL 8199543 (describing antifraud technology).
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to evaluate the notes' genuineness. 7 Even here, reputation plays a role: the
notes' continued value depends on the reputation and credibility of the is-
suer. 8 Cash also makes anonymous transactions possible and enables mer-
chants to under-report income to tax and regulatory authorities.59 Further,
the issuer profits from the circulation of the notes (known as seigniorage). °
The use of currency has implications for loss allocation, if the currency
turns out to be counterfeit and the consumer who used it cannot be located,
the merchant bears the cost.
Federal Reserve notes do not provide any dispute resolution character-
istics. That is, people cannot invoke the jurisdiction of U.S. government
courts merely by denominating a transaction in dollars. Thus, a transaction
conducted entirely in dollars among Guatemalans in Guatemala does not
allow any of the parties to bring an action in the U.S. courts, although the
Guatemalans may make use of the antifraud technology built into the
physical notes (i.e. use the detector pens to verify the bill's genuineness)
and the U.S. government profits from the seigniorage produced by dollars
circulating outside the United States. Transactions originating outside the
U.S. can also take advantage of the reputation-based value retention of the
currency by using dollars as the basis for transactions physically located
outside the United States.6'
57 See, e.g., http://www.centercoin.com/coin-supplies/counterfeitdetector.htm (last visited Feb-
ruary 8, 2005) (selling for $4.95 each, "[dietector pens are an inexpensive and reliable screening device
to be used in conjunction with other counterfeit detection methods"); Wikipedia, Counterfeiting,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfeit (last visited February 8, 2005) (describing historical methods to
defeat counterfeiting).
58 See Melvyn King, The Institutions of Monetary Policy, available at http://www
.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2004/speech2O8.pdf) (last visited February 8, 2005)
(speech by Bank of England Governor describing importance of reputation of monetary institutions).
59 See Richard R. Holley II1, One-Card 101: Wachovia Hits the Pit and Becomes the Partner
Bank of the UNC One Card, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 371, 381 (2000) (noting that experience with stored
value cards in 1996 Olympics revealed that merchants viewed anonymity as an advantage of cash over
card-based systems).
60 See Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Governments and Money, http://www
.clevelandfed.org/annuallessay.htm#compcur (last visited February 8, 2005) ('"he authority to print
money allows the government to raise revenue because the cost of producing the money itself is far less
than the government's command over the purchase of goods and services."). See also Paul D. Glenn,
Electronic Banking, Glasser LegalWorks, available at ELCEC GLASS-CEC 85, 105) (1998) ("The
government has a lot to lose from the benefits of seigniorage if its role is somehow usurped... Most of
the $23 billion that the [Federal Reserve Board] returned to the Treasury last year comes from the seign-
iorage attributable to the approximately $400 billion of cash outstanding at any one time.").
61 The recent decline of the dollar, which has created uncertainty over the future value and stabil-
ity of the dollar, against many currencies has raised concern over whether the dollar can maintain its
position as a desirable currency for non-U.S. transactions, potentially costing the U.S. some of its seign-
iorage revenue.
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Using cash as a payment system has transactions costs, however.62
Physically transferring cash for large payments can be expensive.63 Cash's
anonymity makes recovering stolen cash difficult. And in single-instance
cash transactions between strangers, the parties lack reputational incentives
to deal fairly with one another.' By adding additional features that reduce
transactions costs relative to those offered by cash, alternative payment
systems may provide buyers and sellers with sufficient additional value to
allow an entrepreneur to make a profit from charging for the use of the
payment system and still offer the user a transaction cost below that of cash.
For example, cash transactions over large distances are vulnerable to the
theft of the currency while it is in transit.
An early solution to the problem of transporting cash over large dis-
tances was the development of the money order.65 Money orders provided a
substitute for cash that offered the holder protection against theft or loss.
However, money orders also had the potential for fraud, since a purchaser
could alter a money order after purchase and, if successful, cash it for more
than he or she had paid for it. To prevent such fraud, the U.S. post office
required that money orders issued by it be cashed only at designated post
offices. By sending the cashing post office a separate communication from
the issuing post office confirming the value, the potential for fraud was
reduced. These restrictions reduced the usefulness of the postal money
order, however, because they raised the cost to the recipient in cashing the
money order. Competing with the post office for the money order business,
American Express developed a secure money order in 1881 whose design
62 On the costs of cash, see Walter A. Effross, Putting the Cards Before the Purse?: Distinctions,
Differences, and Dilemmas in the Regulation of Stored Value Card Systems, 65 UMKC L. REV. 319,
325-26 (1997). The development of uniform units of currency reduced the transactions costs of cash.
After describing the variety of currency circulating in British colonies in the Caribbean in 18th and early
19th centuries, for example, one author notes that "[w]ith all this complicated variety of currency it must
have been extremely difficult undertaking a simple transaction like buying a drink, and the temptation to
swindlers was great." CYRIL HAMSHERE, THE BRITISH IN THE CARIBBEAN 156-57 (1972).
63 See Michael K. Salemi, Hyperinflation, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, avail-
able at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Hyperinflation.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005); ADAM SMITH
[GEORGE J.W. GOODMAN], PAPER MONEY 57 (1982) ("In 1923, at the most fevered moment of the
German hyperinflation, the exchange rate between the dollar and the Mark was one trillion Marks to one
dollar, and a wheelbarrow full of money would not even buy a newspaper."). In general, cash is too
expensive to use for large payments even in the absence of hyperinflation. See David A. Balto, Can the
Promise of Debit Cards Be Fulfilled?, 53 Bus. LAW. 1093 (May 1998) ("To oversimplify grossly, cash
cannot be used for large transactions.").
64 Cash has other transactions costs, including the possibility of the transmission of disease, or at
least the fear of transmission. See John Dorschner, Flu Scare Leaves Everyone Waiting, FORT COLLINS
COLORADOAN, Oct. 18, 2004, at 1E. Whether or not there is a scientific basis for the concerns about
how disease may have been transmitted through money, some have a fear of this factor, raising the cost
(to those market participants) of using cash.
65 PETER Z. GROSSMAN, AMERICAN ExPRESS: THE UNOFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE WHO
BUILT THE GREAT FINANCIAL EMPIRE 83 (1987).
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reduced fraudulent use by incorporating the amount physically into the
money order, eliminating the incentive for forgery because tampering
would only reduce the value of the money order while eliminating the need
to visit the post office to cash the money order.'
Similarly, travelers have long used letters of credit to secure cash out-
side their home banking areas. With a letter of credit, after depositing
money with a U.S. bank before leaving the country, a traveler received a
letter stating the amount available. By presenting this letter to a foreign
bank which had an agreement with the U.S. bank, the traveler could receive
cash. When a foreign bank was presented with the letter, it compared the
signature of the issuing bank official to a file signature to determine the
letter's validity, then noted the amount withdrawn on the letter. Unfortu-
nately this required considerable time at each bank, as everyone "from the
charwoman up" would be asked to verify the signature.67 Again, American
Express innovated, creating the traveler's check as a substitute for the letter
of credit.6" A crucial feature was American Express's agreement to guaran-
tee the recipient of traveler's checks against fraud and currency risk.6 9
We can compare the payment systems' technologies in these two ex-
amples to illustrate how a payment system offers a mix of characteristics
which affect its relative advantages in the marketplace. In the case of
money orders, the post office had a secure technology (the two-part trans-
mission of information on the value of the money order) which depended in
part on the limitation of locations where the money order could be cashed.
66 Id. at 83 ("On the left side of the money order... [the company] placed nine columns of figures
[which] ... depicted all 5-cent denominations from $1 to $10, the maximum amount of the first express
money orders. When a customer purchased an order, the express clerk wrote the name of the payee and
the amount on two stubs, and gave one to the buyer and kept the other for company records. But instead
of writing an amount on the [money order] itself, he cut the protective margin to the designated sum.
The customer could no longer raise the value of the order because the figures simply were no longer
there.").
67 Id. at 88.
68 Id. at 91; Dean Perritt suggests that the development of the traveler's check was tied to the
creation of a national currency. PERRrrr, supra note 53, at 10 ("Nationalizing the currency had the
effect of encouraging the invention of a variety of quasi-currencies, most significantly, personal checks
and traveler's checks .... Historically, the traveler's check was a consolidation of a traveler's letter of
credit and separate drafts drawn upon the authority created by the letter."). We see no reason in princi-
ple why a traveler's check requires a national currency; we read Perritt's argument to be that the key
was the development of a national banking system and the legal disadvantages imposed on private notes
as part of the effort to create the national currency.
69 GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 91 ("By offering such a sweeping guarantee... Amexco made
the [traveler's check] not just another money order, but rather a kind of universal currency."). When
World War I broke out, American Express successfully honored its promise to pay on traveler's checks
in Europe by building up reserves in the months before the war began. Id. at 123. As a result, European
merchants began to prefer to hold traveler's checks to holding, for example, French currency. Id. at 124.
The company also later added an inspector's office to track down fraud involving traveler's checks. Id.
at 212.
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This approach offered significant advantages over the use of cash for long
distance transfers by reducing the risk of loss to the sender, at least partially
transforming the sender's risk of physical loss or robbery into a risk of
fraud borne by the post office. The post office's technology then reduced
the risk of fraud to a manageable level. The technology did so at the cost to
the consumer of restricting the locations at which the money order could be
cashed. American Express's innovation was to develop a technology which
enabled it to sufficiently lower the risk of forgeries to permit it to broaden
the network of locations at which the money order could be cashed without
incurring losses. It did so by reducing the risk of fraud through characteris-
tics of the document itself, eliminating the need for the second transmission
of information which had made the postal money order secure.
Similarly, the development of the traveler's check reduced the chance
of fraud in a letter of credit by eliminating the need for the bank officials'
signatures to be on file in the receiving bank, by putting the authorization
signature on the traveler's check itself via the requirement of two signatures
by the customer. Moreover, by requiring customers to prepay for the trav-
eler's checks (whose face value would be difficult to alter because of the
use of preprinted values), American Express captured the "float" for itself.
Finally, American Express transformed the potential dispute over a letter of
credit into a smaller set of potential disputes. The only issues with respect
to a travelers' check were the validity of the customers' signatures, some-
thing the technical specifications of the check itself made simple to verify,
and the validity of the travelers' check itself, something that the technical
specifications of the document also made easy to verify through counterfeit-
defeating printing techniques. Letters of credit, on the other hand, were
open to dispute as to the amount authorized, as well as the disputes possible
with travelers' checks. Moreover, by transforming the travelers' check
transaction from consumer-domestic bank-foreign bank-consumer into one
of consumer-domestic bank-American Express-foreign bank-consumer,
American Express inserted itself as a repeat player into every transaction
involving a traveler's check, giving it leverage to control the terms of the
banks' behavior and using its reputation to guarantee payment.7" Because
individual domestic banks' pair-wise transactions with foreign banks were
limited in number, the banks had not been able to exert such leverage. This
enabled American Express to insist on conditions that minimized the oppor-
tunities for fraud.
More complex payment systems are ubiquitous, although often invisi-
ble to the average consumer who benefits from their use. Figure 1 summa-
rizes some of the payment systems used in different contexts in the U.S.
economy today.
70 See Perritt, supra note 53, at 19 ("American Express traveler's checks are accepted because the
market trusts that American Express will remain solvent.").
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FIGURE ONE
Factoring, b2c: b2b:
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Many payment systems described in the business-to-business and business-
to-financial institution segments of Figure 1 also have a relatively long his-
tory. Letters of credit, for example, date to at least the fifteenth century71,
and individually negotiated contracts ("terms") between businesses with
repeated interactions have long existed.72  Payment systems may also de-
velop as part of financial services. For example, businesses have for centu-
ries monetized inventory and accounts receivables through transactions
with financial institutions.73 Legal rules for such practices reduce transac-
tions costs, making possible transactions that would otherwise not occur,
but also introduce new potential for fraud by expanding the set of possible
71 See EDWIN S. HUNT & JAMES M. MURRAY, HISTORY OF BUSINESS IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE,
1200-1550 at 66 (1999).
72 For example, a trucking company might arrange an account system with a truck stop chain to
allow its trucks to refuel without the necessity of the truck drivers making a payment, with the truck stop
chain doing consolidated monthly billing for all fuel purchases.
73 These transactions are not typically thought of as a payment system because such transactions
are limited to the business-financial institution relationship. As one of the earliest examples of payment
system development, however, we think they deserve mention and fall within our definition. For exam-
ple, a business with a capital need will have a financial institution purchase the business's accounts on a
nonrecourse basis and provide "specific credits for the business and function as servicer on the accounts.
Thus, traditional factoring is a nearly complete outsourcing of all of the credit functions of the origina-
tor. The outsourcing itself provides the source of value in a factoring transaction. Given the factor's
expertise in credit determinations and the economies of scale produced by servicing accounts from a
number of originators, the factor places a higher value on the accounts than does the originator." Chris-
topher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REV. 101, 146 (1997).
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transactions.74 The demand for the financial service of monetizing invento-
ries produced the legal rules, including the development of financial in-
struments that facilitated such practices.
The structure of payment systems can have important implications be-
yond particular transactions. For example, the introduction of credit cards
dramatically changed consumer credit. Before credit cards, "most con-
sumer loans were made on a secured, installment basis. Each time a con-
sumer wanted to borrow money, he or she had to reapply to the bank and go
through the application and approval process again."75 With the shift to
credit cards as a payment system came the transformation of most con-
sumer debt into unsecured, revolving debt.76
A full scale survey of the development and spread of the increasingly
varied payment systems in use is beyond the scope of this paper. The rele-
vant points for our purposes are that (1) payment systems offer a bundle of
services which include, but generally are not limited to, the transfer of
value; (2) different systems offer different bundles of services and costs;
and (3) different systems' bundles create different incentive structures for
the participants in transactions with respect to the resolution of disputes.
Since World War II, card-based payment systems have expanded into
the business-to-consumer relationship and, more recently, into the con-
sumer-to-consumer relationship. Banks and merchants began issuing credit
cards of various types in steadily increasing numbers until today's explo-
sion of consumer credit and debit cards has filled our mailboxes with offers
on an almost daily basis.77 Card-based payment systems increasingly sub-
stitute for other payment mechanisms (e.g. cash and checks).78 In the con-
sumer-to-consumer market segment, PayPal offers payment systems with
many of the features of card-based payment systems (although usually not
including the physical card) that allow individuals to pay other individu-
als.79 Our focus is on card-based payment systems. These systems offer
74 American Express had a small commercial credit program built around providing credit based
on inventory starting in the early twentieth century. See GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 194. The com-
pany later had a major fraud problem in connection with a "field warehousing" commercial credit inven-
tory lending product, begun in the 1940s, when $150 million in salad oil was discovered to be missing
from a tank farm due to fraud. Id. at 248, 318-327. The company ultimately paid out $60 million to
settle claims related to that fraud. Id. at 327.
75 AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 3.
76 Id.
77 See Credit Card Offers Again Filling Mailboxes, 14 No. 14 CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS (LRP) 2
(June 24, 2004) (reporting that U.S. households received more than 1.2 billion direct mail credit card
solicitations during the first three months of 2004).
78 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 91 ("Payment cards are substitutes for cash,
checks, and other means of exchange.").
79 As part of the dot-com expansion and later implosion, there were many companies providing a
similar service to PayPal, including Citigroup-sponsored c2it and HSBC-sponsored Yahoo Direct. See
Rogers, supra note 55, at 16 (discussing rapid change in e-payment systems). All of these companies
offered person-to-person money transfer services, typically through email accounts. Unlike with plastic
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important lessons for dispute resolution generally because of their success
in reducing costs in dispute resolution and in aligning the incentives of the
parties. Ultimately, their approach facilitates inexpensive resolution of the
disputes.
B. The Structure of the Technologies
The technologies of card-based payment systems have both differ-
ences and similarities across systems. Some of these technical structures
affect the incentive structure of the dispute resolution systems. In this sec-
tion we examine the technical structures for their influence on the success-
ful features of the dispute resolution systems.
1. Similarities Among Card-Based Payment Systems
In all types of card-based payment systems, both buyers (consumers)
and sellers (merchants) must agree to use the system.8" In addition, the sys-
tem itself must cover its costs of operation. The system must therefore of-
fer a bundle of services and fees that is attractive to both buyers and sellers,
generates sufficient revenue to fund the system's operating costs, and be
competitive with the alternatives.
Because there are two independent, distinct sets of customers with dif-
ferent (and often opposing) interests involved in card-based payment sys-
tems, an important feature of card-based payment systems is how they
manage these conflicting interests, including whether they prevent either
interest group from gaining an advantage in the system as a whole.8 More-
cards, the email account acts as the alternative token to the plastic card. Presumably, transfers through
PayPal are completed to offset an underlying exchange of goods or services. In cases where the pay-
ment provider does not have any information about, and is not responsible for the goods and services
delivered (like the basic PayPal case), these payments are usually referred to as Quasi-Cash. See ERIC
JACKSON, THE PAYPAL WARS: BATTLES WITH EBAY, THE MEDIA, THE MAFIA, AND THE REST OF
PLANET EARTH 9 (2004) (describing market niche for PayPal).
80 See, e.g., Paymentech Merchant Application and Agreement, Terms and Conditions for Mer-
chant Agreement, §1.3 ("You agree to comply with all Association Rules and Operating Guide proce-
dures, and with such other procedures as we may form time to time prescribe for the creation or trans-
mission of Sales Data. We may modify or supplement the Operating Guide in order to comply with
requirements imposed by the Association Rules.") and §5 ("There may be a chargeback under any of the
following circumstances, or as the Association Rules and operational requirements dictate from time to
time. Consequently, additions and/or deletions to this list may occur.") (copy on file with authors).
81 David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. REG.
325, 331 (2003) ("A fundamental insight of the theoretical research is that these businesses need to
determine an optimal pricing structure-one that balances the relative demands of the multiple customer
groups-as well as optimal pricing levels. That insight has implications for many other strategic vari-
ables. Empirical examination of these industries finds that key business decisions are driven by the need
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over, the competition of systems for both merchant and consumer accounts
is critical to ensuring the fairness of the systems' features. We therefore
describe the systems' operation from the point of view of both merchants
and consumers.
To merchants, card issuers offer 2 payment guaranteed against certain
forms of loss, such as consumer bankruptcy;83 relief from the need to collect
on accounts receivable; faster payment (referred to as reduced days out-
standing); automatic deposit of receivables; 4 receivable financing;85 con-
sumer credit services;86 fraud identification tools;87 fraud prevention tools,
such as card security features;88 advance commitment to adopt new tech-
nologies as mandated by the payment mechanism provider, thus creating
to get critical levels of multiple customer groups on board and to balance complementary customer
communities.").
82 For an exhaustive analysis of the payment system options available to merchants, see Merchant
Seek, Debit Card & ATM Processing, available at http://www.merchantseek.com/debitcard.htm (last
visited on February 14, 2005); American Express, Online Merchant Services, available at
http://home3.americanexpress.com/uk/merchant/manage/manage-default.asp?manage-body=earnmOMS
_body (last visited on February 22, 2005); John Burtzloff, Accepting Customer Payments, Entrepre-
neur.com, available at http://www.entrepreneur.comlarticle/0,4621,305819,00.htm (January 13, 2003).
83 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 31 ("payment cards provide a means of insuring
against consumer defaults"). Insurance against consumer default is not a trivial benefit-approximately
one third of VISA's issuer costs in the quarter ending 1996, for example, were due to fraud or uncol-
lected bills to consumers, making net charge-offs the second largest expense for issuers after the cost of
funds. Id. at 214.
84 Automatic deposit of receivables can be a significant element of the value proposition to mer-
chants with high volumes of sales. For example, on average, in 2004, Wal-Mart earned approximately
$29.2 million in sales every hour. If the electronic payment systems did not exist, Wal-Mart would have
to implement a significant cash logistics system, including physical transportation, security, and more.
Hourly sales are estimated by dividing Wal-Mart's annual revenue of $256.3 Billion, by 365 days per
year, by 24 hours per day. This rough calculation works out to be $29.2 million. Note that in peak
volume hours, Wal-Mart is likely to have substantially larger hourly revenue. See Wal-Mart Annual
Report (2004), http://www.walmartstores.com/Files/annualreport_2004.pdf.
85 EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 5 (By taking charge cards, a merchant "makes a sale
to someone who could not have paid cash and avoids having to offer financing.").
86 David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Economic Aspects of Payment Card Systems and
Antitrust Policy Toward Joint Ventures, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 861, 890 (1995) ("[T]he issuers provide
merchants with credit services that increase consumer demand and that the merchant might otherwise
have to provide. Issuers also guarantee payment by assuming the vast bulk of credit and fraud losses.");
see also CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 58 (describing how credit cards improved consumer finance options
for banks and consumers); Id. at 61 (quoting Bank of America official that credit cards were a "natural
extension" of consumer lending); AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 8 ("merchant [using credit card] has none
of the risks inherent in extending credit or accepting checks").
87 EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 241 (describing VISA's "Cardholder Risk Identifica-
tion System," which "uses computer neural network technology to predict the probability that a particu-
lar transaction is fraudulent and prompts the issuer to contact the cardholder if a certain threshold is
exceeded.").
88 See infra notes 97 to 101.
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network externalities89 and avoiding first mover problems in technology
adoption;9° some marketing information about cardholders using the sys-
tem; access to desirable groups of customers;9' increased sales through in-
creased credit;92 and dispute resolution services.93
Competition for merchant business' drives merchant acquirers (in-
cluding closed networks) to continually enhance the product they offer
merchants, as well as compete on price and other terms.95 For example, the
89 "There is a network externality when the value existing users get from the network increases
when another user joins the network." EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 149.
90 Id. at 113 (associations "develop and encourage system-wide innovations in transaction proc-
essing").
91 Evans, supra note 81, at 353 ("There may be certain customers on one side of the market-
Rochet and Tirole refer to them as 'marquee buyers'-that are extremely valuable to customers on the
other side of the market. The existence of marquee buyers tends to reduce the price to all buyers and
increase it to sellers. For example, American Express has been able to charge a relatively high price to
merchants as compared to other card brands, because merchants viewed the American Express business
clientele as extremely attractive. Corporate expense clients were 'marquee' customers that allowed
American Express to raise its prices to the other side of the market, merchants.") (citations omitted).
92 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 62; AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 7.
93 Many of these enhancements are discussed in more detail in section III, entitled Dispute Reso-
lution Systems, below.
94 See AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 27, 32 (2nd ed. 1996) (noting "fierce competition" for mer-
chant business). In theearly 1990s there were approximately 250 merchant acquirers, although the top
twenty-five VISA and MasterCard merchant acquirers accounted for 79 percent of the total transaction
volume. Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 86, at 866. Today approximately 80 merchant acquirers
account for 95 percent of the market in the United States. Lloyd Constantine, Remarks at 2 Sided Mar-
ket Conference, Columbia University School of Law, May 23, 2005 (notes from conference on file with
authors). In addition to the competition for merchants by networks, there is fierce competition for
managing merchants' private label (or store brand) cards. See, e.g., W.A. Lee, Citi Challenging Leaders
in Private-Label Cards, AMERICAN BANKER, Feb. 1, 2002, at 8 [2002 WL 4099786] (describing compe-
tition among processors and financial institutions for private label business).
95 This competition has been a feature of the marketplace almost since the beginning. For exam-
ple, American Express initiated a cooperative advertising program in 1962 to win airline business,
paying for airline ads that included a suggestion that passengers use their American Express card. See
JON FRIEDMAN & JOHN MEEHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: INSIDE THE TROUBLED EMPIRE OF AMERICAN
EXPRESS 59 (1992). Similarly banks used lower fees to persuade merchants to accept debit cards in the
late 1980s. As Prof. Evans explains
[T]he debit card is an example in which different platforms made different pricing choices
because they had different customers on board when they entered. In the late 1980s, ATM
networks had a base of cardholders who used their cards to withdraw cash or obtain other
services at ATMs. They had no merchants that took these cards. To add debit services to ex-
isting ATM cards, ATM networks charged a smaller interchange fee than did credit card sys-
tems to encourage merchants to install PIN pads. Compared to credit card systems' inter-
change fee of 38 cents on a typical $30 transaction, ATM networks only charged 8 cents.
(On debit and credit transactions, the interchange fee is paid by the merchant's bank to the
cardholder's bank. A lower interchange fee will tend to lower prices on the merchant's side
and to raise them on the cardholder's side.) The PIN pads merchants installed could read the
ATM cards that cardholders already had and accept the PINs they used to access ATMs. In
response to ATM networks' low interchange fee, many merchants invested in the PIN pads,
whose numbers increased from 53,000 in 1990 to about 3.6 million in 2001. In contrast to
the credit card systems, which already had a base of merchants who took their cards and con-
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physical cards have changed over time to better prevent fraud.96 Thus, in
the 1980s, the payment mechanism providers mandated the addition of the
"Card Verification Value" numbers to the back of the card ("CVVl") and
the magnetic strip ("CVV2"). 97 The CVV numbers made it more difficult
for a thief not in possession of the physical card to secure enough informa-
tion to make a fraudulent purchase. 9 For example, if a thief stole a credit
card receipt from a consumer's trash, the thief would have the consumer's
name as it appears on the card and the card number.99 He would not, how-
ever, have the CVV numbers, which are not printed anywhere on the receipt
and should not be stored in any third party information system."°° In re-
sponse, of course, criminals created more sophisticated methods of gaining
card information.'0
The appearance of these enhancements is important because mer-
chants, not merchant acquirers or card issuers, bear the burden of paying for
sumers who used them, ATM systems had to persuade banks to issue debit cards and card-
holders to take these cards. Their strategy worked: The number of VISA debit cards in circu-
lation increased from 7.6 million in 1990 to about 117 million in 2001.
Evans, supra note 81, at 352-53 (citations omitted). Competition extends beyond large merchants. See,
e.g., Steve Watkins, Nashville, Tennessee Small Merchants Provide Steady Business to Credit Card
Processor, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Jan. 28, 2004, at A07 (describing iPayment, Inc.'s strategy of
focusing on small business accounts with an average annual charge volume under $250,000 but with a
total annual charge volume of $4 billion).
96 See infra note 184.
97 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 188; id. at 194 (describing CVV system).
98 Homer Brickey, Credit Card Firms Battle Crooks with Technology, THE PATRIOT LEDGER,
June 24, 1995, at 27 ("[t]he best deterrent so far is a separate number used in a card-verification system,
usually three digits and based on a mathematical algorithm (formula) known only to the card issuer.
'That has really put a dent in fraud,"' said John McKnight, regional director of fraud control for VISA.).
99 Beginning in 2005, the associations bar merchants from printing the full card number on the
receipt. See, e.g.,MasterCard International Inc., Global Operations Bulleting No. 3, Mar. 1, 2005, at 88
("Newly installed, replaced, or relocated point-of-interaction (POI) terminals, whether attended or
unattended, must produce receipts that reflect only the last four digits of the primary account number
(PAN). Fill characters such as X, *, or # must replace all preceding digits.") (copy on file with authors);
Global Payments, Inc. Card Account Information Truncation Requirements: Suppression of Account
Information on Transaction Receipts, http://www.globalpaymentsinc.com/myglobal/industry-initiatives/
cardtrancationrequir.html (describing association rules). State governments created a variety of
requirements on account number truncation, ultimately preempted by the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952.
100 Another example is VISA's deployment of the "Payment Service 2000" in 1992, which re-
quired members to upgrade their processing capabilities. The "Payment Service 2000" increased
VISA's competitiveness against MasterCard and American Express and also reduced fraud. EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 204-05 (describing rollout of system).
101 Chutkow describes several of these methods. One example is the use of a separate reader in
situations where the card is used out of sight of the cardholder (e.g. restaurants). The card is swiped
through not only the point-of-sale terminal but a reader that captures the information from the card; this
information is then used to create a fraudulent card that appears legitimate. Other schemes include the
use of cameras to capture cardholders' entry of PIN numbers. CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 185-86.
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many types of fraud. 102 Innovations to reduce those fraud costs borne by
merchants do not directly benefit any of the parties in direct control of the
payment system: merchant acquirers, issuers, or payment mechanism pro-
viders. However, card networks that offer superior fraud prevention meas-
ures such as CVV numbers have a competitive advantage in gaining mer-
chant business. For example, if a new anti-fraud feature is introduced by
American Express, merchant acquirers who process VISA and MasterCard
transactions are at a competitive disadvantage in gaining both new accounts
and transactions from their existing customers." 3 Market forces have thus
driven the merchant acquirers and payment mechanism providers to en-
hance consumers' cards for the benefit of both consumers and merchants,
even though neither consumers nor merchants have a direct voice in the
design and operation of the card-based payment systems, as we discuss
below.
Merchant acquirers profit from their merchant accounts primarily
through a variety of charges, including discount rate,"°4 equipment rental
fees, membership fees, service fees, and dispute resolution-related fees.' °5
Fees differ substantially between institutions and between merchants. Wal-
Mart, for example, likely pays lower per transaction fees than most small
merchants, because Wal-Mart's volume is substantially larger, giving it
leverage in negotiations with a merchant acquirer that Joe's Deli lacks."°
Some merchant acquirers require equipment rentals, others allow merchants
to purchase their own equipment. Most importantly for our purposes, mer-
chant acquirers charge for various aspects of processing disputes.
102 Some types of fraud are paid for by the issuer bank. Thus when a card number is stolen and a
counterfeit card is created, the issuing bank usually bears the loss. See id. at 186.
103 Recently, VISA introduced "Verified by Visa" and MasterCard introduced SecureCode. Both
of these programs utilize an authentication technology to verify the cardholder's identity, at least verifi-
cation of the registered identity on file with the issuer. When SecureCode authentication is offered by
the merchant and merchant acquirer, the association rules shift liability for fraudulent transactions from
the merchant to either the issuer or the cardholder. Although there are many flaws associated with these
two programs, these two initiatives have made both VISA and MasterCard more attractive to certain
merchants who suffer from high rates of fraud and chargebacks. The smartcard initiative (EMV) holds
similar promise for certain kinds of fraud.
104 The discount rate includes an interchange fee that is passed from the merchant acquirer through
the association to the issuer, to compensate the issuer for the float and certain cardholder risks. See
MasterCard International, MasterCard Dictionary, December 2003, Discount Rate, at 34; and Inter-
change, at 52-53. See also, VISA U.S.A. INC. OPERATING REGULATIONS, VOLUME I-GENERAL RULES,
MAY 15, 2004, [hereinafter, VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I], §A, Definitions, Interchange, at A-27.
See also, MasterCard International, Quick Reference Booklet, October 2003 [hereinafter, MasterCard
Quick Reference Booklet], §5, Interchange Rate and Other Fee Programs, page 5-1 (describing inter-
change generally).
105 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 213 (describing various merchant fees).
106 Wal-Mart, for example, is estimated to do 10% of all PIN debit volume in the U.S. David
Sibley, John Michael Stuart Centennial Professor in Economics, University of Texas in Austin, Presen-
tation at the Columbia University School of Law Two-Sided Market Conference (May 23, 2005).
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For example, typical merchant acquirers in the United States charge
merchants a discount rate of between 1.5% and 3% of the purchase price.107
Thus in a typical $100 charge by a consumer, the merchant acquirer will
pay to the merchant between $97 and $98.50 of the $100, retaining $1.50 to
$3.00 as its fee. The merchant acquirer will then have to forward the inter-
change fee to the payment mechanism provider, most of which is then
passed along to the issuer. 1 8 The interchange expense varies by the type of
merchant, risk, and other factors. "09
In addition to monetary charges, each network has its own system of
rules governing everything from the physical attributes of cards" to how
disputes are handled."' Merchants must adhere to the operating rules of the
payment mechanism provider, through the terms of the contract between
the merchant acquirer and the merchant."2 For example, the two leading
associations (VISA and MasterCard) also require the merchant acquirer to
have a merchant agreement with every merchant it services and to incorpo-
107 See MerchantSeek Merchant Account Rates, www.merchantseek.com/merchantaccounts
_rates.htm (last visited April 23, 2005) ("a typical discount rate for U.S. businesses is right around
2.49% ... Non-US businesses will pay a higher discount rates [sic] closer to the 3 % to 4% range.").
108 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 86, at 890 ("both MasterCard and VISA have set inter-
change fees so that the payment goes from the merchant side to the issuer side."); Evans, Antitrust
Economics, supra note 81, at 376 ("A higher interchange fee tends to raise merchant fees and lower
cardholder fees."); Id. at 375 ("Charge card systems-such as Diners Club and, historically, American
Express-set these fees so that merchants contributed the preponderance of fees.").
109 See Tim Miller, Explaining Credit Transaction Fees, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, Aug. 27, 2001,
http://wwww.entrepreneur.com /article/0,4621,292172,00.html (last visited April 23, 2005) ("Discount
rates vary depending on the type of business, such as traditional brick-and-mortar business, a mail-
order/telephone-order business, a restaurant or an e-business. Discount rates also vary depending on
whether a card number is keyed into the point-of-sale terminal or swiped into the terminal."). Histori-
cally, interchange was designed to compensate issuers for the guaranteed payment, float, and the costs
of extending credit to consumers. More recently, merchants have argued that they are indirectly funding
cards with substantial benefit programs, far beyond the original purposes of funding float and risk. See
also MasterCard Quick Reference Booklet, supra note 103, § 5 (explaining various regional and product
based interchange programs).
110 See VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I, supra note 104, § 10. See also MASTERCARD
INTERNATIONAL, CARD DESIGN STANDARDS (2003).
111 See VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I, supra note 104, § 7 (description of the Dispute Resolu-
tion process, generally); MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL, CHARGEBACK GUIDE (rev. June 2004) [here-
inafter MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE] (guide to Chargebacks); and VISA U.S.A. INC., OPERATING
REGULATIONS: VOLUME II, DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES (May 15, 2004) [hereinafter VISA GENERAL
RULES, VOLUME 11] (rules associated with Chargebacks and Dispute Resolution).
112 See, e.g., PAYMENTECH MERCHANT APPLICATION AND AGREEMENT, supra note 79, § 1.3 (Jan.
2004) (requiring the merchant "to comply with all Association Rules and Operating Guide procedures,
and which such other procedures as [Paymentechi may from time to time prescribe for the creation or
transmission of Sales Data."). See also VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I, supra note 104 § 4.2.C
(describing the minimum requirements of a Merchant Agreement between the Acquirer and the Associa-
tion); MasterCard International, Bylaws and Rules, April 2004 [hereinafter, MasterCard Bylaws], § 9.1,
(Apr. 2004) (description of the requirements for a Merchant Agreement and certain provisions).
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rate the terms and conditions of the operating rules into that merchant
agreement." 3
On the consumer side, the value proposition is itemized billing with
delayed payment, referred to in the industry as "country club style bill-
ing"; 14 lifestyle financing (i.e. that you can consume a cruise today and pay
for it over the next year);..5 record keeping features, including summary
statements and interfacing with personal finance software;" 6 fraud protec-
tion limiting losses to a small, fixed amount (imposed in some countries by
government regulation);" 7 point schemes; mail-order and Internet purchas-
ing;"' and dispute resolution processes. As on the merchant side, market
forces have driven continual improvements in card features and contract
terms that benefit consumers. For example, the practice of offering low
introductory balance transfer interest rates to credit-worthy consumers has
greatly lowered the cost of lifestyle financing for many," 9 while the use of
prepaid cards has extended the convenience of card usage and the availabil-
ity of alternate dispute resolution to customers with less desirable credit
ratings. 2 '
Issuers are paid for the value they provide to consumers through
charges that include annual membership fees, interest on balances, transac-
113 See Mastercard Bylaws, supra note 112, §§ 9.1.1-9.1.2; VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I,
supra note 104, § 4.2.B.1.
114 AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 7.
115 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at xi ("The millions of people who finance purchases on
credit cards want to enjoy life earlier than their current incomes and savings permit."); CHUTKOW, supra
note 4, at 61 ("enormous financial flexibility" introduced by credit cards.); AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at
6 ("the convenience and credit availability offered by bank credit cards were major contributors to their
proliferation around the country.").
116 AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 7.
117 Id. ("Bank cards also offer a comparatively safe means for conducting transactions. If currency
is lost or stolen, the potential loss is much greater than if a credit card is stolen. It is more difficult to
fraudulently use a credit card, and the cardholder's liability is limited if a card is misused.").
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Aviya Kushner, Proceed with caution on balance-transfer 'deals', Bankrate.com,
Financial Literacy in America, http://www.bakrate.comfbrmlnews/financial-literacy2004/
balance-transferl .asp (last visited April 25, 2005) ("'If you're a good, responsible consumer, it can be a
great opportunity,' says Mark Oleson, director of Iowa State University's Financial Counseling
Clinic.").
120 The use of prepaid cards, also called Stored Value Cards, is limited to the value on the card.
So, individuals who cannot secure credit may still avail themselves of the payment system, by deposit-
ing funds onto such a card. These prepaid cards are proliferating into new uses that are targeting the
cash economy. For example, some employers are now putting the entire value of a paycheck onto a
Payroll card, for those employees who lack a bank account. The employee may then spend their pay-
check, simply by using the card at a merchant, or withdrawing funds at an ATM. See, e.g., Lavonne
Kuykendall, Banks Taking Baby Steps in Prepaid Debit Space, AMERICAN BANKER, October 28, 2004,
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tion fees (late fees, over limit fees, etc.). 121 Issuers are also compensated by
the merchant acquirers through the interchange fee. 22  Many of these
charges not only are subject to general competitive pressures-with banks
competing, for example, to offer lower balance transfer costs to good poten-
tial customers-but also to individual negotiations between consumers and
issuers.' Issuers also receive payments from organizations offering co-
branded cards (e.g. professional associations, alumni associations, and the
like).2 4  Also as with merchant acquirers, the networks directly (closed
networks) or indirectly (open networks) require consumers to agree to the
relevant network rules, including the rules governing dispute resolution. 5
All potential card users cannot bargain equally effectively with all card
issuers. Consumers with better credit have greater bargaining power than
those with poor credit scores.'26 Consumers that are more profitable than
others also have greater bargaining power. Profitable consumers may not
be the ones with the best credit scores. 7 As courts have recognized, how-
ever, the market provides many opportunities for consumers to obtain ac-
cess to card-based payment systems.' It is not necessary that all consum-
ers have equal bargaining power for consumer-issuer bargaining to effect
121 EvANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 147; AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 26-27 (describing
revenue sources for issuers).
122 EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 86, at 890 (payment of the interchange by the merchant
acquirer to the issuer "reflects the fact that, in both [the VISA and MasterCard] systems, other rules
require the issuers to bear far more of the costs and to take much more of the risk of producing the
venture's interdependent payment service.").
123 See, 'e.g., How to Negotiate a Better Credit Card Deal, http://www.ehow,.com/
how_109504 ...negotiate-better-credit.html (last visited May 31, 2005) (describing how consumers can
negotiate more favorable credit card deals.). Note that we would not expect to see identical products as
consumers demand different cost structures depending on their circumstances. See also, EvANs &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 211 (distinguishing between fee structures preferred by those who pay
off balances and those who carry balances).
124 AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 12.
125 Issuers can modify the rules (including dispute resolution rules) even after the consumer has
accepted the card's original terms in many states. See, e.g., Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d
1249 (Del. 2001).
126 See DEANNE LOONIN & CHI CHI Wu, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDrr DISCRIMINATION
100 (3d ed. 2002) (describing credit scoring). Once card issuers solved the problem of screening card
holders to restrict the pool to those with desirable credit behavior, the list itself becomes valuable. As a
result of American Express's success in this regard, for example, the brokerage firm of Shearson Loeb
Rhoades accepted a merger with American Express in part to gain access to "the master list of AmEx's
Gold Card holders." FRIEDMAN & MEEHAN, supra note 95, at 103.
127 See Frontline: Secret History of the Credit Card (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 23, 2004),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit (last visited February 24, 2005).
128 See, e.g., Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 231 N.Y.L.J. 19 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. March 11, 2004)
(noting that "In any event, in this day and age when credit cards are rather easily available from any of a
number of issuers, the fact that the customer who elected not to accept the [modification to the account
agreement initiated by the issuer] would have to terminate his/her account, would not be grounds for
concern.").
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the terms of issuer-consumer contracts; what is important is the marginal
consumer's ability to bargain. In the highly competitive issuer market, 129
this ensures that issuers continue to innovate to attract high value consum-
ers as customers. These innovations then spread throughout the industry.
2. Key Differences Among Card-Based Payment Systems
There are two dimensions in which card-based systems differ from one
another that are important for our analysis: network structure and payment
timing. With respect to network structure, there are open and closed sys-
tems; these differ in the ownership and management of the relationships
between the financial institutions13 and the consumers and merchants. The
entity maintaining the contractual relationship with the consumer is known
as the "issuer" and the entity with the contractual relationship with the mer-
chant is known as the "merchant acquirer" or "acquirer." An open system
is a payment system where an association or third-party company maintains
a contractual relationship with both the card issuer and the merchant ac-
quirer. In an open system, issuers and acquirers may enter and exit that
particular payment system according to the terms and conditions of mem-
bership.131 Only the issuer maintains a direct contractual relationship with
the consumer cardholder, and only the acquirer maintains a direct contrac-
tual relationship with the merchant. Open systems include associations
such as VISA and MasterCard.'32 In a closed system, on the other hand, the
issuer and the acquirer are the same financial institution; one entity main-
129 In the early 1990s there were approximately 7,300 VISA issuers, including approximately 100
national issuers such as Capital One, Citibank, MBNA, Bank of America, Household Bank (HSBC), US
Bank, and others, who issue cards across the United States. Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 86, at
865-66.
130 We use the term "financial institution" to describe entities issuing cards, although not all such
entities meet the federal regulatory definitions of the term. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(a) (defining
financial institution as "as a business engaging in financial activities). Two major open card associa-
tions limit their membership to financial institutions who are licensed for financial activity (i.e., lending,
deposit taking, etc.) in the country which they operate. See MasterCard Bylaws, supra note 112, art. L §
1; VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I, supra note 104, art. II, § 2.01.
131 There are terms and conditions for entry and exit into each payment system, and these condi-
tions include fees and capitalization requirements. Entry into the MasterCard association may require a
member initiation fee, a transfer fee, a sponsorship fee, and/or a portfolio acquisition fee. See Master-
Card Bylaws, supra note 112, § 2.12. See also EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 233 (describ-
ing exit terms).
132 Some industry leaders assert that associations such as VISA are not "open" because member-
ship is limited to financial institutions. Non-banks are not permitted to become a member. See supra
note 130. The assertion that such associations are not open was recently made by Randy Gutierrez of
Unicache at the Technology of Remittances Conference in San Francisco on December 11, 2004. For
the purposes of this paper, we need not address this particular point in our analysis since the point is that
the systems are open to entry and exit by multiple financial institutions, creating competitive pressures.
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tains the relationship with both the cardholder and the merchant. Closed
systems include programs such as department store cards, American Ex-
press,'33 and Discover. As we will discuss below, the incentive structures
for various parties are different in open and closed systems.
With respect to payment timing, there are credit and debit cards. A
credit card is a short term extension of credit by the issuer to the con-
sumer." 4 The consumer is not obligated to immediately pay the full bal-
ance at the end of the month. If the consumer does pay the full balance
owed, no interest is charged.'35 With a debit card, on the other hand, the
money to pay the merchant is immediately'36 deducted from the consumer's
bank account. Debit cards are expanding rapidly along with other cash-like
substitutes, including prepaid and stored value debit cards where the con-
sumer deposits cash and uses the card until the balance is zero.' As dis-
cussed below, different regulatory structures apply to debit and credit cards,
influencing a number of attributes of the payment system. For example, the
133 Historically, American Express maintained an exclusive relationship with both the cardholder
and merchant (a closed system). Internationally, American Express selectively issued cards under
unaffiliated financial institutions. Domestically in the United States, this historical structure may be
changing, as American Express recently offered a co-branded cards with MBNA and Citibank. See
MBNA Issues New American-Express Card Branded Credit Cards for More than 1,000 Affinity Groups
[hereinafter American-Express Card Branded Credit Cards], http://home3.americanexpress.com/
corp//pc/2004/mbna_cards.asp (Last visited February 22, 2005). In this sense, American Express is
moving from a closed system where it maintained the relationship with both the cardholder and mer-
chant, to an open system, where it maintains a relationship with an issuer financial institution, who in
tum maintains the relationship with the consumer.
134 AURLEMMA, supra note 5, at 2 ("Bank credit cards are a form of consumer loan, a revolving
credit account that has a credit line of a specific amount that can be borrowed against in part or in full.").
135 For example, if a consumer has a zero balance on January 1, charges $10 on January 15, re-
ceives his statement for $10 on January 20, and pays the $10 balance before the due date (usually 30
days later), no interest applies. If, however, the consumer has a $5 balance on January 1, and the card
charges a 1% per month interest rate, and then charges $10 on January 15, the consumer will owe the
1% interest on the $15. (This ignores the average daily balance method of calculating interest to sim-
plify the example.) If the consumer charges an additional $10 on February 15 and pays the $15 balance
in full by the due date, the consumer will still be charged interest on the February 15 $10 charge on the
February statement. In short, the 30 day interest-free period applies only when the bills are paid com-
pletely and on time each month. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 141-44 (detailing differ-
ences between methods of calculating interest).
136 Generally within minutes but, depending on the technology used, it may take longer. When a
PIN is used, the deduction is instantaneous. When the debit card is swiped like a credit card, it will take
up to two days. See EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 299-300.
137 Stored Value cards, prepaid cards, and the like, are not regulated as depository accounts. See
F.D.I.C. Gen. Couns. Op. No. 8 (1996), 61 Fed. Reg. 40490 (Aug. 2, 1996). See also F.D.I.C., Defini-
tion of "Deposit"'; Stored Value Cards, 12 C.F.R. pt. 303, RIN 3064-AC80 (Apr. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/financial/2004/fil4404a.html (last viewed Sept. 23, 2005). For an interesting
holiday shopping scenario where a family utilizes these forms of debit cards, see John Gould, Ready to
Explode, http://www.intelcard.com/factsandfigures/03factsandfig.asp?AID=339 (last visited December
2004). A thorough account of legal issues involving stored value cards is Effross, supra note 62.
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money flows from the consumer into the transaction pipeline more quickly
than in a credit card transaction.
3. Networks
In addition to the card-based payment systems' differences, there are
differences among transactions within the system. These differences de-
pend upon the relationships between participants in the systems which are
based on the type of network used to process the transaction. There are
three types of networks over which these transactions travel: centralized,
noncentralized, and hybrid. In a noncentralized network (see Figure 2),
each bank has a connection to every other bank in the network.138
FIGURE TWO
Banks used noncentralized networks when they first began issuing card-
based payment systems, with each bank contracting individually with other
banks for the acceptance of the issuing bank's cards at the merchant ac-
quirer banks' merchants. Thus, when a consumer used a decentralized net-
138 Historically, when banks privately issued their own banknotes, the settlements between them
occurred through individual, bilateral exchanges of each others' notes. See Neal Stephenson, The Great
Simoleon Caper (Spring 1995), http://www.cyberartsweb.org/cpace/scift/cyberbib/Essays/
SimoleonCaper.htm (last visited February 9, 2005) (explaining in detail how currency works through a
fictional account of creation of private currency).
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work card issued by Chase at a merchant acquired by Key Bank, the au-
thorization and payment transactions would be routed through a private
network between Chase and Key Bank. If the consumer later used the card
at a merchant acquired by Wells Fargo, the transactions associated with that
purchase would be routed through a private network between Chase and
Wells Fargo. Similarly, if a different consumer used a card issued by Bank
of America at the merchant acquired by Key Bank, those transactions
would be routed through a third private network between Key Bank and
Bank of America.'39 As the number of merchant acquirers and issuers con-
tracting with each other grew, the number of private networks needed to
make the noncentralized network function grew rapidly. (See Figure 2).
Today, such bilateral agreements may be prohibited, at least in certain con-
texts, such as the processing and routing of transactions. 14°
In a centralized network, on the other hand, all contracts and transac-
tions are with a central authority (e.g. VISA). (See Figure 3). The central-
ized networks offer significant cost savings to the participating institutions.
Rather than individually negotiating contracts and maintaining infrastruc-
ture to support the flow of money and information between every pair of
entities in the network, a participating institution has to comply with only
one set of technical standards for the exchange of money and information,
and negotiate only one set of contracts with the central entity.
The availability of hybrid and private networks limit the monopoly
power of the payment mechanism providers both directly (in the case of
open systems) and indirectly (via open systems' competition with closed
systems) by allowing participants to route transactions outside any particu-
lar associations or network providers' system. It is necessary to consider
how transactions are processed to fully understand this point.
When a consumer presents a card to a merchant and the merchant
swipes the card through the point of sale terminal, the terminal reads vari-
ous information from the card. 4' That creates an authorization transaction
which is forwarded to the merchant acquirer's system. There, the authori-
zation transaction is routed according to rules based on the bank identifica-
tion number ("BIN") from the consumer's card. This number identifies the
financial institution that issued the card and the appropriate 'routing,' to the
merchant and merchant acquirer. The routing is the path the authorization
transaction takes from this point to reach the issuer. It is dependent on the
139 The dispute resolution processes, described below, would function differently under a bilateral
processing approach. See discussion infra Section II, Dispute Resolution Systems.
140 See MasterCard International, Cirrus Worldwide Operating Rules, June 2004, §9, Processing
Requirements (for a rule requiring certain cash machine transactions to be routed through MasterCard,
having the effect of prohibiting certain bilateral processing agreements). See also MasterCard Interna-
tional, Maestro Global Rules, July 2004, §9; Steve Ruwe, Required Processing of Visa Transactions
through VisaNet, Visa Bus. Rev., Visa U.S.A., Feb. 2005.
141 Terminals were introduced in the early 1980s. CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 164-65 (describing
introduction of the point of sale terminals).
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contracts and rules of the participating institutions. For example, consider
the case of a pure centralized network, such as VISA, with a consumer card
issued by Chase and a merchant acquired by Fifth Third Bank. A VISA
card issued by Chase and used for a charge submitted through a merchant
acquired by Fifth Third Bank will have the authorization transaction routed
from the merchant to Fifth Third Bank, then to VISA, then to Chase, and
then the approval or rejection will reverse the path back to the merchant.
The payment transaction follows the same path later that day from Chase
back to the merchant's account with Fifth Third Bank. Payment by the
consumer to Chase follows at a later date.
FIGURE THREE
Hybrid networks occur when an institution participating in a central-
ized network shifts some of its transactions from the network to a bilateral
arrangement with another institution in the network, bypassing the central
system for a subset of transactions. For example, Chase might determine
that a large number of cardholder transactions occur with merchants in Ath-
ens, Greece acquired by the General Bank of Greece. 142 By negotiating a
separate contract with General Bank of Greece and building the necessary
infrastructure, including dedicated communications links, General Bank of
Greece can dynamically route transactions involving Chase customers out-
side of the VISA network over a private network between General Bank of
142 We have chosen actual bank names for our examples. The transactions described, however, are
all hypothetical.
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Greece and Chase. To do this, General Bank of Greece programs its com-
puter to route transactions with Chase BINs directly to Chase rather than
through the VISA network.'43 Chase and General Bank of Greece can then
divide the savings from shifting those transactions away from the VISA
network among themselves.'" Although at present most of such agree-
ments are between banks in different countries, because the savings from
removing transactions from the network are greater when the network for
charge for currency conversions is also present, there is no reason why such
hybrid networks cannot exist domestically as well.'45
Centralized networks benefit from the network externalities and trans-
action cost-saving features of centralization. There is thus a strong incen-
tive for institutions to join centralized networks as networks grow in size
and complexity. This incentive creates fears about monopoly abuses by the
networks.'" At least while financial institutions are not restricted in routing
transactions across any network (of which that financial institution is a
member), monopoly rents the network can obtain are limited by the poten-
tial competition allowed by hybridization of the network.'47 If the network
abuses its position, 4 s institutions will shift more business outside the net-
work. Furthermore, most financial institutions are members of both VISA
and MasterCard.'49 So, even in environments that restrict dynamic transac-
143 For example, the BIN table will direct that all card transactions prefixed with VISA BINS are
routed to the VISA connection except BINs belonging to Chase, which are routed through the special
connection.
144 At times, networks have attempted to prevent this by charging a fee regardless of whether the
network was used. For example, Interlink attempted to impose such a charge in the debit card market
but was forced by competition from Mastercard's Maestro network to drop it. See Balto, supra note 63,
at 1096-97.
145 Such networks do exist for ATM/debit cards, where the merchant may route the transaction
based on the cost of using a particular network. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 310. See
also Ruwe, supra note 140 (notice that, with some exceptions, domestic Visa branded transactions must
be processed through VisaNet, effectively prohibiting domestic bilateral transaction routing arrange-
ments).
146 See Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society, Part One: Power vs. Liberty, CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1985; Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society, Part Two:
Crime Prevention and the Legal Order, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1986 (discussing problem
of monopolizing entity in a competitive legal market).
147 Payment card system networks are vulnerable to competition. As Professors Evans and
Schmalensee note,
In network industries, as in industries with important scale or learning economies, we also
tend to see temporary dominance of one or a few firms or networks. There is a temptation to
think that such dominance will be permanent. But most network industries are not like
manufacturing industries, in which ownership of capital-intensive capacity or key proprietary
technology may give rise to long-lived dominance. As we shall see, the shares of payment
card networks and individual issuers have varied considerably over time.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, PAYING, supra note 1, at 153.
148 We define "abuse" as seeking to obtain profits above the competitive level.
149 Since many financial institutions are members (owners) of both MasterCard and Visa, the
charge is often made that these two associations must be directly colluding together. See EVANS &
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tion rerouting among competing networks, financial institutions are able to
threaten to, or to actually alter their portfolios of cards to prevent either
network or both from extracting monopoly rents. Even financial institu-
tions that are only a member of either VISA or MasterCard may be able to
issue cards under other payment brands, such as American Express.'
Moreover, because the network is negotiating with the issuers and merchant
acquirers, who are themselves in a competitive market for consumer and
merchant accounts, the network's ability to shift costs to individual con-
sumers or merchants is limited by the market pressures in the issuer and
merchant acquirer markets. In effect, consumers and merchants negotiate
with the network through the issuers and merchant acquirers. Those institu-
tions can be thought of as "bundling" individual consumer and merchant
bargaining power into larger units, since an issuer or merchant acquirer
which negotiates more favorable terms for its customers from the network
will gain a competitive advantage over other institutions. Competitive
pressures from the individual account market thus are an important limit on
the ability of networks to rent-seek at the expense of merchants or card-
holders.
C. Applying the Technology: The Payment Transaction
A payment transaction in a card-based payment system has two logical
components: the authorization and the settlement transactions.' In a sim-
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 193-06 (debunking this claim). Some countries, such as Canada, ad-
dress this concern head-on by prohibiting a financial institution from issuing under both the MasterCard
and Visa brands. See David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to Promote Network
Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 523, 538 (1999) (describing Canadian ban on duality). We have
not found any study that addresses whether prohibiting an institution from issuing multiple brands either
limits or promotes competition. If anything, we suspect that such limitations on card issuing, bilateral
processing arrangements, or dynamic re-routing of card transactions, increase the transactions costs of
switching from one association to another. This increase in switching costs correspondingly increases
the monopoly-like rents that both associations may assess, to just below the amount required to change
the card portfolio from one association to another.
150 See American-Express Card Branded Credit Cards, supra note 133, at 38.
151 In a credit-card transaction, those two components occur separately (referred to as a "dual
message transaction"); in a debit card transaction those two components occur simultaneously (a "single
message transaction."). The difference between single message and dual message approaches to pay-
ments creates potential issues for financial institutions. These issues are not relevant for the private
dispute resolution mechanism, and, therefore, are ignored here. Also, the electronic path the transaction
components take will vary depending on the type of network (open or closed) and the relationships
between the particular banks and other parties. General descriptions of the payment card industry are
contained in the opinions of the courts in U.S. v. VISA, U.S.A. Inc., 163 F.Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
and Schwartz v. VISA International Corp., 2003 WL 1870370 (Cal. Super. 2005). Although we dis-
agree with the courts' legal reasoning and conclusions in these cases, the basic presentation of the tech-
nical details of the card systems is reasonably accurate.
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pie closed network transaction, a consumer uses her American Express card
at Best Buy. The card is swiped at the Best Buy cash register, the card
reader transmits the authorization request 52 to American Express, and
American Express checks the consumer's credit and responds accordingly.
If the transaction is approved, the consumer signs for her purchase and the
sale is complete. Later that day,'53 the merchant uploads all its American
Express sales transactions for the day to American Express. American Ex-
press posts the purchase to the consumer's account and transfers the funds
to the merchant's account. At the end of the billing cycle, the consumer
receives and pays her bill from American Express, but the funds (net of
American Express's charges) have previously been sent to the merchant by
American Express, a short term extension of credit to the consumer by
American Express.
In an open system where the merchant acquirer and issuer institutions
are different, the transaction is similar, except that the authorization transac-
tion flows from the merchant to its merchant acquirer, then to the appropri-
ate association,"5 which routes the transaction to the issuer, who then re-
sponds via the same route. The settlement transaction flows later that day
in reverse through this same route.
What appears to be an open network transaction can actually be a
closed network transaction when the issuer and merchant acquirer institu-
tions are the same. Thus, if a Citibank MasterCard is used to purchase a
cellular phone at a Cingular store and Cingular's merchant acquirer is also
Citibank, then the transaction may not be routed through the association but
instead be handled internally by Citibank entirely within a Citibank network
in the same manner as American Express would have handled the transac-
tion if the American Express card had been used.'55 When a transaction is
internally routed, the incentive structures for dispute resolution change, as
described below.
152 The data sent are the card number, expiration date, amount of transaction, date of transaction,
security code, and merchant number. Some transactions also include additional security information
such as cardholder addresses (e.g. Internet transactions).
153 There are generally several windows each day in which transactions are posted. Large mer-
chants (e.g. Wal-Mart) may settle transactions multiple times within a day; smaller merchants may settle
once a day.
154 In international transactions, there is an additional step in which the information flows between
the appropriate national associations. Thus, when a U.S. consumer uses a U.S. issued VISA card in
Europe, Visa Europe (a distinct legal and business entity) will pass the information from the European
merchant acquirer to Visa U.S.A, who in turn will pass the transaction on to the US issuer. Inter-
regional transaction handoffs occur when the region (within a single association) utilizes its own trans-
action authorization and settlement systems.
155 Of course, there may be differences in internal procedures between banks and other institutions.
Our point is merely that the open network will resemble a closed network in these instances. When a
transaction in an Open network is internally routed, the decision making incentives associated with
dispute resolution more closely resemble the incentive structure of a Closed network. See discussion
infra Section III, Dispute Resolution Systems.
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Further, some institutions subcontract data services with third party
transaction processors. The rise of third-party entities was an important
development in the 1990s.'56 First Data, Total Systems, eFunds, EDS, Atos
Origin, Alliance Data Systems, Sema, Arksys, FiServe, Euronet, and other
companies contract with financial institutions to handle various aspects of
processing card transactions. 57 If the same company has contracted with
both the merchant acquirer and issuer, the transaction may not be routed
through the association, but stay entirely within the third party transaction
processor's network."'5
These differences can have consequences for the dispute resolution
process, since a transaction that is not routed through the association is not
necessarily governed by the association's rules;59 indeed, the association is
likely to be completely unaware that the transaction even exists. When a
transaction is routed outside the association, the institution(s) involved may
opt to provide its (their) own dispute resolution process."6 This process
substitution may be indistinguishable to the merchant and the cardholder
156 Brian G. Olsen, Bank Credit Card Organization, in AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, THE
BANK CREDIT CARD BuSINESS 15, 22 (2d ed. 1996).
157 Third party transaction processing companies provide technology services to the financial
institution. In effect, the financial institution is outsourcing their financial operations to that technology
company. First Data began as a regional association of banks to handle processing. It was later spun off
and became a for-profit company. Id. at 21.
158 This routing alternative is an issue in that it juxtaposes the legal and technology relationships
between associations and financial institutions. Some associations contend that not routing the transac-
tion through the association will violate association rules. It certainly deprives the association of its fee
for the transaction. This ability to reroute transactions can give large players with merchant and con-
sumer accounts an advantage. See EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 276 (describing how
National Bancard Corporation saw this as a threat in Chicago in competition with First Chicago, which
the company argued could undercut its price because it did not have to pay the interchange fee on trans-
actions between merchant customers and its own bank card holders.) Evans & Schmalensee argue that
this does not necessarily advantage the First Chicago-type banks, because they still must cover the
network costs on their own network. Id. at 277. While they are correct, they do not take account of the
function of such competition in limiting the interchange fee that the associations can charge. See, also,
VISA's announcement that all signature debit transactions must be routed through VISA's network.
See, e.g., Steve Ruwe, Required Processing of Visa Transactions through VisaNet, Visa Business
Review, Visa U.S.A., February 2005, Issue No. 050215 (explaining that the Visa U.S.A Board of Direc-
tors has directed Visa U.S.A to revise its Operating Regulations to require all Visa transactions be
processed through VisaNet).
159 The multi-party nature of the payment system creates disagreements about which party owns,
manages, and regulates cardholder data, merchant data, and transactional data. See Paul Wenske, Some
Debit Card Users Receive a Little More Protection, KANSAS CITY STAR, Jan. 6, 2005, at Cl, available
at http://www.kansascity/business/10575372.htm?lc (noting VISA chargeback protection is provided
only on VISA's network.).
160 The motivation for routing around the association is the savings of the association's fees and
expenses associated with the transaction. In the international context, the process, earnings, and ex-
penses related to converting transacting currency into cardholder currency (also known as foreign ex-
change) can be a substantial motivation for routing around the association.
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from the association process, but it need not be. Regardless, the parties to
the transaction are unlikely to know the corporate jurisdiction to which
they are committed at the time of the transaction."' And, the cardholder is
unlikely to be aware of the differences ex ante because cardholders rarely
know who a merchant's merchant acquirer is when making a purchase. 6 '
Similarly, the merchant's employee conducting the transaction may be
aware of the name of the consumer's issuer (which is generally imprinted
on the card)'63 but store clerks are unlikely to be aware of the consequences
for fees or dispute resolution rules of accepting one card over another. No
party to a particular transaction may thus be aware simply by entering into
the transaction of either the specific legal rules to which they are agreeing
to use in the event of a dispute, or the private jurisdiction that will apply
those rules. Despite consumers' ignorance of the system, however, they are
not disadvantaged because of the competition among issuers and networks.
ATM network transactions are similar with one key difference. In an
ATM transaction, the interchange fees flow in reverse. Fees are paid by the
issuer to the ATM owner, instead of by the merchant acquirer to the is-
suer." 4 As with credit and debit card transactions, if a cardholder uses a
machine owned by the issuer, the transaction is probably handled internally;
if the cardholder uses a machine owned by another party, then the transac-
tion flows over a network. Depending on the relationships between the
ATM owner and the issuer, a transaction may flow through an association
or through an alternative network, as described above. There are more al-
ternative networks for ATM machines than for credit and debit card trans-
actions at merchants.'65 Indeed, most debit cards provide debit services
161 A similar issue arises with debit cards, where consumers may not be aware of whether they are
using an online or offline system. See, e.g., Effross, supra note 62, at 362. Some commentators argue
that such lack of knowledge is a justification for intervention. See, e.g., Malla Pollack, Opt-In Govern-
ment: Using the Internet to Empower Choice-Privacy Application, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 653, 670
(2001) ("Market choice activation of the 'invisible hand' requires transparency. Consumers cannot
choose x unless they can tell when x is, and is not, part of the offer.").
162 Even if provided with this information, however, consumers may not be aware of the conse-
quences of using particular financial associations with a merchant.
163 Many issuers use multiple brands on their cards, however. Thus AT&T credit cards are cur-
rently issued by Citibank. Jane Adler, Troubles for Cobranded Cards, CREDrr CARD MGMT., Jan. 2005,
at 12, 14, 2005 WLNR 58777. The Citibank name appears only in small print on the back of the card,
where it is unlikely to be noticed by the merchant's employee.
164 Fees flow in reverse because the ATM machine is a substitute for a branch of a financial institu-
tion. Therefore, when an issuer's cardholder utilizes another financial institution's ATM machine, the
Issuer compensates that other financial institution for making their ATM available to their cardholders.
Also, there is a cost for holding cash in an ATM machine. Thus, the interchange flows in the opposite
direction for ATM transactions, from the Issuer to the Acquirer. Reverse interchange does create some
unusual incentives for merchants, with regards to merchant ownership and placement of the ATM
within the merchant's location.
165 For example, major ATM networks include NYCE, Star, Pulse, MAC, and MoneyStation.
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across several platforms."6 A bank, for example, may issue a debit card
that works in its own ATM network, through a regional ATM network, and
through MasterCard or VISA.'67
Again, the crucial characteristic is the ease with which existing or new
institutions can enter the market. Establishing a new connection between a
merchant acquirer and an issuer requires only negotiation of an agreement
between the institutions, acquisition of telecommunications channels, and
modification of the relevant computer programs that route transactions.
Although such costs are not zero,168 for large numbers of transactions the
per transaction cost is effectively or close to zero, given the low marginal
cost of telecommunications and the ability to amortize the fixed costs over
substantial numbers of transactions. 69 This ease of entry allows both ac-
tual.7 and potential competition' to discipline the networks' behavior to-
166 See EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 297.
167 During the 1980s, ATM networks became more interconnected. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE,
supra note 1, at 303 ("In the 1980s, ATMs not only increased in number, they became more intercon-
nected."); CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 231-32 (describing expansion of ATM networks). Some transac-
tion processors such as First Data have purchased networks such as Star, which in effect makes First
Data capable of internally routing transactions amongst their transaction processing customers without
using the VISA, MasterCard or other traditional card-based system networks, a practice sometimes
called sub-switching. Richard Mitchell, The Future of Visa and MasterCard, CREDIT CARD MGMT.,
June 2004, at 36, 38, 2004 WLNR 205830 ("First Data sought to leverage its connections with issuers
and acquirers to create a closed-loop processing system, and enable clients that send V[ISA] transac-
tions through First Data Net to bypass V[ISA]'s VisaNet authorization, clearing and settlement system
and avoid some of the association's fees."). VISA initially saw the ATM networks as a threat. See
CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 231-32 (describing opposition from VISA to development of member bank
ATM networks). The practice is recognized as a serious threat to the associations in the industry.
Mitchell, supra, at 40 ("[T]he ability of First Data to route transactions internally as 'on-us' between its
processing clients that are both issuers and acquirers not only is financially attractive, but theoretically
allows the processor to provide customized loyalty programs, special pricing outside of 'inflexible'
interchange schemes and other innovations not generally available through traditional networks.").
168 Determining the price structure for a multisided network such as a card-based payment system
is a complex problem, whose solution can be costly. However new entrants have the benefit of existing
price structures, which can serve as a model for the new entrant. See Evans, supra note 81, at 363
("Multi-sided platform markets are also hard to get into because firms must solve quite complex busi-
ness problems. That complexity may, however, give subsequent entrants an advantage; they can look to
the pricing structures and business models adopted by successful incumbents. When American Express
entered the charge card business in 1958, for example, it could observe the success of the pricing struc-
ture that Diners Club had adopted when it entered in 1950.").
169 See EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 127 (noting declines in transmission and process-
ing costs); Robin Sidel & Joseph T. Hallinan, MasterCard Swipes Big Debit Account from Visa, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 6, 2005, at C3 (noting competition between MasterCard and Visa in debit market and sug-
gesting Discover is preparing to enter market).
170 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 228 ("Entering the payment card industry as an issuer
is fairly easy.").
171 See EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 116 ("The prominence of First Data in both the
issuing and acquiring business has led some to suggest that it has the potential to become a competing
payment card system.").
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ward the merchant acquirers and issuers. The competitive markets for mer-
chant and individual accounts in turn prevents rent-seeking by those institu-
tions.
17 2
D. The Private Legal Structure
The rules governing card-based transactions are largely created
through a series of private contracts. The constraints both shape and are
shaped by the payment systems' technologies. Merchant acquirers negoti-
ate contracts with merchants to obtain the merchants' sales transactions.
The degree to which terms vary depends, of course, on the bargaining
power of the parties. Small merchants have less leverage than, for example,
Wal-Mart.' The existence of alternative networks and the low transactions
costs of rerouting transactions, for example, by reprogramming the card
readers to route transactions from particular card issuers over particular
networks limits merchant acquirers' ability to shift costs onto merchants.
Issuers negotiate contracts with consumers, although these negotiations
generally center on the interest rate, annual fees, and rewards programs
rather than on the remainder of the terms of the contract.174 Both issuers
and merchant acquirers negotiate contracts with the payment mechanism
providers. These contracts are generally boilerplate, but side agreements
between the payment mechanism providers and particular financial institu-
tions occur, where the financial institution controls a particularly desirable
block of accounts.175 Moreover, their members, who are the issuers and
acquirers, control the associations.
The associations also impose rules on their member institutions.
These rules are created by the associations' boards and membership. Mem-
ber institutions get votes on the association boards based on their relative
size, with larger institutions which provide the association with a greater
172 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 171 (noting that "system wars ... have raged
since 1958 when American Express introduced its charge card to challenge Diners Club, then the domi-
nant payment card. These wars have provided long-run benefits to consumers and merchants through
lower prices, faster service, and enhanced features."); id. at 226-28 (concluding that industry is competi-
tive); id. at 239 ("Prices [received by issuers on balances] declined by almost 35 percent between the
first quarter of 1984 and the fourth quarter of 1996. The price that the typical consumer actually paid,
however, decreased by 7 percent over the same period, and would have decreased significantly more
had tax laws not been changed.").
173 James J. Daly, Visa's Trillion-Dollar Year, CREDIT CARD MGMT., May 3, 2004, at 38, 2004
WLNR 183657 (Wal-Mart is "widely rumored to have a custom interchange plan with Visa," but the
association won't confirm it.).
174 See, e.g., SCOTT BILKER, TALK YOUR WAY OUT OF CREDIT CARD DEBT!: PHONE CALLS TO
BANKS THAT SAVED MORE THAN $43,000 IN INTEREST CHARGES AND FEES (2003).
175 See, e.g., Glenn Cheney, A Credit Card Collision for the Ages, BANK TECHNOLOGY NEWS,
April 1, 1999, at 8 (describing dispute between VISA and Citibank that led Citi to switch its primary
allegiance to MasterCard.)
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number of transactions and dollar volume of transactions receiving more
votes.' These rules provide the "law" that governs much of the relation-
ship between financial institutions and both merchants and cardholders.177
We discuss the characterization of these contractual terms as law below.
The card based payment systems have bylaws and operating rules that
cover a wide range of topics at various levels of detail. The bylaws and
operating rules may even be in a variety of different documents. For exam-
ple, some relatively mundane but practical issues are defined, such as the
physical appearance of the cards, including the position of the association
logo, font, inclusion of security measures such as holograms and security
numbers, and a card design approval process."7 The operating rules also
specify how cards should be packaged, transported, and stored.179 The as-
sociation bylaws and operation rules also cover standard corporate matters,
including the duties and responsibilities of the board of directors and vari-
ous advisory boards and councils. 8 ' Some payment associations are not
really payment associations in the classic sense because they are owned and
operated by an unaffiliated non-bank company. 8' These payment entities
typically have councils or advisory boards that have the authority to amend
the rules.'82
In any given dispute between a merchant and a cardholder, the dispute
is potentially governed by the contracts between the cardholder and the
issuer, between the issuer and the payment mechanism provider, between
the merchant and the merchant acquirer, and between the merchant acquirer
and the payment mechanism provider plus the rules of the payment mecha-
176 See, e.g., Jason Fargo, Behind Citi's Feud with VISA, CREDIT CARD MGMT., April 1, 1999, at
28, (describing Citibank's gain in representation by its shift to MasterCard.)
177 See David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 371, 405-06 (2003) (analyzing
Visa and Mastercard rules as law).
178 See generally VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I, supra note 104, §§ 10.1-10.4; MasterCard
Bylaws, supra note 112, §§ 5.1-5.8; NYCE Network Operating Rules, § 4.6 (January 1, 2005); Star
Network Operating Rules, Version 1.4, app. D (October 2004); Quest Operating Rules, Version 1.3, ch.
2 (May 2001); ACCELJExchange Network Operating Rules, app. D (March 2003). See also, Master-
Card International, MasterCard Card Design Standards (2003); Visa Check Card: Design and Branding
Standards (2004); Visa PrePaid Card: Design and Branding Standards (2004).
179 See, e.g., American Express, Global Network Services, Business and Operational Policies, §
8.3, Shipments from Manufacturer to Issuer (October 31, 2004).
180 See e.g., MasterCard Bylaws, supra note 112, art. IV; VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I, supra
note 104, art. V; NYCE Network Operating Rules, § 2.2 (January 1, 2005); Quest Operating Rules,
Version 1.3, App. I (May 2001); and, ACCELIExchange Network Operating Rules, § 1.3.2.2 (March
2003).
181 There are many examples of such payment systems. Some examples include: American Ex-
press which is owned by American Express; NYCE which is owned by Metavente; Star which is owned
by First Data; Exchange which is owned by FiServ; Pulse which is owned by Morgan Stanley; and,
Discover which is also owned by Morgan Stanley.
182 See supra note 178. Note that the Star ATM/Debit network does not have such an advisory
board.
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nism provider. In most cases, however, the critical document for dispute
resolution will be the payment mechanism provider's rules governing dis-
putes, since the payment mechanism providers will require the issuers and
merchant acquirers to incorporate those rules into their contracts with con-
sumers and merchants.
These rules are the law of the relationship. They go beyond a contract
because the payment mechanism provider agreement is not only a contrac-
tual agreement to existing rules but an agreement to a process which gener-
ates future rules.183 These as-yet-unknown rules are binding on the mem-
bers of the association. To avoid these rules' application requires exit from
the association. The introduction of holograms is an example of the impo-
sition of "new law" by the associations. Both VISA and MasterCard began
requiring card issuers to alter their cards to include various security meas-
ures such as holograms in the 1990s.11 All card issuers had to include this
security feature, which was not a trivial expense."5
Most critically, the rules require most disputes to be handled within
the institutions established by the rules themselves. That is, consumers,
merchants, merchant acquirers, and issuers must make use of the institu-
tions created by the web of contracts amongst them and, in this case, largely
derivative of the payment mechanism providers' contracts with the issuers
and merchant acquirers.
E. The Context
To briefly summarize, we have shown that card-based payment sys-
tems provide a mechanism to convert a diverse set of interactions, many of
183 See Chris Sagers, The Evolving Federal Approach to Private Legislation and the Twilight of
Government, (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("The more one thinks about it, the more
difficult it seems to find any robust and meaningful distinction between 'law' and 'standard' except to
say that 'standards' are created by private bodies.").
184 See CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 180-82 (describing card security measures, including micro-
printing on logo and holograms); see also CHUTKOW, supra note 3, at 188-89 (describing other security
features); Homer Brickey, Credit Card Firms Battling Crooks with Technology, THE PATRIOT LEDGER,
June 24, 1995 (describing security features).
185 Industry players hold pricing and cost information as highly confidential and competitive in-
formation. However, it is possible to estimate the magnitude of this expense. In a recently I0-Q filing,
one of the leading providers of holograms, American Bank Note Holographics Inc., indicated that a
"significant portion of the Company's business is derived from orders placed by certain credit card
companies, including MasterCard and manufacturers of VISA brand credit cards, and variations in the
timing of such orders can cause significant fluctuations in the Company's sales. Sales to MasterCard
were approximately 37% and 45% of sales for the three months ended September 30, 2004 and 2003."
Sales for the quarter ending on September 30, 2003 totaled $4.6 million. Sales for the quarter ending on
September 30, 2004 totaled $5.8 million. See American Bank Note Holographics Inc., Quarterly Report
(Form 10-Q) (Nov. 12, 2004), available at http://biz.yahoo.comle/041112/abhh.oblO-q.htmil (last visited
February 24, 2004).
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which are single episode transactions, into a series of repeat relationships.
Thus individual purchases by consumers from separate merchants are trans-
formed into a repeat relationship between the consumer and her issuer and
between the merchant and its merchant acquirer. The issuers and merchant
acquirers themselves interact in repeat relationships (or are a single entity).
Moreover, these relationships are subject to simultaneous competitive
forces in many distinct markets: the consumer relationship;" 6 the merchant
relationship;'87 the relationships with the financial institutions;8 ' the choice
of payment,'89 and the terms of that choice. The result of the competitive
environment is pressure on the payment mechanism providers, the issuers,
and the merchant acquirers to improve the quality and reduce the costs of
their products. One important set of improvements produced by this com-
petition is aimed at reducing the frequency of fraudulent use.
By virtue of the web of contracts connecting issuers, consumers, mer-
chants, merchant acquirers and payment mechanism providers, the parties
to all these contracts are governed by a set of institutions created in the
payment mechanism providers' contracts with issuers and merchant acquir-
ers by reference to the payment mechanism providers' rules. These institu-
tions include rule generation institutions (e.g. "legislatures") and dispute
resolution institutions (e.g. "courts"). In the next section we discuss the
details of these dispute resolution institutions. This section has shown that
several key characteristics are the result of the underlying technology and
186 There are many financial institutions that compete for the consumer, her payments, and her
borrowing choices. This competition is not limited to financial institutions licensed by VISA or Master-
Card, but also includes other card based payment systems such as American Express, Carte Blanche,
Diners Club, Discover, JCB, and a host of privately issued payment cards.
187 There is also an intense competition for merchant acceptance. If the merchant does not accept
the payment mechanism/mode/choice, no consumer will want that payment vehicle. Likewise, if no
consumers have a particular payment mechanism, no merchant will want to accept it.
188 Each association and even many private companies offering payment vehicles that compete for
the attention of the financial institution. Some of these associations are jointly owned by financial
institutions (i.e., MasterCard, VISA, The Clearing House, etc.) and others are private companies (i.e.,
NYCE/Metavente, Star/First Data, Pulse/Morgan Stanley, etc.). The Clearing House, a private company
jointly owned by many financial institutions, competes with the Federal Reserve to clear checks while
simultaneously competing with card based payment mechanisms to extend the reach of checks into new
markets. See http://www.theclearinghouse.org/paymentservices/000229f.php (last visited May 27,
2005), for new check-based product offerings currently being pitched to financial institutions. Likewise,
ATM networks, such as Star and NYCE, compete with VISA and MasterCard over the routing of debit
card traffic, while simultaneously competing for the consumer's choice with other payment mechanisms
(cash, check, etc.).
189 Competition extends beyond card based payment systems into other payment systems entirely.
At the most fundamental level, the consumer may elect to utilize cash. The consumer may also elect to
pay with check. The source of funds for that check has exploded over the years to include many nontra-
ditional sources of funds. A check may draw on: equity in and be secured by a consumer's residence; an
unsecured personal line of credit that may not even be associated with a card, at all; a brokerage ac-
count, including any line of credit established to purchase equities; corporate bonds (i.e., The General
Motors' GMAC Demand Notes investment vehicle); and any other source of value.
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the competitive environment amongst the players in the card-based pay-
ment system industry.
First, competition restrains the behavior of the various parties. Be-
cause there is real or potential competition at each stage of the web of rela-
tionships that comprise the card-based payment systems, no individual en-
tity can exert monopoly power to force disadvantageous terms on others. In
effect, competition serves as a substitute for the combination of checks and
balances and due process limitations imposed by constitutions in political
systems to restrict the scope of their law-making power.
Second, much of the web of contracts is opaque to individual entities
and participants. An entity which is solely an issuer, for example, may not
know anything about the terms of merchant acquirer-merchant contracts;
consumers are likely to know little about the terms of issuer-association
contracts, and so forth. In one sense, it is as if the federalism provisions of
the United States Constitution were unknown to the residents of the states,
and known only to the state governments. Despite this opacity, however,
those involved in contracts are restrained by competition from colluding to
extract rents from the parties to whom the contracts are opaque. Continuing
our political analogy, (perhaps past the point of reasonableness), it is as if
individual U.S. states had the option of switching from membership in the
United States to membership in Canada, Mexico, the E.U., or a new combi-
nation of states at will (and without a civil war). Under such circumstances,
the parties to the contracts have an interest in promoting "federalism" even
if state citizens are unaware of the terms of the federal constitution. Com-
petition thus overcomes opacity.
Third, the transformation by card-based payment systems of diverse
transactions into a limited set of transactions, facilitates the standardization
of dispute resolution procedures through the imposition of ex ante proce-
dures which prevent the creation of disputes (e.g. deterring fraud), create an
objective basis for resolving disputes (e.g. creating physical proof of au-
thorization of a charge through signatures on charge slips), and restrict the
domain of potential disputes by defining possible grounds for disputing
charges in the contracts. The ability to affect potential disputants' behavior
by contract before a dispute arises is a significant advantage for the result-
ing dispute resolution mechanism over public legal systems' ex post scope
for inducing behavior changes.
Fourth, card-based payment systems' transformation of discrete trans-
actions into repeat interactions allows them to harness reputational effects
to make the system work. At the most basic level, all participants gain sub-
stantial benefits from the use of card-based payment systems. The potential
loss of these benefits motivates parties to (in most cases) comply with the
association rules. Thus consumers can lose their cards, merchants their
accounts, issuers and merchant acquirers their memberships in associations,
and associations their members. The threat of being excluded from future
mutually beneficial trades thus motivates participants to behave.
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11. DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
One of the interesting features of card-based systems is their ability to
reduce the universe of possible complaints to a limited, workable, and finite
number of dispute types. Cardholders might claim that the charge was not
authorized (e.g. "I did not buy a TV set from that merchant"), that the item
delivered does not meet the promised quality ("I bought the TV set but it
does not work as promised"), or that the item delivered is unsatisfactory for
other reasons ("When I got it home, I realized that the TV set is unattractive
in my living room and I do not want it."). The card-based payment sys-
tems' dispute resolution processes vary their procedures according to the
type of dispute. If the question is only whether the charge was authorized,
the factual issues are straightforward: was there an authorized use of the
card at the merchant in question? The merchant must demonstrate that it
has proof that an authorized use took place (e.g. a signed charge slip) and
that it complied with the payment mechanism provider's rules in authoriz-
ing the charge (e.g. that it sought authorization, verified the signature on the
card, etc.). If the merchant cannot prove the use was authorized (and the
exact proof will vary depending on whether the transaction was at a bricks
and mortar facility, online, or by telephone), the consumer is likely to pre-
vail. If the merchant can prove authorization and rule-compliance, the mer-
chant is likely to prevail. Our other examples of disputes require different
approaches to fact gathering. In the following section, we will explore the
process itself, various aspects of automation, the legal basis for the system,
fees and incentives, and resulting behavior of the players in the payment
system.
A. The Process and Supporting Systems
Most disputes are initiated by the consumer, once the consumer be-
comes aware of some difficulty with the transaction. Difficulties generally
arise in one of two circumstances: the receipt of the cardholder statement, 9'
or when the product or service fails to meet the consumer's expectations.
On the cardholder statement, a consumer may notice either that there is an
unauthorized charge or that the amount of a particular charge is incorrect.
Here the consumer is likely to complain directly to the financial institution
issuing his card. With a quality issue, at some point after purchase, the
product or service becomes defective (at least from the point of view of the
190 We are using the term "statement" in a very general sense. In today's electronic era, it is im-
portant to note that a consumer receives a statement from their financial institution through many differ-
ent mechanisms, including web based notification, mobile phone notification, paper statements, and on
screen display at ATMs, among others. Through any of these mechanisms, the consumer may realize
that there is a problem that needs resolution.
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consumer). If the consumer fails to secure an acceptable outcome from the
offending merchant, the consumer may escalate the process and complain
to the financial institution who issued the card. In both circumstances, the
consumer will initiate a dispute.
1. Initiating a Dispute
The consumer initiates a dispute by contacting either the merchant or
the financial institution that issued his or her card. 9' The consumer initiates
the formal process by contacting the financial institution that issued the
card. A customer service employee of that financial institution will catego-
rize the complaint with a code to indicate the reason that most closely re-
sembles the substance of the consumer complaint. Based on the code that is
selected, different steps in the resolution process and information may be
required. Some of these steps or provision of information will be required
prior to proceeding on to the next step. For example, if the consumer dis-
putes a charge because the cardholder either does not recognize the transac-
tion or denies that the transaction occurred, the consumer must notify the
issuer in writing that she is contesting the charge.'92 There are usually no
formal requirements for the format of the written charge contest; as long as
the consumer includes the information necessary to identify the charge in
question and makes the basis of the dispute clear, the issuer accepts the
written contest.'93 Not all disputes require a written letter complaint from
the consumer, however.'94
191 Of course, if contacted, the merchant may issue a full refund or partial refund to the consumer,
by submitting a credit transaction through to the payment mechanism, in the same way that the con-
sumer was initially charged. The merchant may also exchange defective merchandise for non-defective
merchandise. If, upon contact from the consumer, the merchant corrects the problem to the satisfaction
of the consumer, the dispute ends. There are no fees assessed by either the card issuer or merchant
acquirer to any other party for settled disputes. This part of the process may appear unrealistic to those
who believe banks have an inherent advantage over individual consumers or that the size of a particular
party renders any bargain with an individual unfair. However, as described below, the dispute resolu-
tion fee structures create significant financial incentives for the merchant to resolve the dispute with the
consumer directly, before the consumer complains to her financial institution.
192 If the consumer does not initially notify the issuer in writing (e.g. she calls the issuer rather than
writing the complaint) for certain types of disputes, the issuer notifies the consumer that she must put
the dispute in writing. An increasing variety of "writings" are acceptable, including web fill-in forms,
email, and the like.
193 The dispute resolutions by VISA and MasterCard do not address in great detail how the issuer
should interact with the consumer for dispute resolution. MasterCard does require a consumer com-
plaint in writing, but, indicates that an unedited email is acceptable. See MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK
GUIDE, supra note 111, 1-31 . For certain chargeback codes, MasterCard specifies that the consumer
complaint must make certain affirmations to be acceptable. One type of affirmation that may be re-
quired is that the cardholder engaged in the transaction. Another type of affirmation is that the con-
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2. Classifying a Dispute
All payment mechanism providers have their own unique dispute rea-
son codes and resolution requirements for each of these codes. MasterCard
uses approximately thirty reason codes to characterize the dispute;'95 VISA
uses approximately forty.'96 These reason codes are important to all parties
involved in any dispute because each code specifies any unique process
steps, the required information necessary to resolve the dispute, and, some-
times, the decision criteria for resolution. Failure to follow a particular
process step, failure to provide a specific piece of information, or failure to
act within prescribed timeframes all may result in permanently losing the
dispute on process (as opposed to substantive) grounds.
There are differences between systems.'97 For example, if a consumer
sumer first attempted to resolve the dispute with merchant. Not all affirmations are required for every
dispute. See id. at 3-6.
194 Some card issuers now accept web based complaints on card transactions. Indeed, the web
based card transaction complaint may substantially improve the accuracy of the complaint process.
Instead of searching for a transaction from a consumer written letter complaint, the consumer searches
and self-identifies the specific problematic transaction. Once the consumer identifies the specific trans-
action, the consumer next self selects the reason for the dispute from a web based drop-down box,
effectively classifying the dispute for the issuer. After selecting the reason, a customized web screen
with relevant fields may appear next. For example, a series of fields requesting confirmation that the
consumer has already attempted to resolve the dispute with the merchant with a blank date field and
contact name at the merchant, would only appear if the consumer had a product quality related dispute.
That series of fields would not appear if the consumer denied making the charge completely, because
such fields are both unnecessary and irrelevant. After all of the relevant information is collected, it is
electronically forwarded through the network to the merchant acquirer and onto the merchant, with no
initial human interaction, other than the consumer's completion of the dynamic web based forms. See,
e.g., American Express, http://www.americanexpress.com (last visited Feb.1 2005) (note: forms are
available only to cardholders who are actually disputing a charge). Consider how such dynamic forms
(that vary the information requested, depending on the dispute) prevent a consumer plaintiff from taking
two positions that are internally inconsistent or contradictory.
195 MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note I11.
196 VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME II, supra note Il1.
197 Depending on business strategy, some financial institutions who issue cards issue only one
brand, MasterCard or VISA. Given the many associations and alternative brands in the market, and the
control mechanisms for each, there are many business strategies that financial institutions elect to
maximize value from these associations. For example, a financial institution may elect to issue only
MasterCard cards. Such strategies are important to industry structure but do not impact the dispute
resolution function. As such, they are beyond the scope of this analysis. Those financial institutions
need not concern themselves with the differences among payment mechanism providers. Indeed, those
institutions who issue more than one brand must expend additional effort to understand some of the
subtleties underlying various reason codes. Unfortunately for financial institutions who acquire for
merchants, competitive pressures in most countries demand that acquirers handle multiple payment
mechanisms from multiple payment mechanism providers.
Typically, merchants demand that their financial institution support all payment choices they elect to
accept from consumers. Otherwise, that merchant would have multiple accounts at multiple financial
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contacts her financial institution complaining that a purchased product no
longer functions and the transaction was a VISA transaction,'98 the issuer
institution should classify the complaint with Reason Code 56, Defective
Merchandise.19 This reason code has a time limit of 120 days from the
transaction and certain process steps and information items are required, as
discussed below. If the consumer brought the same complaint, and the
transaction was a MasterCard transaction, the issuer should classify the
complaint as Reason Code 4853, Defective/Not as Described." As with
VISA, this MasterCard reason code has a time limit of 120 days, and cer-
tain specific process steps and information items are required, as discussed
below.
3. Gathering Information from the Cardholder
Once notified, the issuer conducts a preliminary investigation of the
contest. This preliminary investigation revolves around the process steps
and information gathering required by the classification of a consumer dis-
pute (into a particular reason code). In our example, if the product does not
function as the cardholder expected, MasterCard requires a written state-
ment from the cardholder. That written statement must: (1) indicate that the
cardholder did in fact engage in the transaction; (2) indicate that the card-
holder contacted the merchant to resolve the dispute and the merchant de-
clined to resolve the problem; (3) indicate that the cardholder returned or
institutions, and may have multiple sets of point of sale equipment (for each payment system). This
scenario imposes substantial additional overhead onto the merchant. For example, the total incoming
revenue would need to be reconciled with multiple bank accounts and reconciliation problems become
much more difficult to isolate to one particular payment system, For historical and sometime anti-trust
reasons, this scenario exists in some countries.
These multi-payment mechanism provider/brand acquirer financial institutions must understand the
requirements of all institutions for which they acquire transactions from merchants. Since most mer-
chants elect to accept cards from multiple payment mechanism providers, to successfully defend them-
selves these merchants must understand the rules for each payment mechanism. Misclassifying a dis-
pute can be costly to the issuer, both in terms of the fees that are passed back and forth, and more impor-
tantly, the issuer may lose the dispute because of the coding error.
198 A payment system will only handle dispute transactions associated with that payment system.
Therefore, a transaction that is internally routed where the Issuer financial institution is the same as the
Acquirer financial institution (on-us) is not eligible for dispute resolution by Visa, MasterCard, or any
other payment system. Likewise, transactions routed under a bi-lateral agreement between two financial
institutions are also ineligible for dispute resolution by the brand on the face of the card. See e.g., VISA
GENERAL RULES, VOLUME II, supra note I11, § 1.1 (defines Visa rules as uniformly governing disputes
for cards with the Visa brand, but indicates that the rules only apply to transactions made using the
brand).
199 Id. § 1-224, Reason Code 56.
200 MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 111, § 3-113, 3.19, Message Reason Code
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attempted to return the goods; (4) provide a description of the goods or ser-
vices disputed; (5) explain how the goods did not conform, specifically
stating if the goods were of a different quality, quantity, color, or size than
expected, or (6) whether the goods were damaged during the shipping proc-
ess; and, (7) provide any additional documentation that may be necessary to
resolve the dispute.2  VISA's requirements for its equivalent chargeback
reason code are substantially similar. 02
Since all customer service employees of a financial institution are not
likely to know or understand the requirements of every rule, the issuer may
have employed technology in their customer service system to explicitly
script these steps and information requirements for the customer service
agent.0 3 After the customer service agent classifies this dispute as a Defec-
tive Merchandise dispute, a series of questions will appear on the agent's
screen for the customer service agent to ask the consumer. These questions
will mirror the requirements of that particular reason code.2"
In this example, after the dispute is classified the issuer is likely to ask
the cardholder whether they have contacted the merchant. If the cardholder
has not yet contacted the merchant and the dispute is submitted for formal
resolution, the issuer and cardholder will lose this dispute.2 5 Therefore, the
issuer will advise the cardholder to contact the merchant first to resolve the
problem and, if and only if the merchant is not willing to resolve the prob-
lem, then open a formal chargeback to resolve this problem.
Assuming all of the requirements for this reason code are met using
the technology and expertise of the issuer's financial institution, the item
will be formally charged back to the merchant; we describe the chargeback
process below.
20 Id. § 3.19.
202 VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME II, supra note 111, § 1.
203 Interview with William Green, Manager, Chargebacks and Retrievals Processing, Electronic
Data Systems, in Westlake, Ohio (Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter, Interview, Green] (describing how EDS
implemented various work queues and scripts to simultaneously comply with both Visa and Master-
Card's rules, to maximize the likelihood that EDS' institutional customers would win the disputes, or at
least, minimize the number of lost disputes); see also Interview with Robert Sadeckas, Executive, Busi-
ness Process Management, Electronic Data Systems, in Westlake, Ohio (Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter,
Interview, Sadeckas] and Interview with Loretta Hui, Assistant Vice President, Claims and Adjust-
ments, Citishare Corporation, New York, N.Y. (Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter, Interview, Hui].
204 See Interview, Green, supra note 203; see also Interview Sadeckas, supra note 203, see also
Interview, Hui, supra note 203.
205 See, e.g., VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME II, supra note 111, at 417; MASTERCARD
CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra, note 111, §3.19.1, Message Reason Code 4853. See also, Interview,
Green, supra note 203; Interview, Sadeckas, supra note 203; Interview, Hui, supra note 203.
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4. Gathering Information from the Merchant: The Retrieval Request
Certain disputes require a retrieval request. A retrieval request is the
process the issuer may utilize to retrieve a copy of the transaction receipt
from a merchant or merchant acquirer.2" When the issuer initiates a re-
trieval request, the request is passed onto the association, which in turn
passes it onto the acquiring financial institution, which then either responds
on behalf of the merchant, or passes the request onto the merchant.
Since the receipt2 7 ultimately documents the payment obligation, the
issuer may initiate a retrieval request sua sponte for its own investigations
of fraud, rules violations, or as a result of a cardholder request or dispute.
To prevent abuse, the payment mechanism providers have imposed some
limits to retrieval requests. For example, VISA has prohibited requests for
original transaction receipts.20 8
Another limit on retrieval requests is the requirement that the issuer
provide certain minimum information elements to secure a retrieval request.
Some of these elements include a reference number, account number, trans-
action date, category code, transaction amount, and merchant location.2'
By requiring that the issuer supply this information for a retrieval request,
the payment mechanism provider curtails the sort of open-ended requests
that are common in the discovery portion of public dispute resolution. For
example, the structure of retrieval system makes it challenging for an issuer
to request copies of all charge authorizations during a particular period.
The issuer would need a great deal of information to make such a request,
some of which, it simply does not possess. This limitation on the "discov-
ery" permitted or enabled is an important factor in holding down the costs
of the process.
Chargeback rules may require retrieval requests for some disputes be-
cause of the nature of the dispute itself. For example, if an incoming trans-
action does not have enough information to process the transaction, an is-
suer may only chargeback this item after attempting to reconstruct the miss-
ing item, through a retrieval request." °
206 See MasterCard Dictionary, supra note 40, at 91.
207 We are using "receipt" very generally here. Historically speaking, merchants used to send their
card based payment system receipts into their financial institution for payment, as with pre-Check 21
drafts. Now, the receipt is primarily electronic and both the merchant and cardholder receive copies for
their own record keeping. Notwithstanding the improvements in back-office processing that eliminated
the need for merchant submission of most paper receipts, the rules still impose requirements on the
creation of a receipt. See, e.g., VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I, supra note 104, §4.2.J, (requiring that
a POS terminal must generate an Electronic Transaction Receipt).
208 See, e.g., VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME nI, supra note 111, § 1.2.B.2, Requests for Transac-
tion Receipt Originals.
209 See, e.g., VISA, GENERAL RULES, VOLUME II, supra note Il, § 1.2.D, Dispute Resolution
Rules, Retrieval Requests. See also, MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 111, at D- 1.
210 See MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note I l, Chargeback Code 4802.
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Other than the processing costs (see below), a retrieval request by it-
self does not have a monetary impact on any of the parties involved with
the payment. At this point, the consumer's account is not credited for the
amount of the transaction and the merchant's account is not debited for the
transaction amount.
In our example of a consumer complaining about defective merchan-
dise, no retrieval request is required by rules because the consumer is not
denying the transaction itself. Indeed, the chargeback rules about defective
merchandise require the consumer to affirmatively state that the cardholder
participated in the transaction. That affirmative statement eliminates reason
codes related to transactions that the consumer denies making altogether.21'
For retrieval requests, an acquirer may charge an issuer a fee based on
the timeliness of the acquirer's response. Rapid responses from the ac-
quirer are rewarded with larger fees. For example, an acquirer may charge
an issuer $8 for certain responses within five days of the issuer request and
$0 for responses that take more than 21 days.212 VISA's rule is even more
punitive to acquirers because if an acquirer does not meet the retrieval and
fulfillment standards, VISA will assess an increased transaction fee for all
future fulfillments. 2 3  Fees also vary depending upon the reason for the
request. If the retrieval request was required because the merchant informa-
tion was incorrect (i.e., the name of the merchant was different than the
actual name, the location was incorrect, etc.), the issuer may collect a
nominal punitive fee from the acquirer for misinformation. t 4
5. Charging a Transaction Back to the Merchant
Unlike a retrieval request, a chargeback transaction has a monetary
impact on the consumer, issuer, association or other payment mechanism
provider, acquirer, and merchant. Upon initiating a chargeback to the mer-
chant acquirer, the issuer temporarily removes the charge from the con-
sumer's account, stopping the accrual of interest and fees associated with
211 Consider how such affirmations prevent multiple contradictory positions that are permitted in
public dispute resolution forums.
212 MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 111, MasterCom fees, Retrieval Requests and
Fulfillments, 6-21.
213 See VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME II, supra note 111, §1.2.1, at 1-15.
214 See MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note I 11, Part I, §F, Message Code 7612 Re-
trieval Handling Fee; For Issuer Use to Penalize an Acquirer for Incorrect Information Verified by the
Retrieval Request Document; VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME II, supra note 111, §1.2.1.2.a at 1-15
("The Issuer may collect a [nominal] handling fee from the Acquirer... for a Retrieval Request result-
ing from a significantly different Merchant name or incorrect city, state, foreign country, or Transaction
Date in the Clearing Record.").
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the charge.215 Likewise, upon receipt of a chargeback, the acquirer financial
institution will debit the merchant's account, reduce incoming settlements
by the amount or hold the amount in a reserve account. The monetary im-
pact of the chargeback gives the merchant a strong incentive to resolve the
dispute quickly. Moreover, the ability of the issuer and merchant acquirer
to control the fund eliminates the need to worry about enforcing the deci-
sion.2"6 In addition, the issuer may collect a nominal handling fee from the
acquirer for each chargeback processed. This handling fee is in addition to
the amount of the transaction itself. The handling fee is designed to cover
the information gathering and complaint codification process. It also shifts
some of the handling costs to the merchant acquirer.
6. Representment
Based on its investigation, the merchant acquirer and merchant deter-
mine whether or not to accept the chargeback. If it accepts the chargeback,
the merchant acquirer removes the amount in question from the merchant's
account permanently. If the merchant acquirer rejects the chargeback, it
represents the charge to the issuer.
When the merchant submits a representment of a transaction, the mer-
chant must have a reason and the associated documentation required for
that reason code, to represent the transaction. The payment mechanism
providers have codified these reason codes. Fundamentally, the represent-
ment reason codes are grounded in the rules for any given chargeback. If
the issuer did not follow the chargeback rules or if the chargeback was sub-
stantively improper, the acquirer or the merchant may represent the item to
the issuer. In our example of a consumer complaint about defective mer-
chandise, the merchant may represent if the initial chargeback was unsub-
stantiated. In this case, an unsubstantiated chargeback would not include
the required written consumer letter or, if a letter was included, not contain
all of the required elements. The acquirer may collect a more significant
handling fee from the issuer for each representment processed. This fee is
designed to cover the research costs of the merchant acquirer and to shift
some of the response cost to the issuer. In this way, the issuer has an incen-
tive to make the complaint as accurate as possible when initially submitted.
215 The issuer may still reduce the cardholder's credit line for the amount, because until the tempo-
rary credit is permanent, the charge may be reinstated.
216 See Perritt, supra note 42, at 676 ("Many forms of ADR involve a readily available fund (usu-
ally the payment for the disputed transaction) as a way of satisfying a decision for either disputant. The
availability of the fund often is underestimated as a consideration. This consideration may explain why
intermediary-provided dispute resolution, such as credit card chargebacks and escrow arrangements,
prove more attractive in practice than independent third-party mechanisms such as arbitration or media-
tion. The successful party to an arbitration must still be concerned about the enforceability of an arbitra-
tion award against a reluctant loser.").
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7. Acceptance or Rejection of Representment and Further Charge-
back Rights
The issuer then decides whether or not to accept the representment. If
it accepts the representment, the issuer releases the funds back to the ac-
quirer bank. If rejected, this stage of the process ends. The issuer may then
repost the amount in question to the consumer's account or decide to pay
the charge itself, depending on the facts of the case and the value of the
consumer's relationship with the issuer. The issuer may also collect a han-
dling fee in addition to any fees previously assessed to the issuer by the
acquirer if the issuer elects to chargeback and escalate to arbitration, as
discussed below. In this way, the acquirer has an incentive not to represent
items that are likely to be escalated to arbitration.
8. Association Arbitration and Mediation
If the issuer does not accept the representment, the issuer may appeal
to the association. This is the first point in the process involving a neutral
decision maker. Analysis of the substance of the dispute begins and ends
with the underlying merchant-consumer transaction. When a consumer
purchases goods or services from a merchant, using a card, that transaction
is governed by any explicit or implicit contract between the consumer and
merchant, including the implicit or explicit warranty and the warranty's
limitations.
If a dispute is appealed, the association investigates and makes a de-
termination. The investigation is typically limited to the materials provided
by each member to the other member during the earlier stages of the dispute
resolution process. Indeed, MasterCard's rules explicitly state that it will
discard any materials submitted outside of the normal retrieval, chargeback,
representment, and arbitration processes.2"7
In the arbitration process, the associations are not limited to awarding
the amount in contest; the association may fine either or both parties for any
errors it uncovers in the course of the investigation and may investigate rule
violations related to the transaction regardless of their connection with the
merits of the dispute.2"'
The party which loses the appeal to the association can then appeal
once more within the association based on claimed errors in interpreting the
rules. The loser can also make an equity-based claim (i.e., "It isn't fair that
217 See MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 111, §4.4, at 4-5.
218 In any circumstance where a member financial institution believes that another member finan-
cial institution is out of compliance regarding a particular transaction or set of transactions, that member
institution may bring a compliance case against the other member even without a dispute.
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I lost") against the other financial institution outside the formal process.
The winner has complete discretion over whether to grant such a claim. 219
In the association arbitration processes, the appeals follow the English
rule, with the loser paying the costs of the appeal process. The associations
typically charge a significant filing fee 20 and an even more significant ad-
ministrative fee to the member found responsible for the case.22' In addi-
tion, the association may assess fees for technical violations during the dis-
pute resolution process regardless of whether the member won or lost the
dispute. Such technical fee violations include persisting with an invalid
chargeback; submitting an invalid representment; submitting invalid docu-
mentation; and processing a chargeback beyond the permitted time limits. 222
B. Incentives
An issuer bears the primary costs of consumer behavior, at least for
those consumers that are that financial institution's customers. Therefore,
the issuer will question the consumer early in the process to ensure that the
dispute is legitimate and that the required documentation is available prior
to submitting a dispute. If the dispute appears legitimate, and the consumer
is a profitable consumer, to avoid the fees the issuer may simply remove the
charge from the consumer's statement, without actually charging back the
amount in question.
With the narrow exception of civil rights laws,223 there is no legal re-
quirement that an issuer serve all people without regard to cost or profitabil-
ity of that consumer. Therefore, an issuer has several options with consum-
ers who are costly to service. The issuer may impose higher fees, including
higher annual fees, late fees, and higher interest rates to expensive consum-
ers. The issuer may elect not to renew a consumer account or the issuer
may terminate an existing account.24  Given the financial incentives de-
219 Statistics for such scenarios are not available. However, evidence exists that winners occasion-
ally grant internal reviews of such disputes. See Interview, Hui, supra note 203. The mere fact that
such a review possibility exists and is sometimes granted without any force whatsoever, is evidence of a
process where the potential for and the value of repeat interactions is quite significant. In Hui's view,
"it is important to be standing on principle in any decision, and to be sure that the other [financial insti-
tution] believes it, even if the result is unfavorable to that party." Id.
220 See MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 111, §4.5, Fees and Assessments, at 4-6.
221 id.
222 See, e.g., VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME II, supra note I 11,§ 2, at 3.G.4.c ("Visa, USA as-
sesses the following fees to the responsible Member ... [significant] penalty fee for each technical
violation of the VISA U.S.A. Inc. Operating Regulations.").
223 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B are two examples of such laws. See gen-
erally, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 1691 (2005); see generally, 12 C.F.R. §§202.1 -
202.17 (2005).
224 Although cardholder initiated disputes are currently not reported to the credit bureaus, the fact
that an account was closed by the issuer is reported and recorded by the credit bureaus. Other unrelated
2005]
JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY
scribed above, as a consumer submits disputes for resolution, that consumer
becomes less profitable.
Likewise, merchant acquirers bear the costs associated with merchants
with chargebacks. If an acquirer receives a chargeback, and the merchant is
a highly profitable merchant, the acquirer may simply accept the charge-
back and not deduct the amount from the merchant's account. The acquirer
may take this action as an act of goodwill.
Merchants with more disputes are more expensive to service and high
dispute rates also indicate that there may be other problems with that mer-
chant. An acquirer financial institution may elect to substantially increase
the discount rate for its merchant customers who receive too many disputes.
Merchants with particularly high rates of chargebacks may be eliminated
from the payment system altogether. Merchants who commit fraud225 can
be permanently banished by the acquirer financial institution with either or
both VISA and MasterCard through the maintenance of a terminated mer-
chant file. Both associations require all merchant acquirers to check the
terminated merchant file prior to opening a merchant account.226 This file
acts as a substantial deterrent for those merchants and their owners who
elect to deliberately defraud the payment system.
IV. COMPETITION, REGULATION, & THE EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEMS
As we discussed above, we contend that two of the crucial elements
that make the card-based payment systems' dispute resolution systems suc-
cessful are their ability to transform single-instance transactions (e.g. poten-
tial disputes) into repeat-play transactions, through the insertion of the as-
sociation, issuer and merchant acquirer into the consumer-merchant trans-
lenders are likely to ask a borrower why the issuer closed their account. This information sharing cre-
ates further incentives to prevent abuse of the chargeback system.
225 There are numerous merchant frauds that are likely to result in global permanent banishment
from a particular payment system. One such fraud is the acceptance and submission of transactions
from known stolen cards, and splitting of the proceeds with the criminals who pilfered the card. This
fraud works (in the short term) because not all stolen cards are known at the time of the card theft and
not all consumers complain about small transactions. Therefore, merchants who are caught colluding
with criminals to submit false transactions to collect the proceeds, may be permanently banished from
accepting cards. Another such fraud is the deliberate acceptance of cards and non-shipment of goods.
Merchants who commit this kind of fraud withdraw the incoming deposits and disappear. Eventually,
cardholders may charge these purchases back to the merchant, but, there will be no merchant left to
accept the chargebacks. Therefore, the merchant acquirer is responsible for this fraud and will likely
permanently banish the owners of that merchant from future participation in the payment system. Often,
these frauds initially appear in the chargebacks process.
226 MasterCard Bylaws, supra note 112, § 9.5.2.4 at 9-6 (requiring acquirers to report merchants to
association); VISA GENERAL RULES, VOLUME I, supra note 104, §4, at 2.D.I.b ("An Acquirer must:
query the terminated merchant file to determine if the prospective Merchant has been terminated for
cause .... ).
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action, thereby harnessing reputational incentives and imposing ex ante
constraints on potential disputants' behavior through requiring structured
behavior by participants to the transactions. Neither feature was an inten-
tionally designed characteristic of the payment systems. Both characteris-
tics evolved in response to market pressures during the multiple attempts at
constructing card businesses by banks and other financial institutions in the
1950s.
In addition to the market pressures, card-based payment systems have
been affected by regulatory pressures. While we believe, as we argue be-
low, that these regulatory pressures have not been determinative of the suc-
cess of the card-based payment systems' dispute resolution systems, we
briefly describe the major regulatory events and analyze their influence as
well.
A. The Creation of Card-Based Payment Systems
Hotels, oil companies and department stores all began to issue cards to
their customers before World War I, but these systems were limited to spe-
cific merchants rather than general purpose systems. 27 The first major step
in the creation of the modem card-based payment systems was the begin-
ning of networks in 1948 when a group of New York City department
stores banded together to make their cards interchangeable across mer-
chants.22 Card-based payment systems did not become widespread until
the development of the Diners Club (1950) and American Express (1958)
charge cards in the 1950s. 29 Other companies also attempted to create gen-
eral purpose cards during the 1950s but all but these two failed.23° Diners
Club initially targeted wealthy residents of Manhattan for use at restau-
rants.23' The companies' value proposition to prospective customers was
227 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 61.
228 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 62.
229 See GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 262-263 (describing start of Diners Club); id. at 280-285
(describing start of American Express card). Although American Express did not produce a card until
1958, the company considered the idea as early as July 1946 but rejected it because of fear it would
compete with the travelers' check market. Id. at 264-266. Later the company rejected moving into the
market because it saw Diners Club and other early card companies as "shlock" operations. Id. at 265-
266. When it finally decided to enter the market, American Express initially considered buying Diners
Club. Id. at 274.
230 EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 63.
231 See GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 262 (Diners Club initially intended as "a universal restaurant
card that would be accepted at all major New York restaurants."); EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note
1, at 84 (describing early industry as targeting "selected Manhattan gourmets"); id. at 85 ("Credit cards
have led the way in taking a product that was originally targeted to well-off restaurant goers in Manhat-
tan and making it available to the masses.").
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that the cards freed the customer from carrying cash,232 provided thirty day
payment terms, 3 and gave the prestige of membership in an elite group of
card-holders. 2' For merchants (Diners Club targeted primarily restaurants
at first but soon expanded to "florists, gourmet shops, motel chains," and
Hertz rental cars), 35 the companies would automatically deposit the charged
funds in the merchants' accounts, freeing them from handling incoming
cash, and also handle collections from card-holders.236 In particular, Diners
Club and American Express assumed the risk that cardholders would not
pay their monthly bills. If a cardholder did not pay, the restaurant retained
the payment from the card issuer.
By 1957, Diners Club had almost 500,000 cardholders and charge vol-
ume of $7 million per month.237 When American Express entered the mar-
ket in 1957, it purchased the American Hotel Association and Gourmet
magazine's charge cards, giving it 190,000 cardholders before it even began
operations.23 s  Applications brought in another 60,000 cardholders by the
first day.239 The company had more than 17,500 establishments committed
to accept the card by the first day as well, helped by the company's pres-
tige.2' The card grew quickly, reaching 900,000 cardholders and 82,000
merchants in 1962.241' Both cards were sufficiently valued by consumers
that the companies were able to charge an annual membership fee.242 They
were also valued by businesses, allowing the card companies to charge a
"discount fee" of a percentage of the transaction.243  Diners Club initially
232 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 94 ("By reducing the need for cash balances,
payment cards provide a potentially enormous benefit to consumers."); GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at
262 (Diners Club was founded when Frank McNamara "had just finished a meal at a restaurant when he
realized to his dismay that he could not pay the check."); EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 212
("Simply put, payment cards are much easier to carry around and use than are most of the other payment
methods.").
233 See GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 262 ("In the card, club members had blank-check, interest-
free charge privileges and a notable convenience.").
234 Id. at 262.
235 Id. at 263.
236 Id. at 262.
237 Id. at 274.
238 Id. at 283.
239 GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 284.
240 Id. at 285.
241 FRIEDMAN & MEEHAN, supra note 95, at 59.
242 GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 263.
243 "Transaction" is a term of art in the payment system industry. It refers to the individual ex-
change that occurs when a consumer utilizes a payment mechanism to transfer value to a merchant (e.g.
when a consumer swipes their credit or debit card through a merchant's terminal). We use the term in
this paper as it is used in the industry rather than to mean a deal (e.g. acquisition of one company by
another), as lawyers and investment bankers often do. See also, MASTERCARD DICTIONARY 104-106
(for thirteen different definitions of various types of transactions or items related to the core concept of a
transaction).
[VOL. 1:2
PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CARD CONTEXT
charged a 7 percent merchant discount; more recently typical merchant dis-
count rates ranged from 1.6 percent for Discover to 2.75 percent for Ameri-
can Express.2" (Diners Club is now co-branded MasterCard,2" and there-
fore, the discount rate has fallen to the MasterCard levels.)
In effect, the early payment cards were simply the extension of the
type of credit provision made possible in industries selling physical inven-
tory by factoring to the consumer-restaurant transaction. As we described
earlier, in a factoring transaction a financial intermediary provides a busi-
ness with credit secured by the business's inventory, while that inventory is
being sold to customers.2' Factoring required, however, a relatively con-
stant level of inventory of durable assets to secure the credit and costly
physical monitoring 247 to ensure the merchant kept the required level of
inventory. Providing credit on this model to a restaurant would not, of
course, be possible because the restaurant's "inventory" is the accounts
receivable from individual diner's consumption of food. Without physical,
durable assets, restaurants lacked the collateral to obtain loans based on
value.
Diners Club changed that. When Diners Club handled a consumer
purchase of a meal in a restaurant, Diners Club paid the restaurant the bill
for the charged meal (less the discount) before Diners Club received its
payment from the consumer. When Diners Club issued the card to the con-
sumer, it selected only people it thought most likely to be able to ultimately
pay the bill, although its initial credit screening was quite crude.24 Diners
Club then essentially offered the restaurant financing for those portions of
the receivables charged to the card, monetizing the cardholders' promises to
pay in the future for the meal they had already eaten. Thus not only were
consumers able to buy meals on credit, but the restaurant was able to fi-
nance its receivables.
As this brief account makes clear, the credit card business was not cre-
ated to harness reputation or to structure transactions to reduce the fre-
quency of disputes. It was created, like most businesses, in the hopes of
making money by offering a service. Nonetheless, the nature of the busi-
244 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 129.
245 Diners Club and MasterCard announced a relationship where Diners Club cards would become
co-branded MasterCard. See http://www.dinersclubnewsroom.com/view-release.cfm?id=183 (April 29,
2005) and http://www.dinersclubnewsroom.com/view_release.cfm?id=199 (September 20, 2005). In
effect, the Diners Club card is effectively a MasterCard. When the card is presented to a merchant, that
card is treated as a MasterCard, with the discount rates applicable to MasterCards.
246 See note 73 supra.
247 There are also problems associated with merchants who secure more than one loan on the same
inventory, particularly because of historic information gaps associated with collateral. These informa-
tion gaps disappear with financing based on a specific consumer transaction.
248 GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 263 (noting that initial list of prospects was simply a mailing list
of 5,000 sales managers).
2005]
JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY
ness produced problems that led the industry to develop measures which
introduced reputation and structure.
The new charge cards quickly developed problems. Abuse and fraud
were major risks, large enough that many early observers did not believe
Diners Club could survive.249 Because of the lack of real-time connections
between the merchants and Diners Club and American Express, there was
no way to immediately stop a card's use if a cardholder began to abuse it.5
American Express lost $4 million on the charge card operation in its first
two years of operation, largely because of a lack of credit screening of pro-
spective cardholders.25t Indeed, by 1960 losses had reached $10 million
and senior executives were not convinced that the card would survive.252
At the same time as Diners Club and American Express were creating
their closed networks, banks were also attempting to enter the credit card
market. In 1951 Franklin Bank in New York expanded the market by creat-
ing an applicant screening process that allowed it to issue revolving cards
outside the narrow demographic relied on by American Express and Diners
Club. 253 Franklin began by simply sending cards to prospective cardholders
without credit screening.254 Eventually, Franklin developed a profile of
249 id.
250 Id. ("[Miany people doubted that the company would survive [due to credit risk] ... A large
number of card abuses would bankrupt the Diners' Club.")
251 Id. at 286 ("The company had done a poor job in evaluating credit risks, which was understand-
able since it had no experience with handing out blank-check credit, or any credit for that matter.")
Screening card holders remained an issue for issuers into the 1970s. As Chutkow's history of VISA
notes, "many banks issued cards indiscriminately, and not only to their own customers. Some banks
bought mailing lists and issued cards to everyone on them, without any credit analysis or screening.
Mass mailings led to massive thefts, often directly from mailboxes, and that led to massive fraud."
CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 154.
252 GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 299. Starting a new card operation remains expensive. Dean
Witter "incurred substantial initial losses as it spent money prospecting for customers and building
merchant acceptance" but ultimately became profitable. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 281.
To cope with the losses, American Express raised its fees from $6 to $10 a year and increased the mer-
chant discount rate. The losses stopped, and by 1967 card volume reached $1.1 billion, the number of
cardholders reached 2 million, and the card earned American Express $6.5 million in profits.
GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 303. This problem continued to plague card issuers, with Citibank losing
more than $500 million over three years after it introduced a national marketing campaign for its credit
cards and American Express experiencing twice the industry average uncollectible debts with its Optima
card. See FRIEDMAN & MEEHAN, supra note 95, at 65; see Rob Wells, American Express Chief Brings
Stability to Card Giant, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, at D7 [1993 WLNR 1149106].
253 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 59-60.
254 AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 4. Banks issuing early credit cards had several problems. First, in
many cases they issued cards without prescreening the cardholders for creditworthiness. AURIEMMA,
supra note 5, at 9 ("The most aggressive banks sent cards to deposit customers, loan customers, safe
deposit customers, and any other customers whose addresses they could obtain. Many banks bought
mailing lists consisting of names from magazine subscriptions, driver's license registrations, and the
like. Not surprisingly, some of the individuals who were issued cards did not manage the credit well.").
Second, even when they did screen, banks sometimes used inappropriate criteria. Id. ("Some banks
[VOL. 1:2
PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CARD CONTEXT
customers it believed likely to pay and vastly expanded the number of peo-
ple with access to a card-based payment system.255 Franklin's card, how-
ever, was useful only in the New York metropolitan area.256
Banks across the country began to issue proprietary cards.257 By 1953
there were nearly 100 banks issuing proprietary credit cards in Manhattan
alone. 8 While the markets for these cards were geographically limited
(e.g. a New York bank's card was accepted only by merchants in the New
York area, and a San Francisco bank's card was accepted only in the San
Francisco area) there was intense competition among banks within each
geographic region.259
The proliferation of cards led to complications on the merchant side,
however, since each bank had to individually create a relationship with each
merchant to allow the merchant to accept its card. Merchants were reluc-
tant to accept additional cards unless there was a substantial base of con-
sumers with that bank's proprietary card.2" To get the necessary cardholder
base, banks offered successively more generous terms and features to card-
holders.
The transactions costs of the proliferation of cards for merchants were
substantial, since each proprietary card required a separate contract, bank
account, and processing with the issuing bank. Within a few years many of
the banks exited the market because they lacked sufficient cardholder
and/or merchant bases to profitably operate proprietary card systems.26" ' By
1960, the boom was over but a competitive market in proprietary cards with
were inexperienced with extending unsecured credit-especially revolving credit associated with a
credit card. The credit approval criteria that had served banks well when making installment loans, such
as automobile or home loans, proved to be inadequate for extending credit through cards.") Similar
problems arose when banks began converting ATM cards into debit cards. See BALTO, supra note 63, at
1102 ("A large part of the [fraud] problem arises when offline debit cards are issued in an unsolicited
manner. Banks often reissue their online ATM cards as a VISA check card which can be used as either
an ATM or an offline debit card.").
255 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 60 (describing credit screening).
256 Steve Rhode, The History of Credit and Debt, http://www.myvesta.org/history/history
_creditcard.htm (last visited May 31, 2005).
257 EvANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 63.
258 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 60 ("By 1955, about 100 banks were operating card programs...
Most of these bank cards were usable only in a small local area, and few generated enough transaction
volume to be profitable."); AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 4 ("Franklin National Bank's credit card pro-
gram was copied by hundreds of other banks in the late 1950s and early 1960s.").
259 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note i, at 63-64 (describing competitive environment that
saw banks losing large amounts of money competing in the new business).
260 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 86, at 887 ("payment cards were useful to consumers
only if they were accepted by many merchants, and they were useful to merchants only if they were
carried and used by many consumers").
261 EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 63-64 ("By 1962, many bank payment card plans had
fled the field, including Chase Manhattan's.").
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local merchant bases existed throughout the country in most major metro-
politan areas.262
The proprietary era thus had two critical weaknesses. First, the trans-
actions costs of merchant-bank relationships were high because of the need
for individual contracts with each issuer. The individual nature of the mer-
chant-bank relationships also reduced the scope for banks to impose struc-
ture on the credit card transactions, as merchants would not be willing to
follow different procedures for each card they accepted. Second, the issuer-
consumer relationship lacked sufficient reputational guarantees. Banks had
selected cardholders based on little more than the magazines the cardhold-
ers subscribed to; unsurprisingly, the cardholders had "defected" from the
deal by not paying their bills in a timely way.
B. The Rise of Associations
In the mid-1960s two crucial innovations developed that took opposite
approaches to solving the problems created by the regional-based proprie-
tary cards. In California, Bank of America had the most extensive set of
relationships with merchants, allowing its cardholders to use their Bank of
America credit card at the widest range of merchants in California.263 Real-
izing that this set of relationships with merchants had value to other banks
as well, and that it had one of the few profitable bank card operations, in
1966 Bank of America decided to license access to its merchant portfolio to
banks from other states, creating "BankAmericard." 264 Within two years,
forty-one banks were issuing BankAmericards and another 1,823 banks
were signing up merchants or issuing cards as licensees of the forty-one.265
Bank of America limited the fraud problem by giving each card a credit
limit ($300 for "simple" cards and $500 for preferred customers) and re-
quiring merchants to call in for authorization for transactions over that
amount. 64
Banks who licensed the merchant portfolio from Bank of America
physically added the BankAmericard logo to their credit cards, in addition
to maintaining their own name on the card.2 67 Thus, for example, a con-
sumer in Nevada would have a First National Bank of Reno card which was
also a BankAmericard. The franchise model had serious problems, with
franchisees losing hundreds of millions of dollars in the first years.268 Later
262 EVANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 64.
263 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 64.
264 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 69-70 (describing how Bank of America decided to license the use
of the system to other banks).
265 Id. at 70.
266 Id. at 64.
267 EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 65.
268 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 92.
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Bank of America spun off the card network as National BankAmericard
Inc. ("NBr') in 1970269 (which became VISA in 1976)270 because the fran-
chise model was unworkable.27" ' The following year, the newly independent
network had $3.7 billion in charges, up from $2.7 billion the year before.272
Bank of America charged the licensing banks a variety of fees. Not
only did it charge licensees for the use of its trademark, it introduced a con-
cept it called "Interchange" which was a fee for each transaction at a Bank
of America merchant.273 The development of the interchange was critical to
making the open network function.274 Merchant acquirers cannot predict in
advance which issuer's cards will be used at their merchants, requiring
them to either negotiate ex ante a price for the obligation generated by the
underlying transaction with every issuer in the network or to negotiate ex
post once the issuer was identified. Of course, in an ex post negotiation the
merchant acquirer would be in a difficult bargaining position since the only
buyer available would be the cardholder's issuer.275 Alternatively, the mer-
chant or merchant's bank could negotiate bilateral agreements with every
other bank in the system. If, for the sake of argument, there are 15,000
participating financial institutions, and the merchant desired 100% cover-
age, that would translate to numerous individually negotiated contracts.2 76
By setting a system-wide pricing and negotiating structure for the obliga-
tions, the networks solve this coordination problem inexpensively, both in
terms of the upfront setup and the ongoing maintenance.
At about the same time, banks in other areas began to form associa-
tions that truly shared the merchant portfolios.277 For example in 1965, the
Midwest Bank Card Association was formed by four Chicago banks,278 in
1966 Interbank was formed by fourteen eastern banks,279 and the Western
States Bank Card Association ("WSBCA") was formed by four big Califor-
269 Id. at 92-109 (describing spin-off).
270 Id. at 159-160 (describing name change).
271 EVANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 157.
272 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 117.
273 The interchange fee compensates the issuer bank "for the 'free' period between settlement, or
payment, to the acquirer (the merchant bank) for cardholder purchases and billing to cardholders."
Olsen, supra note 156, at 17.
274 Evans, supra note 81, at 375-76 ("Members of cooperative systems such as MasterCard and
VISA compete for cardholders and merchants. Absent coordination there is no way for these members
to determine pricing structure and thereby internalize the indirect network externalities created by mer-
chants for cardholders and vice versa. A centrally set interchange fee enables the cooperatives to estab-
lish a pricing structure.") (citations omitted).
275 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 86, at 889-90.
276 To be specific, under the assumption of 15,000 financial institutions and a target of 100%
coverage, there would be 15000! (factorial) individual contracts.
277 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 65-66.
278 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 70.
279 Id. at 70.
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nia banks. By the end of the 1960s the WSBCA became MasterCharge.280
In the 1970s, the regional associations began to merge into larger, more
national and even international associations.
281
The association approach differed from Bank of America's approach
in that, rather than licensing an asset to another bank, members in the asso-
ciation contributed assets (e.g. access to their merchant and consumer port-
folios) to the association, receiving back reciprocal access to the other
members' merchant portfolios. There were also similarities. The associa-
tions implemented fee structures for transactions out of a bank's card port-
folio in another member bank's merchant portfolio that paralleled Bank of
America's charges for the use of Bank of America's merchant portfolio.
One major change in the association structure came in 1976 when anti-
trust regulators forced a change in both associations' rules that prohibited
members from participating in both. 2  With those rules withdrawn, many
banks joined both associations.2 3 Today VISA and MasterCard are both
owned by many of the same banks, although the percentage share each
bank has in the two networks may vary. Despite this overlap in ownership,
the networks are extremely competitive. 2' Today the competition is largely
on the card issuer side, with a few banks and non-banks dominating the
merchant acquirer business. 5 In the 1990s, non-banks began to enter the
credit card issuer market. Companies like AT&T, General Motors and oth-
ers created co-branded cards through partners and financial subsidiaries.2 6
Although the major event of the 1970s was the rise of the two national
associations, MasterCard and VISA, proprietary networks continued to
thrive as well. Not only did Diners Club and American Express expand out
of their original market niches among the Manhattan elites, 287 other proprie-
tary networks (e.g. gasoline and department store cards) also grew.8 In-
280 Id. According to Robert D. Manning, the Western States Bank Card Association, the Interbank
Card Association, and the Midwest Bank Card Association were all specifically formed as a response to
Bank of America's licensing of BankAmericard. And, later, Western States Bank Card Association
became MasterCharge. See ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICA'S ADDICTION TO CREDIT 84 (2000).
281 WSBCA first licensed its know-how to Europay in Europe, ultimately merging with it in the
1970s. See CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 224-27 (on rise of Visa International).
282 EvANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 69-70 ("Faced with an ambivalent Antitrust Division
[of the Department of Justice] and the possibility of expensive litigation, Visa removed all restrictions
on dual membership in mid-1976.").
283 Olsen, supra note 156, at 19 ("Duality has eliminated most of the profits from the merchant
business" due to competition.).
284 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 70-71 ("Considerable competition" between net-
works explained).
285 Olsen, supra note 156, at 19.
286 Cynthia R. Whiteman, Marketing, in AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, THE BANK CREDIT
CARD BUSINESS 38, 39 (2d ed. 1996).
287 EvANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 85.
288 Id. at 85-94.
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deed, new closed networks have regularly appeared since then, the largest
and most widely recognized of which was the creation of Discover by
Sears, Roebuck & Co. in 1985. s9
By the 1970s, the proprietary bank card world of the 1950s and 1960s
was transformed. VISA and MasterCard's innovations in both business
model and technology had reduced transactions costs to a fraction of Diners
Club's and American Express's initial charges, association networks linked
merchants and consumers, association rules governed virtually every aspect
of transactions, and advances in credit reporting began to make it possible
for issuers to track the reputation of their customers. Issuers and merchant
acquirers competed for business by cutting costs and innovating to improve
the quality of their products.
C. The Modern Era
Since the 1970s, the evolution of card-based payment systems has in-
creased in pace. Important security features, which reduce fraud, and fea-
tures which reduce errors and speed processing appeared during the
1970s,29 including the introduction of the magnetic strip on the back of the
card in the 1970s,29' which facilitates swiping the card through an electronic
mechanism, reducing errors in transactions and increasing security. New
anti-fraud technology continued to appear, such as the addition of the CVV
and CVV2 numbers in the 1990s. 2 2 Holograms on cards were introduced
in 1983, making it harder to counterfeit.293 Tamper resistant signature pan-
els on the back of cards were introduced in 1989.294
Perhaps the two most important technological developments were the
appearance of PIN-based debit cards in the 1980s295 and the shift to elec-
tronic processing in the mid-1970s 6.2 " As noted earlier, debit cards operate
on a single message system, combining the authorization and settlement
289 Id. at 281.
290 See CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 153-54 (describing development of computer systems to reduce
fraud losses).
291 See Jim Collins, Hidden Identity, AfrACH9 (June 2004), available at http://
www.attachemag.com/archives/06-04/informed/infosl.htm (describing history of magnetic strip).
292 These numbers are created by proprietary formulas by issuers; the association rles in open
associations specify how complex the formulas must be.
293 CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 183.
294 MasterCard, History of Firsts, http://www.mastercardintemational.comcorpomte/history
firsts.html (last visited April 23, 2005).
295 EvANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 297-302 (describing growth of the debit card).
296 VISA introduced electronic processing in 1973 and American Express and MasterCard soon
followed. CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 158-159. See also EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 176
("[Plerhaps the most important series of innovations that have taken place over time have involved
improvements in processing transactions.").
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messages into a single transaction.297 Electronic processing made card
based systems less like check processing and allowed innovations such as
the introduction of real time authorization and rule-based systems for de-
tecting potential fraud.298
One key aspect of many of the innovations in the industry is that they
reduce fraud. The burden of fraud had been contractually shifted to the
merchants by the merchant acquirers. Indeed, since the financial institu-
tions write the rules, they have every incentive to shift losses to others. Yet
card-based payment systems continue to innovate to reduce losses that no
party to the association contract bears. Moreover, the industry continues to
be highly competitive,299 with competition regularly appearing in new areas
and in driving new technologies. For example, the associations make use of
financial incentives to encourage the adoption of new technologies, with
interchange fees varying with the merchant's authorization mechanism (e.g.
POS terminal, allowing rapid settlement, or paper)."r Moreover, while the
1990s saw a great deal of consolidation among financial institutions"° and
technical services companies' operating networks,'2 it also saw the rise of
independent sales organizations (ISO). Historically the ISOs acted as sales
arms of merchant acquirers, going door to door from merchant to merchant
297 See supra notes 136-137.
298 For example, the Falcon system, originally developed by HNC from technology utilized to
recognize friendly tanks on the battlefield, compares authorization requests against the prior use pattern
for that specific card holder. Thus if a card holder has not traveled internationally in the past ten years
use of her card overseas is more likely to trigger a real-time hold or a post transaction alert (depending
on the fraud and risk control policies of the issuer) than if she has frequently traveled outside her home
country in the past. If the card holder has never made a major jewelry purchase, then a request for
authorization for a significant purchase at a jeweler's is more likely to trigger a real-time hold or a post
transaction alert than if the cardholder frequently purchases jewelry. See http://www.fairissac.com (for
a description of Falcon; HNC was purchased by Fair Issac.). See also CHUTKOW, supra note 4, at 188-
89 (describing VisaNet's similar system). By comparison, prior to the development of electronic verifi-
cation,
"authorizations involved checking an account number against numbers listed on a merchant
warning bulletin. Putting a number on a merchant warning bulletin could take several weeks.
And even after the listing, so long as the delinquent customer kept he amount of purchase be-
low the floor limit, the merchant had no way of knowing that the cardholder's charge privi-
leges had been suspended. Delinquent borrowers could make numerous purchases of this na-
ture before the account appeared on the bulletin."
AURIEMMA, supra note 5, at 10.
299 The modern era is also marked by fierce competition among networks. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN &
MEEHAN, supra note 95, at 110-111 (describing American Express's competition with VISA and
MasterCard in the 1980s); id. at 253-54 (describing competition for merchants with VISA and Master-
Card, especially the 1991 restaurant "revolt" in Boston).
300 Olsen, supra note 156, at 17.
301 See Simon Kwan, Banking Consolidation, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER, June 18, 2004, available
at http://www.frbsf.orglpublicationseconomicsletterl2004/1l2OO4-15.pdf.
302 First Data, for example, has an impressive market share and continues to expand. See Olga
Kharif, Why First Data Is Ready to Roll, Bus. WK., Jan. 5, 2004, available at http://yahoo
.businessweek.comlbwdaily/dnflash/jan2004/nf2004015_7492_dbOI4.htm.
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convincing the merchants to sign contracts with the merchant acquirer the
ISO represented. More recently, however, ISOs used their relationships
with merchants to persuade merchants to accept ISO-owned ATM ma-
chines in the merchant's facilities. These ATM machines route their trans-
actions through a merchant acquirer via a contract between the ISO and the
merchant acquirer.3"3 The ISOs have thus introduced a new form of compe-
tition. Similarly, the growth of firms such as First Data provides the asso-
ciations with potential competition across networks.3" Network competi-
tion suggests the continuation of substantial differences in services across
the networks.3 5
D. Competition-Driven Evolution
At some points in time, the evolution of card-based payment systems
appears to be the paradigmatic story of an industry evolving into oligopoly.
A fiercely competitive market of individual small players competes itself to
the point of bankruptcy, consolidates into a few major players (the associa-
tions, American Express), and then imposes detailed rules on the entire
industry. Just another "dog bites man," or, rather, a "capitalist bites con-
sumer" tale--one of many told in the legal academy.
Closer examination reveals the dominance of competition at virtually
every turn. Competition drives MasterCard and VISA, despite the common
ownership of the two networks. Competition drives individual banks
within both associations. Competition drives American Express to chal-
lenge VISA and MasterCard and vice versa. Competition drives First Data
to build a network that could challenge the associations. We think it is fair
to conclude, therefore, that the card-based payment systems market has as
its primary characteristic competition. This competition is aimed at making
money. To make money, the various players in the industry have harnessed
reputational capital and technology to reduce losses. As a byproduct of this
effort they have created a dispute resolution system that offers important
advantages over public court systems.
303 The merchant acquirer must be a bank and a member of the network through which the ISO
wishes to route the transactions.
304 See supra notes 142-50.
305 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 151 ("When network externalities are important,
multiple networks that do not interconnect can survive only if they are offering consumers substantially
different services. In the case of payment cards, multiple networks exist in part because these networks
offer consumers and merchants somewhat different products.").
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E. Regulation-Driven Evolution
In this section, we review the interrelationship among the private dis-
pute resolution system and some of the impacts of federal regulation of
lending. In 1968, Congress passed the Consumer Protection Act; 6 the
components most relevant for this analysis are the sections that are now
referred to as the Truth-In-Lending Act (TILA). This act attempted to pro-
tect consumers by providing more transparent and clear disclosure of terms
and conditions associated with lending transactions." 7 (Its success in
achieving this is open to question.) Over the years, this act has been
amended to expand the protections beyond the disclosure of key terms,
rates, and fees.3"8 Using the regulatory authority granted to it by the TILA,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System adopted Regulation
Z.31' Both the TILA provisions and corresponding Regulation Z provisions
directly regulate some aspects of card-based payment systems' dispute
resolution systems.31 Three provisions are particularly relevant.
First, the TILA and Regulation Z limit the liability of the holder of a
credit card to $50 for unauthorized charges."' Capped liability thus fre-
306 Truth-In-Lending Act, Pub. L. 90-321, May 29, 1968 [hereinafter, TILA] 15 USC 1601 et seq.
307 Financial institutions complied with the extensive disclosure requirements by providing the
mandatory notices and explanations. Consumers and even lawyers have not reacted well to these exten-
sive disclosures mandated by the act. Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Warren, a noted expert on
contract law, claimed on public television that "I have read my credit card agreement, and I can't figure
out the terms. I teach contract law. And, the underlying premise of contract law is that the two parties
to the contract understand what the terms are." See Frontline: Secret History of the Credit Card, Chap-
ter Three, "Credit Reporting Agencies / Traps in the Fine Print", (PBS television broadcast Jan. 2005),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/shows/credit/view. A discussion of whether the extensive disclosure
requirements of this act should be repealed to enable better and clearer contracts is beyond the scope of
this analysis on dispute resolution. See Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of
Consumer Finance, 4 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 168, 193-95 (2002) (analyzing TILA provisions).
308 In 1974, protections were added for inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card prac-
tices. Pub. L. 93-495, Oct. 28, 1974. In 1980, the act was reorganized and some requirements were
eliminated. Pub. L. 96-221, Mar. 31, 1980. Further changes that are beyond the scope of this analysis
were made in the decades that followed. See Pub. L. 104-12, Mar. 19, 1995 (changes to class action
suits under this act). See also Pub. L. 104-29, Sept. 30, 1995.
309 See 12 C.F.R. 226 (known in the industry as Regulation Z or sometimes Reg Z).
310 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2005) Liability of the holder of a Credit Card; 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2005)
Correction of Billing Errors; and 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (2005) Assertion by cardholder against card issuer
of claims and defenses. Within Reg Z, these key sections are implemented through, respectively: Liabil-
ity of cardholder for unauthorized use (12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)); Billing Error Resolution (12 C.F.R. §
226.13); and Right of Cardholder to assert claims and defenses against the Issuer (12 C.F.R. §
226.12(c)).
311 15 U.S.C. § 1643 ( "A cardholder shall be liable for the unauthorized use of a credit card only
if-(A) the card is an accepted credit card; (B) the liability is not in excess of $ 50; (C) the card issuer
gives adequate notice to the cardholder of the potential liability; (D) the card issuer has provided the
cardholder with a description of a means by which the card issuer may be notified of loss or theft of the
card .... "); ("(b) Liability of cardholder for unauthorized use-(l) Limitation on amount. The liability
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quently turns on what is actually authorized by the cardholder.312 The
courts have largely interpreted this to put absolute responsibility on the
issuer to know and understand its consumer's intent, and therefore, if there
is a question about authorization, the issuer has generally been held li-
able.3 13
As a result, issuers implemented rules, processes, and technologies to
enable them to prove that the cardholder authorized the transaction. For
example, to comply with the notification method component of the statute,
issuers placed a "Lost/Stolen" telephone number on the reverse side of
every card. To ensure that the end consumer actually physically received a
card, when issuing and mailing out new credit cards, issuers implemented
card activation technologies that required the recipient to take steps to
prove to the issuer that the card had been received by the intended recipi-
ent.314 In addition, sometimes the issuer will contact the cardholder after the
first purchase using a new card, to ensure that the intended consumer actu-
ally made that purchase.
Later, if and when a consumer initiates a dispute with the complaint
that a charge was not authorized, these processes and technologies can ei-
ther support or refute the consumer's claim with additional information.
For example, in the initiation of the dispute, if the consumer claims that she
never received the card, the issuer will check the activation records. If that
card was activated from the cardholder's phone number, the issuer knows
of a cardholder for unauthorized use of a credit card shall not exceed the lesser of $50 or the amount of
money, property, labor, or services obtained by the unauthorized use before notification to the card
issuer under paragraph (b)(3) of this section.") Reg Z defines "unauthorized use" as "the use of a credit
card by a person, other than the cardholder, who does not have actual, implied, or apparent authority for
such use, and from which the cardholder receives no benefit." 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)).
312 See Universal Bank v. McCafferty, 88 Ohio App.3d 556 (1993), 624 N.E.2d 358 (McCafferty
not liable on friend's charges when issuer sent card to friend at McCafferty's request because McCaf-
ferty did not authorize friend's use of the card). The sentence construction of the act starts with the
declarative statement "the cardholder shall be liable for unauthorized use of a credit card only if" and
then provides a laundry list of requirements. The laundry list utilizes the conjunctive "and" between
each of the provisions to indicate when a consumer is actually liable for an authorized charge. Arguably
therefore, if any of the items on the laundry list fail to be true, then AND the charge is unauthorized, the
cardholder cannot be held liable. Therefore, liability typically turns on authorization.
313 See discussion supra note 312.
314 The service works because a card mailed to a consumer is not "live" in the sense that the card
cannot be utilized to make purchases until the consumer activates it through an activation process of-
fered by the issuer financial institution. Although not foolproof, this activation service employs various
technologies to ensure that the person receiving the card, did in fact receive the card. For example, most
card activation systems require the consumer to dial a toll-free 800 style number and answer a few
questions with a computer known as an Interactive Voice Response Unit. Questions may request the
consumer's social security number, birth date, and other information that is not generally known. This
computer also utilizes the Automated Number Identification service to collect secondary information
from the phone company. Automated Number Identification is roughly equivalent to Caller Id. The
incoming telephone number from the Card Activation Call is then matched and cross referenced to the
telephone number on the card application and to the name the phone company has on record.
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that someone in the household activated the card, perhaps even the card-
holder." 5 And, if the issuer has held a previous conversation with the con-
sumer about her first purchase, it will be much more difficult for the con-
sumer to claim they never received the card.
A second important regulatory measure is the requirement that issuers
correct billing errors." 6 Simply stated, this provision requires the card is-
suer to credit the consumer cardholder's account and investigate the prob-
lem when it receives a complaint about a billing error. If the consumer
validates that the charge is actually correct, the correction process is undone
and the charge is reinstated onto the consumer's account. The statute uses
an expansive definition of billing error, including many types of claims
beyond accounting and mathematical errors in the definition.3"7
315 Although possible, it is highly unlikely that a card thief would break into a house solely to
complete the card activation from the actual consumer's home phone number.
316 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2005) (Written notice by obligor to creditor; time for and contents of notice;
procedure upon receipt of notice by creditor: "[I]f a creditor, within sixty days after having transmitted
to an obligor a statement of the obligor's account in connection with an extension of consumer credit,
receives . . . a written notice ... from the obligor in which the obligor- (1) sets forth or otherwise
enables the creditor to identify the name and account number (if any) of the obligor, (2) indicates the
obligor's belief that the statement contains a billing error and the amount of such billing error, and (3)
sets forth the reasons for the obligor's belief ... the creditor shall, unless the obligor has, after giving
such written notice and before the expiration of the time limits herein specified, agreed that the state-
ment was correct- (A) not later than thirty days after the receipt of the notice, send a written acknowl-
edgment thereof to the obligor, unless the action required in subparagraph (B) is taken within such
thirty-day period, and (B) not later than two complete billing cycles of the creditor (in no event later
than ninety days) after the receipt of the notice and prior to taking any action to collect the amount, or
any part thereof, indicated by the obligor under paragraph (2) either- (i) make appropriate corrections
in the account of the obligor, including the crediting of any finance charges on amounts erroneously
billed, and transmit to the obligor a notification of such corrections and the creditor's explanation of any
change in the amount indicated by the obligor under paragraph (2) and, if any such change is made and
the obligor so requests, copies of documentary evidence of the obligor's indebtedness; or (ii) send a
written explanation or clarification to the obligor, after having conducted an investigation, setting forth
to the extent applicable the reasons why the creditor believes the account of the obligor was correctly
shown in the statement and, upon request of the obligor, provide copies of documentary evidence of the
obligor's indebtedness.") See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.13.
317 15 U.S.C. § 1666 ("For the purpose of this section, a "billing error" consists of any of the fol-
lowing: (1) A reflection on a statement of an extension of credit which was not made to the obligor or, if
made, was not in the amount reflected on such statement. (2) A reflection on a statement of an extension
of credit for which the obligor requests additional clarification including documentary evidence thereof.
(3) A reflection on a statement of goods or services not accepted by the obligor or his designee or not
delivered to the obligor or his designee in accordance with the agreement made at the time of a transac-
tion. (4) The creditor's failure to reflect properly on a statement a payment made by the obligor or a
credit issued to the obligor. (5) A computation error or similar error of an accounting nature of the
creditor on a statement. (6) Failure to transmit the statement.., to the last address of the obligor which
has been disclosed to the creditor, unless that address was furnished less than twenty days before the end
of the billing cycle for which the statement is required. (7) Any other error described in regulations of
the Board.").
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So, in the dispute resolution process, the issuer will classify a con-
sumer dispute that is brought"' under this section of the TILA and Regula-
tion Z according to the association rules. As described earlier, each dispute
classification will initiate specific process steps and information gathering
needs. With the exception of non-delivery of goods or the statement itself,
the TILA requirements affect disputes which require the sales receipt from
the merchant. A billing error ultimately leads to either a consumer who
denies making or simply does not recognize the charge, or to a dispute in
which the amount is incorrect."9 Therefore, a retrieval request, as described
earlier, is initiated to provide the information necessary to resolve these
classes of disputes.32 Under the TILA provisions, consumers are time lim-
ited to raising billing error disputes to sixty days from the statement mailing
date.32" ' TILA also bars issuers from assessing interest or penalties on dis-
putes or reporting the disputes to credit bureaus until the dispute resolution
process is completed.
The third important TILA impact comes from its provisions permitting
cardholders to assert claims and defenses against card issuer provisions. 22
318 Of course, a consumer is unlikely to indicate that they are making a claim under the Billing
Errors section of the Truth in Lending Act. Rather, that consumer will simply call the issuer and com-
plain that the charges are incorrect. The issuer will classify the complaint.
319 Sometimes the "tip" amount at restaurants is incorrect. Therefore, the consumer recognizes the
restaurant charge, but does not recognize the total amount, as accurate.
320 Of course, if the merchant does not respond to the retrieval request, the merchant may ulti-
mately lose a chargeback dispute and the credit to the consumer's account will become permanent. If
the retrieval request produces a receipt that the consumer recognizes and accepts as legitimate, the
charge is reinstated onto the account and the process ends. Or, the remainder of the dispute resolution
process is followed, as described above.
321 Given the timing of any particular card charge item and the printing of the statement, the con-
sumer probably has closer to ninety days from the date of the actual charge to complain about an error.
322 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (2005) ("(a) Claims and defenses assertable. Subject to the limitation con-
tained in subsection (b), a card issuer who has issued a credit card to a cardholder pursuant to an open
end consumer credit plan shall be subject to all claims (other than tort claims) and defenses arising out
of any transaction in which the credit card is used as a method of payment or extension of credit if (1)
the obligor has made a good faith attempt to obtain satisfactory resolution of a disagreement or problem
relative to the transaction from the person honoring the credit card; (2) the amount of the initial transac-
tion exceeds $ 50; and (3) the place where the initial transaction occurred was in the same State as the
mailing address previously provided by the cardholder or was within 100 miles from such address,
except that the limitations set forth in clauses (2) and (3) with respect to an obligor's right to assert
claims and defenses against a card issuer shall not be applicable to any transaction in which the person
honoring the credit card ... (E) has obtained the order for such transaction through a mail solicitation
made by or participated in by the card issuer in which the cardholder is solicited to enter into such
transaction by using the credit card issued by the card issuer. (b) Amount of claims and defenses assert-
able. The amount of claims for defenses asserted by the cardholder may not exceed the amount of credit
outstanding with respect to such transaction at the time the cardholder first notifies the card issuer or the
person honoring the credit card of such claim or defense.") See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (2005). Note
that the implementing regulations specifically exclude debit cards and similar non-credit cards. Al-
though the statute is based on the extension of credit, the question of what is a credit card is left unan-
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The statute and regulations provide that a cardholder may assert a claim or
defense on the underlying transaction to the issuer, if that cardholder has
first made a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute with the merchant.
Note that the assertion of a claim or defense on the underlying transaction is
mutually exclusive with authorization or billing error disputes, described
above. So, in asserting a claim or defense, the consumer is admitting that
the transaction occurred, and that the consumer authorized that transaction.
The net effect of TILA and Regulation Z is to shift responsibility asso-
ciated with the payment system away from the consumer toward the finan-
cial institution that issues that card. Ultimately, however, the issuer does
not actually bear the costs associated with these disputes. By contract and
rule, losses associated with disputes that the cardholder wins are shifted to
the acquirer and ultimately to the merchant, and thence to the consumer
through higher prices.323
Federal regulation, through TILA and Regulation Z, has had an impact
on card-based payment systems' dispute resolution mechanisms. The regu-
latory provisions described above provided reasons for the development of
particular provisions in those dispute resolution systems. We are uncon-
vinced, however, that either TILA or Regulation Z deserves more than
minimal credit for the success of the card-based payment systems' dispute
resolution procedures.324 Regulation mandated a limit on consumer card
losses, provided incentives for some minor card features (e.g. the 800 "lost
or stolen" number on the back), and required some procedure to assert de-
fenses against charges.
It is far from clear, however, that these provisions (or something like
them) would not have been adopted in response to competitive pressures.
As we described earlier, the early credit cards were particularly vulnerable
to fraudulent use, as issuers exercised little to no control over the credit
worthiness of cardholders and made indiscriminate mailings of cards.
Fraud prevention measures resulted in the first instance from the financial
losses experienced by issuers as a result of fraud. Moreover, since consum-
swered. There is a legitimate argument that a debit card would fit into the credit focus of the statute
because there are temporary extensions of credit granted in the payment process of moving money
through the chain of participants from a consumer, through a debit card issuer, an association, a debit
card acquirer, and ultimately to a merchant's settlement account.
323 Of course, if the dispute resolution processes that the associations have implemented lead to an
accurate result, the merchant would have had to pay these damages anyway except that the consumer
would have had to resort to formal public legal means, including lawyers' fees and potentially punitive
damages.
324 Much of the legal literature seems to accept that Regulation Z is responsible for the success of
the dispute resolution system. See, e.g., Jane K. Winn, Making XML Pay: Revising Existing Electronic
Payments Law to Accommodate Innovation, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 1477, 1491-92 (2000) ("Regulation Z
provides not merely a billing error resolution procedure and protection from liability for unauthorized
use of the credit card, but it also provides a simple and effective alternative dispute resolution process in
the event the consumer is unhappy with the transaction itself.").
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ers had to be persuaded initially to adopt credit cards as a means of payment
and since competing payment systems were less vulnerable to fraud (e.g.
checks, cash), adoption of dispute resolution provisions and antifraud
measures generally (although not any particular provision) would have been
compelled by market pressures. 2 ' Finally, the major card networks have
extended provision of dispute resolution procedures internationally, well
beyond the reach of Regulation Z.326  Similarly, domestic debit card net-
works and issuers have generally provided equivalent dispute resolution
procedures, despite the inapplicability of Regulation Z, to protect their
brand names.327 We conclude, therefore, that TILA and Regulation Z had
some impact on the shaping of the dispute resolution systems associated
with card-based payment systems, but the regulatory impact was less im-
portant than the impact of competition.
V. CONCLUSION
We opened this paper by proposing a "radical rethinking of dispute
resolution" based on card-based payment systems' dispute resolution pro-
cedures. Those who have read this far (without skipping!) would undoubt-
edly like to know what that radical rethinking is.
Card-based payment systems' procedures for resolving disputes look
nothing like the procedures used by the public legal system. In place of
lawyers, judges, and juries, card-based payment systems use clerical em-
ployees, simple processes, and technology. In place of notice pleading,
they use something that more closely resembles the old common law forms
of action than anything else we have encountered in the modern world. In
place of liberal discovery rules, they use restrictive rules providing for lim-
ited discovery. In place of clever lawyering, they use structured, semi-
automated interviews. Despite all these differences, card-based payment
systems' dispute resolution systems do not seem to be sparking any signifi-
325 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 1, at 324 ("Payment cards have not flourished just because
they provide a convenient alternative to cash and checks. Over time, entrepreneurs have discovered that
they can integrate other products and services into payment cards and thereby make these cards more
valuable for consumers and merchants.").
326 See, e.g., FI'C filings by VISA and American Express quoted in Perritt, supra note 42, at 690,
n.70 (quoting VISA Senior Vice President that "The chargeback reasons permitted under VISA's rules
for international transactions have been adopted to enable issuers of VISA cards to address the funda-
mental consumer concerns of their cardholders, and incidentally to reinforce the reputation of VISA
Cards as the best way to pay" and quoting American Express Group Counsel that ""[wihile U.S. law
requires us to institute these practices, as a card issuer, we have adopted a policy of applying them
consistently outside the U.S. as well.").
327 See Balto, supra note 63, at 1104-05 (describing voluntary steps by VISA and MasterCard;
although Mr. Balto does not see these steps as sufficient and calls for regulation, we disagree with his
assessment.).
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cant consumer or merchant revolts. Either the systems do not harm con-
sumers or merchants, or any harm they cause is overwhelmed by the bene-
fits of the system.3 2 There is, therefore, some evidence that consumers and
merchants alike accept this sort of system.
Is it better? The systems we describe above handle a high volume of
disputes (generally low value disputes, to be sure) and handle them quickly
and cheaply. For at least some classes of disputes, therefore, we think this
type of system is clearly better, so long as we define "better" as "cheaper."
While we are sensitive to the traditional claims that the legal system serves
a higher function of justice, fairness, and consistency, rather than to simply
cheaply resolve disputes among private parties, we are also skeptical about
the frequency with which that argument is used to justify what appears to
be rent-seeking by those with an interest in the current public legal system
(lawyers, legislatures, judges, etc.)329
We think the card-based payment systems model is better in ways
other than being simply cheaper. In particular, the model provided by card-
based payment systems is better for disputes which arise from the strategic
behavior of one or more of the parties. Such behavior is rampant in the
public legal system because of the structure of the litigation process. 330
Because these systems incorporate information about disputes generally, as
well as about specific parties, they are better able to identify and correct
strategic behavior by disputants. Moreover, because the card-based pay-
ment systems can change the rules governing the use of the cards, card is-
suers can learn from present disputes how to avoid future disputes and im-
plement new rules which prevent such disputes from arising in the future.
One of the reasons the card-based payment systems' dispute resolution
systems succeed may initially appear counter-intuitive for law professors
(at least it did for the ones who coauthored this piece). By simplifying dis-
putes into categories and then applying managerial expertise to ruthlessly
drive down costs, these dispute resolution systems not only do not use law-
yers, they have no room for them. As Professor Hadfield notes, "Brilliant
328 If the dispute resolution systems did harm either consumers or merchants but left net benefits
positive, presumably competitive pressures would push some card to offer superior dispute resolution.
Dean Perritt reaches a similar conclusion from his observation of disputes: "Although good empirical
data is lacking, it appears that the system satisfies both consumers and merchants. Almost no reported
cases in the regular courts exist, suggesting that consumers rarely are motivated to go beyond the
chargeback process to more formal forms of dispute resolution." Perritt, supra note 42, at 691.
329 Astoundingly, one article referred to the American Bar Association as "one of the few neutral,
non-stakeholding but nongovernmental or intergovernmental entities" involved in dispute resolution,
despite acknowledging that "a portion of its members are obviously interested in the provision of ADR
services and therefore have some vested interest." Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing Legal Services for the
Middle Class in Cyberspace: The Promise and Challenge of On-Line Dispute Resolution, 70 FORDHAM
L. REv. 985, 1005 (2001).
330 Hadfield, supra note 11, at 972 ("The process of litigation is a series of strategic moves and
countermoves: sophisticated moves require even more sophisticated responses.").
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lawyering is the art of drawing out and then persuading others of the sali-
ency of distinctions and similarities that were not previously recognized."33'
The essence of the dispute resolution systems described here, however, is
that they reject the introduction of "distinctions and similarities" not em-
bedded in the rules. In short, if there is no code for a dispute, there is no
dispute. 32 If there is a code, everything from the acceptable evidence to the
time limits for the process are dictated by the code. The code is applied not
by a highly trained lawyer, but by a clerk. We think this is critical to reduc-
ing the costs of dispute resolution.333 Moreover, card-based systems' reli-
ance on simple procedures eliminates an important cost to complexity: the
difficulty of explaining complex systems to consumers.33' Professor Had-
field raises an important point about such solutions. After identifying com-
plexity as a key problem in the public legal system,335 she notes that while
reducing complexity is a natural area for improvements, doing so raises
"deep philosophical and practical questions which all come down to this: is
legal reasoning, as we know it, what law and justice is?"336 We are not sure
that it is. After talking with many participants in the dispute resolution sys-
tem of card-based payment systems, both on and off the record, we do not
see injustice in its often inflexible rules. In other words, adding lawyers to
the process would not obviously lead to an improvement in any dimension.
The card-based payment systems' dispute resolution processes de-
scribed here do not meet the traditional public legal system-oriented defini-
tion of due process.337 For example, Judge Henry J. Friendly defined eleven
331 Id. at 966.
332 In a sense, we are echoing the "most significant principle to emerge from the academic study of
law on the Internet ... the ideas that software code... is broadly substitutable for legal code... Code is
law; architecture is control; software is power." R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L.
REv. 457,459 (2005).
333 Prof. Hadfield notes that "the hours required to resolve a legal matter are not fixed by abstract
and immutable principles ofjustice. They are determined by the procedures and reasoning requirements
established and implemented by members of the profession (lawyers and judges and legislators) in an
antagonistic, interactive process." Hadfield, supra note 11, at 965. It is by the use of forms and proce-
dures that the card-based payment systems are able to control the dynamic to complicate disputes that
Hadfield observes in the public legal system.
334 This simplification is a significant concern of "consumer advocates" in their critiques of alter-
native dispute resolution systems. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 6, at 480 ("Many consumer advocates
voice one central, underlying concern. At what point does the imposition of a private dispute-resolution
requirement place too big a burden on the average consumer. That is, when is the sophistication and
savvy of the average Internet user not enough to level the playing field.").
335 Hadfield, supra note 11, at 995 ("The complexity of legal reasoning and process is fundamental
to the entire market. It is the source of direct cost, as we have seen. But more importantly it plays a
central role in a host of indirect distortions.").
336 Id. at 1002.
337 For example, Prof. Gibbons is critical of arbitration in the consumer context because it is 'un-
fair': limited discovery, lack of a jury trial or a right to appeal, repeat-player advantages in selecting
arbitrators, no class relief, and excessive fees unfairly disadvantage individuals bringing claims." Gib-
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elements of procedural due process as: (1) an unbiased decision maker; (2)
notice and a statement of the reasons for the initial action that causes the
dispute; (3) an opportunity to present reasons why the action should not be
taken; (4) an opportunity to present evidence, including witnesses; (5) the
right to know opposing evidence; (6) the right to cross-examine opposing
witnesses; (7) limiting the decision to the evidence in the record; (8) the
right to be represented by counsel; (9) a record of evidence prepared by the
decision maker; (10) the decision maker gives reasons for the decision; and
(11) the availability of appellate review.338 Some have argued that these
elements should also apply, at least in part, to non-judicial forms of dispute
resolution.339
Many of Friendly's eleven elements do not apply to the card-based
payment systems' dispute resolution processes. There is no right to coun-
sel, no opportunity to cross-examine opposing witnesses, no right to know
opposing evidence, no record available to the parties, and no written deci-
sion given to parties stating reasons for the decision. Moreover, it is at least
arguable that the decision maker is insufficiently neutral to qualify in
Friendly's definition, or that either the record or the internal appeals process
would satisfy his definitions. At most, therefore, six of his eleven criteria
are satisfied and possibly as few as four. Rather than forming a basis for
condemning the card-based payment systems, we suggest that these differ-
ences should prompt a radical rethinking of the value of traditional due
process in dispute resolution. In the case of card-based payment systems'
dispute resolution procedures, we conclude that the incentives provided by
competition serve as an effective substitute for formal procedural due proc-
ess structures.
Another criticism of card-based systems is that consumers lack infor-
mation or the incentive to bargain with card issuers, making government
regulation necessary to even the playing field.40 We contend that such ar-
guments fail to grasp the power of competition to induce fair outcomes. In
the case of card-based payment systems, the competitive pressures on card
issuers, the introduction of merchant acquirers as repeat players, and net-
works' role provide incentives for card issuers to treat cardholders fairly
without requiring cardholders to invest in knowledge about the details of
bons, supra note 49, at 15. See also Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business:
Recommendations for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for B2C Online
Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 441 (2002) (describing an elaborate set of principles proposed
by the American Arbitration Association's National Consumer Disputes Advisory Council, few of
which are met by the card-based systems).
338 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-95 (1975).
339 See Perritt, supra note 42, at 679-83.
340 See, e.g., Effross, supra note 62, at 376 ("given consumers' lack of incentive or knowledge to
bargain, and likely reluctance to litigate, especially where their adversaries would tend to be sophisti-
cated financial institutions and the amount at issue relatively small, federal regulation is warranted.")
(citations omitted).
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the system. Demanding that such systems replicate the institutions of the
public legal system only ensures that they cannot innovate and so will have
the same general failings and successes as the public system.
Consider for example the idea of an unbiased decision maker. In the
public legal system this is ensured by providing the judiciary with inde-
pendence. 4 In card-based systems it is provided by the competitive pres-
sures on the networks by other networks. For example, if a network treats a
merchant acquirer or issuer unfairly on a regular basis, that entity will
switch its allegiance generally, or a greater share of its transactions, to a
competing network and issuers and merchant acquirers who treat cardhold-
ers or merchants unfairly will lose market share to competitors.
Lawyers have generally been able to maintain control of alternatives to
the public legal system because most alternatives depend upon the public
legal system to enforce their decisions.42 Card-based systems show that
this need not be true where the dispute resolution mechanism is part of a
good or service desired independently. Merchants and consumers (usually)
accept the results of the dispute resolution process because they want to
continue to participate in the payment system. Instances in which either
seek redress in the courts are relatively rare, (admittedly a judgment largely
based on the infrequency of reported opinions, given the number of cards,
merchants, and cardholders). Moreover, the card-based payment system
actors (issuers, acquirers, networks, card companies) profit by using their
dispute resolution procedures to lure customers to their networks. 3
The strength of the card-based payment system lies in competition's
incentives to develop better, more accurate, cheaper, and faster processes
and its ability to harness reputation and learn from experience. Neither
characteristic is a feature of the public legal system. We therefore contend
that expanding those characteristics would likely lead to better dispute reso-
lution processes for disputes currently in the public legal system.
How can this type of dispute resolution system be expanded beyond
the card context? Wherever repeat players analogous to the associations
and proprietary networks exist in a competitive environment, there is poten-
tial for extending these systems. Ironically, some of the easiest may be in
341 Daniel Klerman and Paul Mahoney provide a concise definition of independence: "A fully
independent judiciary is one in which judges enjoy tenure during good behavior, a salary sufficient to
shield them from pressure from either government or private parties, sufficient prestige that the hope of
promotion to a more prominent post is not a large motivator, a system of prerequisites (location and
appointments of offices, etc.) that is hard for the government to manipulate, and rules regarding jurisdic-
tion over cases that are resistant to executive and legislative meddling, among others." Daniel M. Kler-
man and Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England,
Am. L & Econ Rev. (forthcoming) (available at http://ssm.com/abstract=587383).
342 Hadfield, supra note 11, at 994.
343 See Gibbons, supra note 5050, at 3 ("American Express®, Visa, MasterCard®, Discover®,
JCB®, and other credit card issuers are arbitraging the risk [of e-commerce] by being the dispute reso-
lution mechanism of last resort for most B2C e-commerce transactions.").
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the context of what we traditionally view as interactions between strangers.
Automobile accidents, for example, generally occur between parties who
have already contracted with insurance companies. 41 Treaties between
insurance companies could institute dispute resolution processes with char-
acteristics like those of the card-based payment systems. Medical insur-
ance, if it could be freed from the employer linkage created by the tax de-
ductibility of insurance premiums, offers another potential vehicle for ex-
tending the model.
For these reasons, we advocate radically rethinking assumptions sur-
rounding dispute resolution.
344 Today, when a car hits a pedestrian, both parties may not be insured. If, however, systems of
dispute resolution develop (as described in this section), a strong incentive for pedestrians to insure
themselves may develop, so that pedestrians too, would be able to reap the benefits of such a radical
efficiency orientation.
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